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Chapter 1
Structured nance, acquisitions
and debt agency
Gabriel H. Neukomm1
Abstract
Modern corporations use complex debt instruments and pursue acquisitions. In order to analyze the
properties of some of these contracts in the event of an acquisition, this paper considers a company
that has an incumbent capital structure, comprising one of ve practically important structured debt
contracts. An opportunity for an acquisition comes along that was not ex-ante contractible. The
equityholder decides on the nancing of this expansion by trading o tax advantages of debt against
costs of bankruptcy. The model yields a number of insights for structured debt and acquisitions, four of
which are as follows: First, a seniority clause oers the bondholder protection from agency, but it also
decreases the equityholder's incentives to nance the acquisition. Second, embedded call options are
valuable even if interest rates are constant, because they allow the equityholder to issue a new bond at
fair value. Third, bankruptcy remoteness is valuable, if assets are very risky. Fourth, convertible bonds
are vulnerable to agency and the conversion option bears the same incentive problem as a seniority
clause. These properties explains, for example, the otherwise puzzling practice of companies buying out
convertible bond holders prior to an acquisition.
JEL Classication Numbers: G24, G32, G34
Keywords: Capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, structured nance
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1.1 Introduction
Earlier literature about capital structure and investments, Modigliani and Miller (1958) for the
nancing side or McDonald and Siegel (1986) for the investment side, suggested that the invest-
ment decision may be disconnected from the nancing decision as the Fisher Separation Theorem
suggests. However, a number of papers like Gomes and Schmid (2010) have pointed out that
in the presence of frictions, the investment decision and the nancing decision of an individual
rm, have to be evaluated jointly. It is already mentioned in the original Modigliani and Miller
(1958) paper that: These [ ... ] drastic simplications have been necessary in order to come to
grips with the problem. Having served their purpose they can now be relaxed in the direction of
greater realism and relevance, a take which we hope others interested in this area will wish to
share.
In an insightful paper Leland (1998) laid the foundations for what is since known, as the
structural model for capital structure. He analyzed the agency conict between bondholders and
equityholder over the operational as well as over the nancial risk policy of a corporation. An
interesting stream of literature on debt agency has evolved over time, analyzing nancing and
investment decisions jointly, usually under a capital structure that contains straight debt and eq-
uity. Mauer and Sarkar (2005) extended the theory toward nancing real options and elaborated
on the conict of interests between the same pair of agents. Sundaresan and Wang (2008) on
a theoretical level and Hennessy and Whited (2005) on an empirical level, added some insights
about leverage ratios, implying lower leverage ratios for non-mature companies.
Most of the literature on nancing real options address the question of the optimal capital
structure and the value added or lost due to an acquisition only for the most basic form of debt
- a straight bond. This stands in conict with the large industry and volume of structured debt
contracts. This market experienced a set back due to the late 2000s nancial crisis. But in Q2
2010 emission volumes of structured debt contracts are - a least according to press reports - re-
covering.2 A small number of papers have analyzed dierent forms of debt contracts, but mostly
with respect to other issues than acquisitions and debt agency. Childs et al. (2005) showed that
nancial exibility achieved by shorter debt maturity has an overwhelmingly positive eect on
the agency conict between the equityholder and the bondholder. In Leland (1998), the same
thing was found to be inecient. Hackbarth et al. (2008) analyze the consequences of using
bank debt as opposed to public debt on leverage ratios and the choice of seniority. Martellini
2See e.g. "Bank of America Said to Market 300 Million CLO for Tetragon", by Pierre Paulden, Bloomberg,
Jul 19, 2010 or in general on the subject "Bringing back CLOs", by Vipal Monga, The Deal Magazine, November
27, 2009.
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and Milhau (2009) look at the choice of xed vs. oating rate debt, but within an asset and
liability management perspective. Hennessy and Tserlukevich (2008) consider convertible and
callable bonds within a Leland (1998)-model. This is however a model of risk switching instead
of investmenting and there are no unexpected actions.
In a second insightful paper, Leland (2007) analyzes the nancial synergies that asset secu-
ritization may provide. He starts with the observation, that issuer of asset backed securities use
rather abstract terms when explaining the value added of securitization, such as the claim that it
unlocks hidden asset value. The paper analyzes how nancial benets of a merger depend upon
asset volatility as well as on the correlation between incumbent assets and new assets. In that
paper however, there are no diverging interests between the bondholders and the equityholder
and thus no room for agency conicts.
In the present paper, I analyze the value added, potential agency gains/losses and potential
welfare loss associated with ve distinct structured debt contracts in the event of an unexpected
corporate acquisition. In a two-period trade o model of capital structure, this paper sets to
answer the following questions:
1. How do bondholders and equityholders gain or lose on grounds of an unexpected acquisition
given an incumbent structured debt contract? Who is it that incurs losses or realizes gains?
2. How is the direction as well as the order of magnitude of these value shift inuenced by
risk, bankruptcy costs and taxes?
3. What part of these gains or losses are associated to agency?
4. How relevant is the welfare loss associated with agency?
5. What forms of structured debt contracts observed in practice shield against agency costs?
What forms favor agency costs?
6. What is a good debt contract if unexpected acquisitions are potentially an issue.
The setup in this paper in some sense includes an incomplete contract on restructuring, since
it is assumed that further capital structure adjustments are not contractible ex ante. Any kind
of gains/losses associated with agency in this paper are the result of limited contractibility. The
two period model I consider, is an extension of the model in Leland (2007). There exists one
company that has an incumbent capital structure and incumbent assets. These assets are nor-
mally distributed. A merger or an acquisition becomes available to the company, that requires
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fresh capital if it is pursued. This comes as a surprise for all stakeholders, which is dierent to
sequential nancing, where the future investment needs are known ex ante. So it is a situation
of imperfect rather than asymmetric information, what makes the situation a problem of incom-
plete contracting. All the bargaining power in this paper is assumed to be in the hands of the
equityholders.
The incumbent capital structure in the setup in this paper contains equity and a debt con-
tract, which can be
 I) an unsecured straight bond without priority (this is the benchmark)
 II) a senior secured straight bond
 III) a callable bond
 IV) a single asset and single tranche collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
 V) a convertible bond
A word on the meaning of the term structured nance at this point: There are commonly two
meanings associated with this term. First, structured nance in a narrow sense means the kind
of contracts that boomed prior to the late 2000s nancial crisis, which were termed collateralized
loan obligation (CLO). One of the main feature of that kind of debt contract is that it is secured
with specic asset(s) which are transferred to a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity. So in
its narrow meaning, structured nance is equivalent to asset securitization or project nancing.
In the narrow sense of the word only contract (IV) - which is a single asset and single tranche
CLO - is a structured debt contract. This is the way the term is used in Leland (2007). Second,
in a broader sense the term structured nance means all kind of debt contracts that have more
complex contractual clauses than a simple straight bond. This is how the word is used in Vanden
(2009) or in Jobst (2007). That is also the way the term structured is used in connection with
structured products that are sold to investors in wealth management. Therefore in its broad
meaning contracts (II) - (V) are structured debt contracts. I will use the term in its broad
meaning and consider its narrow meaning as a specic form of structured nance, namely asset
securitization.
The capital for the acquisition is raised by an optimal package of equity and straight debt
only. This has two reasons: First, the conict of interests arises between the incumbent bond-
holder and the equityholder, so the incumbent debt contract is the object of interest not the
new debt contract. The new bondholders receive a fairly priced bond independent of what kind
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of debt contract they buy, anything else would be arbitrage. Second, it limits the number of
situations considerably. The decision of the capital structure is taken either to maximize the
company's total value or to maximize the value of the company's equity stake. The objective
function is a trade o, optimizing between the tax advantage of debt and the costs of bankruptcy,
as rst formalized by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973).
An acquisition may lead to value added which is the value added or lost that the incumbent
bondholders and the equityholder realize. Similar to Leland (2007), it is assumed that assets
are additive i.e. that there are no operational synergies associated with acquisitions. A value
increase/loss of one stakeholder is therefore either an overall value added provided by the acqui-
sition or a transfer of value from one stakeholder to the other. There are ve sources that drive
value added: the volatility of the acquired assets, the tax shield, the bankruptcy costs, agency
costs and limited liability. An acquisition may increase or decrease the former four, depending
on the specics of the incumbent debt contract, the incumbent assets, the new debt contract and
the new assets. The eect of limited liability is always value decreasing as it has been noted by
Sarig (1985) and others.
Agency costs/gains are a subset of value added, that is realized as a direct consequence of
implementing an equity maximizing rather than a value maximizing capital structure i.e. agency
costs are a transfer in value from the bondholder to the equityholder. There may also be a welfare
loss or deadweight loss, which is the loss in overall value on implementing an equity maximizing
capital structure rather than a value maximizing capital structure.
There are two distinct forms of agency occurring in this model: Through controlling the
acquisition the equityholder may inuence the overall volatility of the company's assets. From
the bondholders perspective the equityholder may engage in what was termed asset substitution
in Jensen and Meckling (1976). This term means a transfer of value from the incumbent bond-
holder's claim to the equityholder's claim through a worsening of the quality of the company's
assets. This also works indirectly: The equityholder may take on excess leverage that is pari
passu to the incumbent bond in order to dilute the incumbent claim. This is termed debt dilu-
tion.3
The second agency problem is an underinvestment problem of the equityholder. Originally, it
was termed debt overhang by Myers (1977). It is the problem that some of the additional capital
that the equityholder invests or more precisely some of the prots that this additional capital
yields, is ex post claimed by the bondholders. The bondholder free rides on the equityholder's
3See e.g. Schwartz (1989).
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additional capital outlay.
Question 2 at the beginning refers to three parameters of interest, risk, bankruptcy costs and
the tax rate. I will oer on each of the three parameters a perspective to analyze the eects of
an unexpected acquisition on the structured debt contracts. With the term perspective I refer to
an appropriate two dimensional grid over which a mesh of e.g. added value for the equityholder
is drawn. A perspective is therefore a three-dimensional representation of value added, agency
costs, etc. This allows to see how the value of the contracts evolves over an extensive set of
values for the key parameters risk, bankruptcy costs and the tax rate. Whenever possible, the
numerical ndings are armed with anecdotal evidence from the nancial market.
By analyzing these three perspectives, it is shown that unsecured straight debt is vulnerable
to agency - more precisely claim dilution - unless risk is low and the tax rate is high. In terms
of bankruptcy costs, agency costs are the worst when bankruptcy costs are at an average level.
A seniority clause helps to protect the bondholder from this form of agency, but it gives raise
to the other agency problem that is similar to debt overhang. As a consequence of the seniority
clause, the bondholder prots form the equityholder's investment without contributing to it. The
equityholder's value added from an acquisition is then reduced or even negative.
An embedded call option can help to overcome this latter agency problem, since it allows
the equityholder to renance an incumbent bond. The incumbent bond, whose value potentially
increases after the acquisition, may then be replaced with one whose price is exactly at fair value
after the acquisition.
Securitization oers another way to overcome the second agency problem but with a dierent
tool, namely bankruptcy remoteness. The assets are kept separately from each other such that
there is no issue with debt overhang. Moreover, bankruptcy remoteness can reduce nancing
costs if the acquisition is very risky, because if one asset is in distress it cannot infect the other.
The equityholder can, similar to Leland (2007), further prot from additional limited liability
that is provided by the additional entity.
A convertible bond - often praised as sweetened debt - is problematic: In Green (1984) it
was argued that convertible bonds are a solution for asset substitution. However, similar as in
Hennessy and Tserlukevich (2008), the agency problem that occurs and the equityholder's in-
centives depend on whether the bond part or the option part of the convertible bond dominates.
When it is the bond part that dominates, the convertible bond is - similar to an unsecured bond
- vulnerable to claim dilution. When it is the conversion option that dominates, the equityholder
has a constant debt overhang problem, similar to a seniority clause. This is because the con-
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version option allows the bondholder to prot form the equityholder's additional capital outlay
to nance the acquisition - without contributing to it. A conversion option potentially prevents
asset substitution as proposed by Green (1984), but it exchanges it with a debt overhang prob-
lem. For that reason, a convertible bond ought to be issued callable and should be called prior
to acquisitions. Vanden (2009) proposes an altered payo structure for a convertible bond that
adjusts itself to the value of the assets. However, that payo structure bears large bankruptcy
costs and it is at least questionable whether it would be qualied as debt for tax and bankruptcy
purposes.
The conclusion is that - within the scope of this model - a callable bond with a seniority
clause is the optimal choice for a company that potentially has to deal with unexpected acqui-
sitions. It oers protection against both forms of agency and allows to redeem the bond when
an acquisition is carried out. Securitization is the optimal choice if the risk of the acquisition is
very high. Then bankruptcy remoteness becomes valuable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model. Section
1.3 delivers the results and predictions of the model and relates it to anecdotal evidence. Section
1.4 oers recommendation for debt structuring. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The model
The model I present in the paper to analyze debt structuring and acquisitions is a two period trade
o model of capital structure. It is essentially an extension of the model in Leland (2007). What
makes the model in this paper dierent from the model in Leland (2007) is that i) structured
debt contracts are analyzed and ii) more than one debt contract may be on the company's books.
Without the later one does not have an agency conict, which is the case in Leland (2007) and
which is what is intended by the respective paper, since the questions addressed in that paper are
dierent form the questions addressed in the present paper. In this part, the model is introduced.
1.2.1 The basic model - A corporation with one asset and one straight
bond on its books
1.2.1.1 Corporate tax law and corporation law
Two common characteristics of corporate tax law and corporation law are part of this model: i)
A corporation's operational activities are subject to corporate taxation, the tax rate is denoted
by  , ii) interest payments on corporate debt are tax deductible and iii) a corporation enjoys
13
limited liability.4 A corporation in this model is therefore similar to the payo of a call option
written on the company's assets with strike price zero. As already mention in Leland (2007),
there is a cross dependency here: The value of the debt inuences the interest expenditures, the
interest expenditures inuence the value of the tax shield and the tax shield inuences company's
asset value. But the company's asset value in turn inuences the value of the debt.
1.2.1.2 Assets and environment
The model is a two period model, so there are only two points in time relevant to the model,
namely t = 0 and t = T , where T is some point in the future. An asset in this model is denoted
by Xti , where i denotes the index and t the time. Assets are future cash ows generated at
t = T by some business activity. Assets are assumed to be normally distributed, with some mean
i 2 (0;1) and some standard deviation i 2 (0;1) i.e. an asset is fully dened by the pair
(i; i).
5 If a company owns two assets, these two assets have some correlation i;j 2 [ 1; 1].
There are no operational synergies in this model i.e. payos are additive. There exists a risk free
asset or a risk free interest rate rf . Also, universal risk-neutrality is assumed. This immediately
implies that at t = 0, asset i's value needs to be equal to
X0i = E
"
XTi 
1 + rf
T
#
i.e. the discounted expected value.
1.2.1.3 A straight bond in this model
A straight bond in this model is a nancial security, that promises to pay an amount or principal
P at maturity. At t = 0 the corporation issues such a security at fair market value D(P ). The
dierence between P and D(P ) is the interest paid on this debt contract. Since interest payments
are tax deductible, the company is - given it has a straight bond on its books - only subject to
taxation if the company's earnings are higher than its interest expenses i.e. if
XTi > P  D(P )  XZT (1.1)
4Especially the second feature of corporation law is - according to Armour et al. (2009) - a fundamental
principle of corporation law. As such it is found in next to every developed jurisdiction.
5Financial assets are commonly assumed to have a support greater than zero. However, real assets may have
a value less then zero. One may think of an activity that causes huge claims for compensation for damage.
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where XZT denotes the zero tax boundary.
6
A company les for bankruptcy if the value of its assets at t = T are below P . Since it is a two
period model, a default leads to a liquidation in the spirit of Chapter 77 or Title 6 of the Swiss
Bankruptcy Code8. Together with the deductibility of interest paid on the bond, this implies
that in this model a company defaults if its after tax earnings are below the bond principal i.e.
if
0  XTi    max

XTi  XZT ; 0

  P (1.2)
The asset value that triggers default is the asset value that solves equation 1.2 and is denoted
by Xd ( default boundary). One needs to have Xd  XZT , otherwise the interest payment
would exceed the nal xed payment which is a contradiction.9 A company therefore defaults
in this model if
XTi < Xd  P + 1   D(P ) (1.3)
where the right hand side is just the solution to equation 1.2.10 Default is assumed to be
costly, if a company defaults some fraction  of asset value is lost. Given corporate taxation
and costly default, an optimal capital structure can be derived that is the solution to the trade
o rst formalized in Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), where the tax shield is traded o against
bankruptcy costs.
The question arises, how interest payments have to be treated, when a company is in default.
In Leland (2007) it is assumed that the company - and thus its bondholders - retain full interest
deduction in default. Kim (1978) argues, based on a legal assessment, that creditors of a bankrupt
corporation will most likely lose the tax shield. I will follow Kim (1978) and assume that bankrupt
corporation lose their tax shield.11
6Equation 1.1 corresponds to equation 7 in Leland (2007).
711 United States Code (2010), Chapter 7.
8Bundesgesetzt uber Schuldbetreibung- und Konkurs (SchKG), SR 281.1.
9This is shown in Leland (2007), page 771.
10Equations 1.2 and 1.3 correspond to equations 10 and 11 in Leland (2007).
11Under Swiss Law, namely under x149(4) of the Swiss Bankruptcy Code, post petition interest is not tax
deductible. Under the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 United States Code (2010)) it is less clear: The
wording of x502(b)(2) of the United States Bankruptcy Code implies the same regime as under Swiss law. The
case law on this matter is opaque. As note in Potter (2002), there seems to be a conict between state level courts
and the Circuit Courts. In the case of In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp. (77-1 U.S.T.C., 9121 (E.D.N.Y.
1976)) as well as in Kellogg v. United States (In re West Texas Marketing Corp., 54 F.3d 1194.) the second and
the fth circuit court have denied deduction of post petition interest to bankrupt corporations. In the case In re
Dow Corning Corp. (270 B.R. 393.) the Eastern District of Michigan Bankruptcy Court has granted deduction
of post petition interest.
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Given the real and legal environment in this model, the fair market value D(P ) of a straight
bond with principal P on the books of company with one asset is
D(P ) =
1
(1 + rf )T
 Z 1
Xd
PdFXi + (1    )
Z Xd
0
XidFXi
!
(1.4)
where rst term in equation 1.4 represents the repayment if the company is solvent while the
second term represents the liquidation proceeds if the company is in default. The market value
of the equity E(P ) is
E(P ) =
1
(1 + rf )T
Z 1
Xd
(Xi   P ) dFXi   
Z 1
Xd
(Xi  XZT ) dFXi

(1.5)
where the rst term in equation 1.5 represents the equity holder's residual equity claim while
the second term represents the tax shield. Using the fact that the asset Xi is assumed to be
normally distributed, D(P ) and E(P ) can be expressed as
D(P ) =
1
(1 + rf )T

P

1  

Xd   i
i

+ (1    )G(0;Xd; i; i)

(1.6)
and
E(P ) =
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )G(Xd;1; i; i)  (P   XZT )

1  

Xd   i
i

(1.7)
where
(x) =
1p
2
exp

 1
2
x2

; (x) =
1p
2
Z x
 1
exp

 1
2
y2

dy =
1
2

1 + erf

xp
2

G(xd; xu; ; ) =
Z xu
xd
X



X   


dFX = 


xu   


  
xd   


+


xd   


  
xu   


(x) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution, (x) is the
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, erf(x) is the error function
while the function G(xd; xu; ; ) is the expected value of a normally distributed random variable
of the form E
h
X1fxdXg1fXxug
i
where 1f : g denotes the indicator function. Form here on
forward all remaining expressions for the fair market value of corporate claims are expressed
using the fact that assets are normally distributed. The above equations 1.4 - 1.7 correspond to
equations 12, 14, A4 and A5 in Leland (2007).
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1.2.1.4 Optimal capital structure
The optimal capital structure is determined by selecting the optimal principal P . Since there
is only one bond in place there is in this case no room for debt agency problems and an equity
maximizing strategy is equivalent to an value maximizing strategy. The optimal principal can
therefore be determined by maximizing the value of the sum of all corporate claims i.e. by solving
the problem
P  = argmax
P
fD(P ) + E(P )g (1.8)
Since the legal setup for the company's tax treatment creates the mention cross dependencies
and the equations determining D and E contain special functions, it is not possible to solve the
above problem explicitly. One has to rely on numerical techniques in order to obtain P .
1.2.2 Acquisitions and structured debt contracts in this model
1.2.2.1 Acquisitions and their implementation
In this section I introduce acquisitions and structured debt contracts. At t = 0 it is assumed that
the company has already an asset 1 dened by the pair (1; 1) on its asset side of the balance
sheet. On the liability side it has a debt contract with principal P 1 and equity. Its capital
structure is optimally selected according to the objective function in equation 1.8.
At t = 0, an acquisition becomes available - i.e. the company may invest in a second asset,
which is dened by the pair (2; 2) and correlation 1;2 to the incumbent asset 1. The new
investment opportunity set is therefore dened by the ve parameters (1; 1; 2; 2; 1;2). It is
assumed that assets are traded at their unlevered after tax value. The company may nance the
acquisition by a mix of straight debt and equity i.e. the company may issue a second bond with
principal P2. The optimal principal P2 of the new bond depends on the incumbent contract as
well as on the objective function which may either be value maximizing or equity maximizing.
1.2.2.2 Debt contracts in the extended model
In the following I introduce the debt contracts listed in the introduction. I will dene the con-
tracts and give pricing formulas for the market value of the structured debt contracts after the
acquisition, the new straight debt contract and the equity. These equations are the extended
versions of equations 1.6 and 1.7. It was assumed that assets are additive and normally dis-
tributed. As a consequence of this, for contracts which do not require that the company places
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the assets in bankruptcy remote entities, the asset side of the company may be treated as one
synthetic asset 3, which is described by the parameter pair (3; 3), where 3 = 1 + 2 and
3 =
q
21 + 
2
2 + 2121;2.
1.2.2.2.1 Unsecured straight bond
In this model, an unsecured straight bond is a bond with principal P1, which is not specically
secured with the asset side of the company. This means that the bondholder's claim has no
priority over other debt claims when the liquidation proceeds are distributed. This is the rst of
the so called priority principles of Schwartz (1989) that the current United States Bankruptcy
Code as well as the Swiss Bankruptcy Code follow. This principle essentially means that the
incumbent bond and the new bond are pari passu when liquidation proceeds are distributed.
The zero tax barrier is at
XZT = P

1  D1(P2) + P2  D2(P2) (1.9)
and the default barrier at
Xd = P

1 + P2 +

1   (D1(P2) +D2(P2)) (1.10)
Then the market value of the incumbent and the new debt contracts are
D1(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 P 1 1  Xd   33

+
P 1 (1    )
P 1 + P2
G(0; Xd; 3; 3)

(1.11)
and
D2(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 P2 1  Xd   3
3

+
P2(1    )
P 1 + P2
G(0; Xd; 3; 3)

(1.12)
The rst term is just the repayment of the principal in case the company does not default.
In default, which is the second term, the bondholders are pari passu, i.e. from the liquidation
proceeds they both receive a share that is proportional to the ratio of their own principal over
total outstanding liabilities. The market value of the equity is then
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E(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 (1  )G(Xd;1; 3; 3)  (P1 + P2   XZT )1  Xd   33

(1.13)
The equation for the equity has only a non-default term. It receives all proceeds form the
assets minus the debt payments plus the tax shield if the company is solvent.
1.2.2.2.2 Senior secured straight bond
In this model, a senior secured bond is a bond with principal P1 that is secured with the company's
assets. It has priority over a potential new bond issued by the company, meaning when liquidation
proceeds are distributed, this bond is served rst. This is the third principle of the priority
principles in Schwartz (1989). The new junior bond only receives liquidation proceeds if the
senior bond is fully served. As a consequence of that clause, one needs an additional barrier that
indicates - given the company has defaulted - at what level the senior bond is fully served and
thus the junior bond receives liquidation proceeds. One may view this as a synthetic default
barrier for the incumbent senior bond, since every state above this barrier yields a payo for
that bond that is equivalent to a state above the default barrier. This barrier XSD is at
12
XSD =
P 1
1     
The distribution of liquidation proceeds is the only dierence between an unsecured straight
bond and a senior secured straight bond. This implies that the equations for the default barrier,
the zero tax barrier and the fair market value of the equity remain the same i.e. equations 1.9,
1.10 and 1.13 remain valid for this contract. The fair market value of the incumbent senior bond
after the acquisition is
D1(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 P 1 1  XSD   33

+ (1    )G(0;XSD; 3; 3)

(1.14)
which looks like a conventional bond whose default barrier is at the synthetic default barrier.
The fair market value of the new junior bond is
12For more convenient pricing equation, one would like to have the following ordering between the new synthetic
default barrier and the real default barrier: XSD  Xd. Given the form of the default barrier, this is satised by
the condition 
1   P

1  P2 + 1  (D1 +D2) - which essentially means, that  should not be too large. If 
would be very large then the gap between the company as a going concern and the company in liquidation could
be large enough that there exists a state where the company as a going concern has enough proceeds from the
assets to pay o both bonds, but in liquidation not enough to serve the senior bond. From here on forward I will
assume, that  is small enough that such a state does not exists.
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D2(P2) =
1 
1 + rf
 P2 1  Xd   3
3

+ (1    )G(XSD; Xd; 3; 3)

 
1 
1 + rf
 P 1 Xd   33

  

XSD   3
3

(1.15)
The rst term is the value given the company does not default and the second and third term
are leftovers from the liquidation proceeds that the junior bond receives in default.
1.2.2.2.3 Callable bond
A callable bond in this model is an incumbent bond with principal P1, that the company may
call at time t = 0 at pre-acquisition fair market value13. The callable bond allows the company to
have a restart or reset of its capital structure i.e. it may call the bond prior to the acquisition and
renance it together with the acquisition bond. What kind of impact that has on the value of the
equity, I will discuss in the next section. Insofar as the pricing equations are concerned, they are
essentially equivalent to the base case, only that the asset side of the balance sheet is now larger
and contains the synthetic asset 3. Equations 1.6 and 1.7 remain the pricing equations for the
fair market values of debt and equity in the scenario where a callable bond has been redeemed
and renanced.
1.2.2.2.4 CLO
A CLO is a bond with principal P1 that is secured with a specic asset of the issuing company.
To protect this asset from a potential default of the issuer on a combined level, the company
places the asset in a bankruptcy remote entity or simply in a subsidiary14. The company then
levers the asset through this subsidiary. The result is a debt contract that is backed by a specic
bankruptcy remote asset. After the acquisition there are two CLOs, one backed with asset 1, the
other backed with asset 2. As a consequence of that, the fair market value of the debt contracts
after the acquisitions as well as of the equity stakes may be valued with equations 1.6 and 1.7.
1.2.2.2.5 Convertible bond
A convertible bond is a bond that combines an unsecured straight bond with an option on
13Usually, calling a bond involves paying a penalty fee, but within the scope of this model, such a penalty fee
would be arbitrage.
14Strictly spoken, just placing assets in a subsidiary does not make them a priori bankruptcy remote. Paragraphs
35  45 of FAS 140 detail the conditions that have to be (jointly) fullled by a subsidiary to qualify for the status
of a qualifying special purpose entity. This status is necessary to issue CLOs. The nature of the technicalities in
FAS 140 are important but beyond the scope of this paper. It will just be assumed that they are fullled.
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some of the company's equity. In this model, it is a bond with principal P1 and the option to
convert it into a fraction  of the company's equity. If  - the conversion ratio - is equal to
zero, the conversion feature is void and the bond is equivalent to an unsecured straight bond.
The convertible bond is - as a result of the conversion privilege - assumed to be junior to a
potential new bond i.e. it contains a subordination clause. The conversion option is assumed
to be dilution protected. Also - given the conversion option is exercised - the hypothetical tax
shield provided by the convertible bond before it is converted is lost as payments on equity are
not tax deductible.
So far, all the dierent debt contracts had the same pricing equations prior to the acquisition,
when the company has only one asset and one incumbent bond on its books. They were presented
in equations 1.6 and 1.7. Because of the conversion option, the convertible bond does not share
these equations. The default bound and the zero tax bound as per equations 1.1 and 1.3 remain
the same. The bondholder naturally exercises the conversion option optimally i.e. one has to
dene a conversion bound. This bound is at the point, where the value of the company's assets
is high enough to make the hypothetical equity stake of the bondholder worth more than the
principal received when the bond matures15
XCV =
P1
(1  )
The fair market value of a convertible bond prior to the acquisition is then
D(P1) =
1
(1 + rf )T
((1  )G(XCV ;1; 1; 1))+
1
(1 + rf )T

P1



XCV   1
1

  

Xd   1
1

+ (1    )G(0; Xd; 1; 1)

(1.16)
where the rst term is the value if the bond is converted, the second term the value when the
bond is not converted and the third term the value when the company defaults. The fair market
value of the equity stake is
E(P1) =
1
(1 + rf )T
((1  )(1  )G(XCV ;1; 1; 1))+
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )G(Xd; Xcv; 1; 1)  (P1   Xz)



XCV   1
1

 

Xd   1
1

(1.17)
15A problem of ordering similar to the one in footnote 12 arises here: One of course wants an ordering Xd <
XCV . For that purpose the condition
P1
Xd
>  should be satised i.e. the conversion ration should not be to high.
From here on forward I will assume that this is the case.
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That is the situation prior to the acquisition. Again the company nances the unexpected
acquisition with a mix of debt and equity. As already mentioned, it is assumed that the bond
part of the incumbent convertible bond is junior to the acquisition bond. The principal of
the incumbent convertible bond is optimally determined given the pre acquisition assets of the
company using equation 1.8. P2 denotes again the principal of the acquisition bond.
As a consequence of the combination of an incumbent convertible bond and a new bond, a
number of bounds are needed. These are presented in the list below
 A conversion bound XCV = P

1 +P2 (P2 D2(P2))
(1 )
 A zero tax bound when the conversion option has been exercised XZT2 = P2  D2(P2)
 A zero tax bound when the conversion option has not been exercised XZT1 = P 1  D1(P2)+
P2  D2(P2)
 A default bound Xd = P 1 + P2 + 1+ (D1(P2) +D2(P2))
 A synthetic default bound for the acquisition bond16 XSD = P21  
The fair market value of the incumbent convertible bond is then
D1(P2) =
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )G(XCV ;1; 3; 3)  P2

1  

XCV   3
3

+
1
(1 + rf )T

XZT2

1  

XCV   3
3

+ P 1



XCV   3
3

  

Xd   3
3

1
(1 + rf )T

(1    )G(XSD; Xd; 3; 3)  P2



Xd   3
3

  

XSD   3
3

(1.18)
The rst three terms reect the situation when the bond is converted, the fourth term the
situation when the bond is not converted and the fth and sixth term the situation when the
company defaults. The fair market value of the new bond is
D2(P2) =
1
(1 + rf )T

P2

1  

XSD   3
3

+ (1    )G(0;XSD; 3; 3)

(1.19)
16This bound is necessary because it is assumed that the new bond is senior to the convertible bond.
22
The fair market value of the equity stake after the acquisition is
E(P2) =
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )

(1  )G(XCV ;1; 3; 3)  (P1   XZT2)

1  

XCV   3
3

+
1
(1 + rf )T

(1  )G(Xd;XCV ; 3; 3) 
 
P 1 + P2   XZT1



XCV   3
3

  

Xd   3
3

(1.20)
The rst line represents the equity value if the conversion option is exercised while the second
line represents the equity value if the conversion option is not exercised.
1.2.2.3 The optimal nancing of the acquisition
The capital structure to implement the acquisition may either maximize the company's total
value or only maximize the company's equity value. Prior to the acquisition with only one bond,
these two strategies are equivalent - anything else would be arbitrage. With an acquisition after
the incumbent bond has been issued, these two strategies are not necessarily equivalent. The
reasons for that is that the acquisition allows the equityholder to alter the capital structure
subsequently to his advantage. I will address this in more detail in section 1.3. Equation 1.21
- which is the two bond equivalent to equation 1.8 - states the problem to obtain the optimal
principal P 2 for a value maximizing post acquisition capital structure.
P 2 = argmax
P2
fD1(P2) +D2(P2) + E(P2)g (1.21)
The objective function for the equity maximizing capital structure is to maximize the equity's
net advantage of the acquisition i.e. the equityholder's value added minus the equityholder's
capital outlay to the nancing of the acquisition which is denoted by e(P2). The capital outlay
is the fraction of the costs17 of the acquisition K = (1 )
(1 rf )T
R1
0 X2dFX2 , that the equityholder
bears i.e. e(P2) = K  D2(P2). The equityholder's trade o is then
P 2 = argmax
P2
fE(P2)  e(P2)g = argmax
P2
fE(P2)  (K  D2(P2))g (1.22)
17Remember that assets are assumed to be traded at their unlevered after tax value.
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1.3 Implications and Results
This section presents the implications and results obtained from the model described in the last
section. These implications and insights help to answer the questions posed in the introduction.
They are also compared to anecdotal evidence to provide a link to what happens on the nancial
market.
To visualize this more clearly, I introduce some measurements of gains and losses that the
equityholder of the bondholder may achieve or suer as a result of the acquisition. The debt
value added/loss (DVA), is the gain or loss in value that the incumbent bondholder achieves or
suers as a result of the acquisition. The equity value added/loss (EVA) is the net18 gain or loss
in value that the equityholder makes or suers as a result of the acquisition. The debt agency
costs (DAC) are the dierence between the debt value added/loss after the acquisition under a
value maximizing capital structure and the debt value added/loss after the acquisition under an
equity maximizing capital structure. The equity agency gains (EAG) is the dierence between
the equity value added/loss under a value maximizing capital structure after the acquisition and
the equity value added/loss under an equity maximizing capital structure after acquisition. The
welfare loss (WL) is the dierence between the over all value created/lost by the acquisition after
an equity maximizing capital structure is implemented versus a case where a value maximizing
capital structure is implemented.
As I mentioned earlier, there are only numerical solutions to the model, there is no closed
form solution. It is therefore necessary to assign values to the parameters. Table 1.1 presents the
parameters that will have the same value throughout the paper. The assets in this model have
all the same expected present value and are traded in bits having a value of 100. The annual
volatility of the incumbent asset 1 is xed as well. The value assigned to this parameter is set
according to the empirical analysis of Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) to the average annual asset
volatility of a BBB rated company. The conversion ratio of the convertible bond is also xed.
As mentioned in footnote 15, the conversion ratio should not be too high. But it should also not
be too low because if ! 0, the conversion option is void and the convertible bond degenerates
an unsecured junior bond. The value in table 1.1 is a good trade o between the two issues.
INSERT TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE
Table 1.2 presents values for parameter that are xed unless they are the object of interest.
The correlation is a value that is not extreme in one direction or the other direction. The
18Net gains or losses for the equityholder means gains/losses after accounting for the fresh capital that had to
be injected.
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bankruptcy costs are chosen according to the Leland (2007) paper. In that paper the value
is selected to meet observed recovery rates. In other papers analysing capital structure issues
numerically, similar values are used e.g. in Leland (1998) or a bit lower in Hennessy and Whited
(2007). The tax rate is an average value for both, the United States and Switzerland. The same
value is used in Leland (1998) and Leland (2007). Time to maturity is set to an average as
well, in Leland (2007) it is mentioned that this is close to the estimated average corporate bond
maturity. For that maturity a comprehensive range of iTraxx and CDX indices exists and they
are relatively liquid.
INSERT TABLE 1.2 ABOUT HERE
1.3.1 The risk perspective
1.3.1.1 Unsecured straight bond
The functions of interest in this analysis are the functions that express a shift in one of the
stakeholder's value, agency cost or welfare loss. With the earlier mentioned term perspective I
refer to a mesh, drawn over an appropriate two dimensional grid. For instance gure 1.1 presents
the risk perspective of the DVA under a value maximizing capital structure i.e. the DVA drawn
over a grid of the annual volatility of the acquired assets (2) and the correlation between the
incumbent and the acquired assets (). I oer a perspective on risk, bankruptcy costs, taxes. For
the risk perspective of the unsecured straight bond, the results are collected in gure 1.1, using
the model introduced in the last section.
Figure 1.1(a) and gure 1.1(b) present the DVA under a value and an equity maximizing
post-acquisition capital structure. The north corner of the 2=-plane is the point with lowest
risk i.e. low volatility and no correlation, the south corner is the point with the most risk i.e.
high volatility and almost perfect correlation. What is observed is the following: An increase in
the company's asset volatility leads to a loss for the bondholders - having a concave claim - and
to a gain for the equityholder - having a convex claim. This holds true under a value maximizing
capital structure as well as under an equity maximizing capital structure. The model is here
consistent with classical asset substitution. The reverse holds true for the EVA presented in
gure 1.1(c) and gure 1.1(d). Since the equityholder's claim is convex, the result is that the
riskier the acquisition is, the more the equityholder gains.
INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE
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What is also visible for both - the DVA and the EVA - the losses and gains respectively are
more pronounced for the equity maximizing leverage choice. That can be seen more detailed in
gures 1.1(e) and 1.1(f). DAC and EAG are both dierent from zero and the agency gains/loss
increase with risk. The equityholder may extract agency gains from the bondholder, not only
through asset substitution but also through a dilution of the bondholder's claim. He may do that
by using the change in the company's capital structure triggered by the acquisition to accumulate
excess leverage19. This is presented in the special gure 1.1(h), which illustrates the dierence in
post acquisition leverage ratio of a value maximizing and an equity maximizing capital structure.
The dierence is positive and increasing with risk. It is classical debt dilution that the model is
implying here.
The agency gains are more pronounced the riskier the acquisition is, because then debt
dilution may be reinforced with asset substitution. The order of magnitude of the dilution is
between 2% and 4%. This is a bit more than what was implied by Leland (1998) for an unsecured
straight bond. The question is, whether this is a gure to worry about? In the much publicised
Marriot Case of 1993, the incumbent bondholders lost - according to Parrino (1997) - about 4%
of their value. As a consequence of the incumbent bondholder's pressure, the spin o plan was
revised to reduce their loss. So the model seems to imply an order of magnitude that is relevant
to investors, but still reasonable enough to nd anecdotal evidence.
Another example to demonstrate how this problem of debt dilution is observed in practice:
In 2001 the US company Martin Marietta Materials took over the fellow US company Meridian
Aggregates. Martin Marietta was more focused on chemical building materials, while Meridian
was an aggregates and cement company. So there is certainly some correlation between the two
businesses, since both company's belong to the sector of building materials. This acquisition
led to an increase in asset volatility as well as to an increase in leverage which eventually led
to a decrease in interest coverage. As a result of that this led to a weakening of the existing
bondholder protection measures [namely the interest rate coverage] and to a downgrade of Martin
Marietta's commercial paper program by Fitch.20 This is exactly what is implied by the model
in this paper.
The welfare loss is very low as an absolute gure, but it is also increasing with the riskiness of
the acquisition. This is because of the bondholder's convex claim, the claim is the more diluted,
the risker the acquisition is and asset substitution by denition implies that the company's
19Excess leverage means here the additional leverage beyoned the value maximizing optimum.
20Source: "Fitch Lowers Martin Marietta'S Cp Rating", article in Business Wire, Date: Thursday, March 8,
2001.
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business risk is increased. The agency costs and thus the welfare loss is the worst, the more risky
the acquisition is.
1.3.1.2 Senior secured bond
The senior secured bond is a bond, where the bondholder's claim is senior to any potential new
bondholder. What happened above with the unsecured straight bond was that it was diluted
either by taking on more debt that was ranked pari passu (debt dilution) or by increasing the
risk of the company's assets (asset substitution) or even both. But no matter what eect was
responsible for the bondholder's agency loss, the reason why it happened was a dilution of the
bondholder's claim. It is important to note that it is not the entire claim that was diluted, but
only the embedded claim on liquidation proceeds in case of a bankruptcy. This is exactly where
the seniority clause becomes eective.
Figure 1.2(a) illustrate this. The DVA of an incumbent bondholder with a senior claim is on
the entire grid positive. This has two reasons: The incumbent bondholder is legally protected
against direct debt dilution through the seniority clause. On top of that, there is no room
for indirect dilution through asset substitution. The company is doing an acquisition, which
means that it is expanding its asset base. So even if the incumbent assets are expanded with
extremely risky assets, there are - in the event of a default, which is where the unsecured claim
was vulnerable - still more assets to liquidate and thus in probabilities more liquidation proceeds
to satised the senior claim.
INSERT FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE
The only way to dilute a senior claim would be to siphon assets out of the company i.e. to
reduce the asset base. This is sometimes called asset dilution. For a secured bond that would be
a breach of contract - the assets to be spun o are pledge as a collateral - and it is assumed that
this does not happen. But it is this what the bondholders were concerned about in the Marriot
spin o of 1993. There the equityholders were about to reduce the asset base of the company and
thus reducing the value of the incumbent bondholder. Empirical evidence in Maxwell and Rao
(2003) arms more generally, that spin-os are potentially diluting for incumbent bondholders.
The shape of the DVA however is similar to the one of an unsecured bond: The less risk, the
more is there to gain for the incumbent senior bondholder. The explanations for that is that the
senior bond's payo is still - despite the seniority clause - concave and thus the bond's value is
decreasing in risk. The more risky the assets are, the more likely is default and thus the value
27
added of the incumbent bond must be decreasing in risk. The overall conclusion is therefore that
a seniority clause protects the incumbent bondholder almost perfectly from agency costs caused
by acquisitions, but it does not change the shape of the claim, it is still concave.
The equityholder faces a situation that is altered compared to the situation with the unsecured
bond because of an agency problem: This is presented in gure 1.2(b). The equityholder has
still a claim which is increasing in risk and thus for most of the grid, the best acquisition for him
is one that is very risky. But an additional eect is now more clearly visible. The equityholder
has two ways in which he may increase the value of his claim through an acquisition: One is by
relying on the convexity of his claim and thus increasing the risk - a positive21 risk eect. The
other is in reducing his share of the acquisition costs i.e. reducing the amount of capital he has
to contribute to the acquisition - a capital eect.
Why would the capital outlay matter? This capital eect is related to the debt overhang
problem rst noted in Myers (1977) and is an agency problem as well: In the standard debt
overhang problem, the face value of the incumbent debt is higher than the expected payo of
the assets and as a consequence of that, an additional investment by the equityholder would - at
least in part - be absorbed by the incumbent bondholders. The debt is then called underwater.
The bondholder's DVA in gure 1.2(a) is decreasing in risk i.e. the lower the risk the more the
bondholder prots form the value added created by the acquisition. Thus the senior bondholder
is proting from the equityholder's capital outlay without contributing to it as it increases the
collateral base of the company. So in some sense the incumbent senior bondholder is the agency
player here as free rides on the acquisition, an eect similar to debt overhang.
In the most part of the grid in gure 1.2(b), the risk eect is dominating. Towards the west
corner of gure 1.2(b), the capital eect starts to dominate and thus the EVA is decreasing
instead of increasing in risk. This is because leverage is decreasing with risk and the best choice
for the equityholder in that region is to lever the acquisition as much as possible and thus reduce
the capital outlay. This may be surprising but it is perfectly rational. In the middle of the grid,
neither eect plays and the company nds itself in a debt overhang problem. The capital eect
inuences an unsecured bond as well. However, with an unsecured bond debt dilution is more
eective than the capital eect.22
There is some anecdotal evidence on that: In 2007, the Mexican cement company Cemex
took over the Australian cement and building materials company Rinker. Although Rinker was
21Positive for the equityholder.
22In gure 1.1(c) the capital eect is visible towards the west corner, in gure 1.1(d) the risk eect dominates
so much, that the capital eect disappears.
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from Australia, up to 80% of its sales were generated in North America. Cemex was already
present in the North American market, Rinker's geographical presence was very dierent from
Cemex's presence. At this point in time, the North American market was thought to be a low
risk market for building materials. Moreover, the market has still strong regional dierence i.e.
the regions are not very correlated.23 Overall the acquisition was not expected to increase risk.
In line with the implications of this model, the capital eect was dominating and the Rinker
acquisition was essentially a buyout, mostly funded with debt.24.
The reverse happened two years later: Holcim also announced in 2009 that it will take a
substantial stake in the Chinese cement company Huaxin Cement25. Holcim was not really
present then in China i.e. this was - particularly after the meltdown in the emerging markets
construction sector in 2008 - a risky acquisition. This transaction was - in line with the insights
that the model in this paper delivers - nanced with a capital increase in Holcim.
In terms of quantity, the bondholder's value shift that occurs as a result of the acquisition, is
always positive. He may gain 1% 5% on the acquisition. This is remarkable and may give room
to capital structure arbitrage around mergers and acquisitions. The presence of a seniority clause
reduces the gains for the equityholder. Which were with an unsecured bond at 1%   6% with a
value maximizing capital structure and 2%   9% with an equity maximizing capital structure -
to below 0%  2:5% and leaves no room for agency gains through acquisitions. Since there is no
room for agency, there is also no room for welfare loss.
1.3.1.3 Callable bond
Textbooks like Brealey et al. (1981) and sales presentation often suggest that callable bonds are
essentially issued because of two reasons: First, in order to give the issuer the option to renance
the bond if the reference interest rate signicantly falls or second, to give the issuer the option
to renance the bond if the company's rating improves. Consequently, high yield bonds are
often callable. The rst motive is not relevant in this paper. In this model, credit spreads solely
depend on the company's risk prole and on the company's leverage. The risk free rate is not
stochastic. The second motive is not relevant as well, since it is only a two period model.
There is however a third, new rationale for callable bonds: In a situation with an incumbent
senior bond, the DVA was always positive i.e. the seniority clause forces the equityholder to
23This still holds true within the United States. The eect on residential property price of the subprime
meltdown was very heterogenous. While prices in California or Florida were heavily down, Texas property still
generated very low positive returns.
24Source: Corporate Presentations of Cemex.
25Source: Company press release, June 15, 2009.
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share the value added of an acquisition with the incumbent bondholders. The equityholder
leaves money on the table. This is the reason why a right to redeem the bond early may be
valuable to the equityholder, even in the absence of the usual rationales for embedded options
in corporate bonds. They allow the equityholder to renance an incumbent bond with a new
bond covering company's entire demand for external capital. This new bond can then be sold at
fair value, instead of leaving money on the table for the incumbent bondholders. It allows the
equityholder to have a fresh start and thus implement an exactly optimal capital structure.
Since calling the bond implies that the entire capital structure is revised and a new, large
bond is issued at fair value, there is no room for agency here. What is presented in gure 1.3(a)
is only the EVA of an acquisition that has an optimal post acquisition capital structure with
only one straight bond and equity. The other gures are irrelevant, since the incumbent bond is
renanced.
INSERT FIGURE 1.3 ABOUT HERE
It may be surprising that the optimal acquisition would be one in the west corner of gure
1.3(a) i.e. with low risk. There are again the capital eect and the risk eect that enter the
trade o here. The equity claim is still convex and even the assets on a company's books are in
some sense a convex claim, since the company is protected by limited liability. For most of the
grid in gure 1.3(a), the capital eect is dominating. But as is also visible, at about 2 = 0:3
the slope of the EVA plane is reversed and - if the 2-axis would be widened - further east, in
the region 2 2 [0:4; 0:5] the EVA would surpass the EVA level in the west corner. The risk eect
only starts to dominate this trade o at a high level of asset volatility and is the dominant value
creator for an almost unrealistic level of asset volatility.26
Not only enables an embedded call option the equityholder to claim all the value added of
an acquisition, it might even be a way of signalling that the company is sorting out hypothetical
agency conicts. Or it might also be a form of precaution against potential allegation that the
company tries to extract agency rents. It is occasionally observed on the market that debt is
renanced after an acquisition. When the Swiss duty-free shop operator Dufry took over the
American Hudson Group in September 2008, it was expanding into a new region namely the
United States and into the less concentrated duty-paid business. Although the acquisition was
nanced primarily with equity, the entire debt of Dufry and Hudson was renanced by a new
debt facility, and thus leaving no money on the table for the incumbent Dufry debt holders.27
26This might to some extend be driven by the static structure of the model.
27Source: H1-08 analyst's presentation of Dufry.
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1.3.1.4 CLO
A CLO is a bond that is secured with a specic asset, placed in a bankruptcy remote entity. A
CLO has an advantage for both stakeholder: Since the assets are placed in separate entities, one
entity is not inuenced by the other and thus DVA is zero over the entire grid and is not plotted.
The bondholder is therefore protected against every possible form of agency mentioned so far,
debt dilution, asset dilution and asset substitution. So from the bondholder's perspective, this
form of debt contract makes sense, when agency costs are a potential issue. As it was mentioned
earlier, this is especially the case when risk is high.
The equityholder has an advantage as well: Since the acquisition is brought into a new entity,
the equityholder may reduce that he potentially leaves money on the table. The EVA surface
for the CLO is presented in gure 1.3(b). Because the acquisition is held by a subsidiary rather
than the original company, the correlation  with the incumbent assets does not inuence the
optimal capital structure of the new subsidiary and the default risk is separated.
As it is visible in gure 1.3(b), a CLO make sense for the equityholder, if risk is either very
high or very low. On the low risk side, the equityholder may reduce the money left on the table.
On the high risk side, the equityholder may reduce nancing costs through a separation of the
bankruptcy risk. He may also take advantage of additional limited liability as this was discussed
in Leland (2007).
The present form of debt contract was and is still common for companies in businesses which
are capital intensive. Examples would be energy upstream, airlines or cement making. Also they
were extensively used to renance all kinds of mortgages.
Another example for the use of securitization would be the now bankrupt Enron. Enron
made extensive use of securitization before its default. It nanced its merchant assets to a large
extend with debt through various subsidiaries. In 1999 Enron North America28 pooled a group
of loans to its merchant assets in the United States into a trust and sold securities against the
trust as Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO).29 There is no information what kind of loans
Enron pooled in that CLO, but Enron's new merchant assets were - compared with the original
gas pipeline and gas wholesale business - fairly risky.30 At the time the CLO was issued Enron
was heavily acquiring risky assets. This CLO was therefore an ideal solution to avoid agency
28A subsidiary of Enron, holding most merchant assets in the United States.
29Enron did a series of transaction with loans that were at least questionable if not illegal. This CLO transaction
did - according to Powers et al. (2002) - NOT belong to this group.
30Jerey Skillings is heard saying We like risk, because you make money by taking on risk. in the movie Enron,
the smartest guys in the room of 2005.
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conicts31 in the future with the bondholders - on top of that - leaving no money on the table
for bondholders to other project not included in the CLO.
1.3.1.5 Convertible bond
In textbooks, convertible bonds are often praised as sweetened debt i.e. as an instrument to
reduce credit spreads by allowing the bondholder to prot from the upside. This is undoubtedly
one feature of convertible bonds, but as odd as it may seem, in the base case of this model, i.e.
prior to an acquisition, it is inecient to issue a convertible bond. This is because exercising
the conversion option destroys the tax shield. This has the consequence, that it pushes up the
conversion bound.
The DVAs of the convertible bond are presented in gures 1.4(a) and 1.4(b) for a value max-
imizing capital structure as well as for an equity maximizing capital structure. The incumbent
bondholder has now two parts that drive the value of his position. One is the embedded conver-
sion option, whose payo is convex in shape, the other is the bond part of the convertible bond
whose payo is concave in shape. The shape of the DVAs in gures 1.4(a) and 1.4(b) is similar
to a standard bond i.e. the bond part of the convertible bond is driving the bondholder's added
value in shape. But by comparing gure 1.4(a) to gure 1.1(a), it becomes evident that the
shape of the DVA surface is similar, the level of the convertible bonds DVA surface is however
dierent. This is the inuence of the conversion option.
INSERT FIGURE 1.4 ABOUT HERE
The welfare loss, that is illustrated in gure 1.4(g), is with 1:8% to 2:5% remarkable in size.
Conversion options are therefore not only vulnerable from the bondholders perspective, but may
also be inconvenient for a potential social planner. Striking is the shape of the welfare loss sur-
face. It is not the worse the more risk there is but the worst region is somewhere in the middle.
Looking at the DVA in gure 1.4(b) as well as at the DAC in gure 1.4(e) it is also clear, that
the convertible bond is vulnerable to agency issues. A convertible bond is a hybrid nancing
instrument, an as mentioned earlier. I assume that the additional straight debt can be issued
senior to the convertible bond.
The rst agency problem is equivalent to the one with the unsecured straight bond. The
equityholder may engage in diluting the incumbent bondholder's claim by issuing straight debt.
He can reinforce that with asset substitution i.e. by doing a risk acquisition. This is the rst
31Remember, most of Enron's story is about corporate governance or agency issues between Enron and its
shareholders and not between Enron and its creditors.
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reason why a convertible bond in this model is vulnerable to agency problem.
The second agency problem is related to the conversion option and is again an agency problem
that is related to the Myers (1977) the debt overhang problem: The equityholder has no incentive
to put up additional capital for the company. Through the embedded conversion option, the in-
cumbent bondholders would prot from a hypothetical investment that the equityholder helps to
nance. A convertible bond is underwater when the conversion option dominates the value of the
bond. This problem is reinforced by presence of the anti dilution clause. The conversion option
is written on non diluted equity whereas the equityholder holds diluted equity. The convertible
bond suers in a way a constant debt overhang problem.
This constant debt overhang or simply underinvestment problem of the equityholder is illus-
trated in the special gures 1.4(h) and 1.4(i). They illustrate the surface of leverage ratios of
the company after the acquisition for a value maximizing capital structure in gure 1.4(h) and
for an equity maximizing capital structure in gure 1.4(i). The leverage ratio in gure 1.4(i) is
higher across the entire surface than in gure 1.4(h). This reects exactly the equityholder's lack
of incentive to contribute additional capital to the company. The equityholder tries to neutralize
the debt overhang problem with excess leverage. The potential agency losses that are illustrated
in gure 1.4(e), are remarkable in size, namely between 8% and 18%. Investors in convertible
bonds therefore have to monitor the company's nancing and M&A activities closely.
The equityholder loses under a value maximizing capital structure on every acquisition on
this grid as illustrated in gure 1.4(c). This is a direct consequence of the convertible bond's
debt overhang problem mentioned in the last paragraph. Under an equity maximizing capital
structure, the equityholder may make rather large gains on acquisitions as illustrated in gure
1.4(d). About half of these gains are attributed to agency as illustrated in gure 1.4(f). All these
surfaces are increasing in risk.
The market is well aware of the opportunities and problems that occur with convertible bonds
in acquisitions. During the rst half of 2009, the Australian uranium exploration company Scim-
itar Resources took over the fellow Australian metal and noble metal mining company Jackson
Minerals to become Cauldron Energy. In the month where the acquisition took eect (June
2009), the company issued a new convertible bond to - among other things - redeem an existing
convertible bond of Scimitar Resources.32 The target is an exploration company, the acquisition
can therefore be considered as a risky one.
In another example, Satcon Technology Corporation, a supplier of technology for alternative
32Source: Company Presentation 2009 of Cauldron Energy.
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energy sources announced in 2007 that it will accelerate its growth in the alternative energy mar-
ket which meant to growth through acquisitions. At the same time they announced that they
would raise new external capital under their existing promissory notes program to nance there
growth and to retire an existing convertible bond.33
These two examples show that the market is well aware of the agency problems that can
occur with incumbent convertible bonds. In both cases, the agency loss seemed to be severe
enough that both companies could not aord to jeopardize their reputation as a debtor by not
buying out the incumbent bondholder prior to the expansion.
Sometimes convertible bonds even have voting rights on fundamental change i.e. they have
some bargaining power. In 2005 the London-based Crew Gold took over the fellow London-based
Guinor Gold. Both companies are gold mining and gold exploration companies. The acquisition
was nanced with debt as well as equity and was subject to approval of both, the incumbent
Crew Gold equityholders as well the incumbent holders of a Crew Gold convertible bond. The
Crew Gold convertible bond was protected against additional borrowing.34
A company issuing a convertible bond may signal, that it considers itself to be a mature
company. In 2005 Intel, a former technology bubble stock issued a convertible bond. This was
viewed by the market as a sign that the growth of Intel is coming to an end.
1.3.2 The bankruptcy costs perspective
With the earlier denition of a perspective, the bankruptcy costs perspective is a mesh over a
grid of average annual asset volatility (2) - in a way the master parameter - and bankruptcy
costs (). In some sense this is another risk perspective, since bankruptcy costs are hypothetical
losses in default.
1.3.2.1 Unsecured straight bond
For an unsecured straight bond, this is presented in gure 1.5. For a value maximizing capital
structure after the acquisition, gures 1.5(a) and 1.5(c) illustrate what one would expect: The
higher the bankruptcy costs the less added value is there to gain. For the incumbent bondholder,
this is a direct consequence of a high loss given default when bankruptcy costs are high. For the
equityholder the consequence is indirect: The equityholder receives nothing in default, but the
higher the bankruptcy costs, the larger are the nancing costs. That is why the equityholder's
33Source: Company press release, Nov. 9, 2007.
34Source: Company press release, November 21, 2005.
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EVA surface is similar in shape in the bankruptcy costs direction, but reversed in the asset
volatility direction.
INSERT FIGURE 1.5 ABOUT HERE
What is more interesting is the equity maximizing post acquisition capital structure. At
rst - by only looking at the EVA in gure 1.5(f) and the EAG in gure 1.5(d) - it looks fairly
standard. The more risk and the less bankruptcy costs, the more is there to gain in value and
agency for the equityholder. But what is not reected in these previous gures, but becomes
evident in gures 1.5(e), 1.5(g) and 1.5(h), is that the equityholder is actually doing a trade o
between agency gains and costs of additional leverage.
This is illustrated in the special gure 1.5(h), that plots the dierence between the leverage
ratio under a value maximizing capital structure and an equity maximizing capital structure.
When the costs of bankruptcy are modest, then the costs of additional debt are modest and
the equityholder may use this additional debt to dilute the incumbent debt claim. But with
bankruptcy costs growing, the costs for the additional debt begins to raise and this limits the
application of excess leverage for debt dilution. That is why the DAC surface in gure 1.5(e) has
a kink in the middle. That's where the trade o starts to turn. Excess leverage becomes costly
and only the costs of a smaller tranche of excess leverage are oset by agency gains. Since the
excess leverage that is taken on for debt dilution is directly causing a welfare loss, the shape of
the welfare loss surface in gure 1.5(g) shares the shape with the DAC surface in gure 1.5(e).
1.3.2.2 Senior bond
The results for a senior bond are reported in gures 1.6(a) and 1.6(b). For the senior bond, the
DVA is decreasing in the level of bankruptcy costs. This is because bankruptcy costs have a
direct negative eect on the senior bondholder's liquidation proceeds in case of a bankruptcy.
What is rather surprising is the shape of the EVA surface, namely it is increasing in bankruptcy
costs. The reason for that is again the debt overhang problem that the seniority clause bears.
Since the equityholder's payo is zero in default, assets with low bankruptcy costs only increase
the value of the incumbent bondholders' claim through the seniority clause. This implies that
the lower bankruptcy costs are the more pronounced is the debt overhang problem. This makes
the equityholder better o in a regime with high bankruptcy costs and leads to the shape of the
EVA surface.
INSERT FIGURE 1.6 ABOUT HERE
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1.3.2.3 Callable bond and CLO
The results for a callable bond and a CLO are reported in gures 1.7(a) and 1.7(b). There is
nothing unexpected to report for these two contracts. Both contracts allow for a new trade o
- may it be through separate entities or a fresh start in the same entity - and thus they have
an EVA surface that is decreasing in bankruptcy costs. Since bankruptcy costs directly drive
costs of the new debt, the equityholder has an incentive to keep the bankruptcy costs as low as
possible.
INSERT FIGURE 1.7 ABOUT HERE
1.3.2.4 Convertible bond
The results for a convertible bond are presented in gures 1.8(a) - 1.8(g). What may seem
surprising is that - contrary to all the other bonds - under both, a value maximizing and an
equity maximizing capital structure, the DVA surface is increasing in bankruptcy costs over
most of the grid. The EVA however, is decreasing in bankruptcy costs over most of the grid.
The latter was observed before, but not the former. The explanation for that is the hybrid
structure of the convertible bond.
INSERT FIGURE 1.8 ABOUT HERE
For the bondholder, the question is what part of the bond dominates. When bankruptcy costs
are low, then the convertible bond is in the area of debt i.e. it is in a way a busted convertible
bond35. This is because, when bankruptcy is not very costly, the acquisition is mainly nanced
with debt and then the conversion bound XCV - being an increasing function of additional debt
- is high and thus the probability of conversion is low. The value of a busted convertible bond
is equivalent to an unsecured bond. In gure 1.5(a), DVA is in the region where the convertible
bond is positive in the area of debt, but very low. Since the convertible bond is an unsecured bond
and junior to potential new straight bond, a busted convertible bond is vulnerable to agency.
This is why under an equity maximizing capital structure, the claim is diluted with new straight
debt. DVA for that situation in gure 1.8(b) is negative in the region where the convertible bond
is in the area of debt. The same holds true for the DAC in gure 1.8(e), which is very negative
in the region where the convertible bond is in the area of debt. Since the excess leverage from
agency also leads to a welfare loss, the welfare loss in gure 1.8(g) is very pronounced in the
region where the convertible bond is busted.
35A busted convertible bond, is a convertible bond where conversion is very unlikely.
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Equivalent to the situation with an unsecured straight bond, under an equity maximizing
capital structure the equityholder is enabled to take advantage of debt agency in the region
where the convertible bond is in the area of debt. That is reected in gure 1.8(d) and gure
1.8(f). EVA as well as EAG are high in the region where the convertible bond is in the area of
debt.
With increasing bankruptcy costs, the debt part of the convertible bond loses value and the
conversion option becomes the dominant part of the convertible bond. The bond is then in the
area of equity. In this region the equityholder faces the problem, namely the convertible bond's
constant debt overhang problem. The equityholder has an incentive to increase leverage in order
to keep his own capital contribution as low as possible.
This is however no longer possible when bankruptcy costs are high because this also means
that the costs of new debt are high. On top of that the success of classical debt agency is
limited since the equityholder cannot compensate the high costs of debt with agency gains. The
equityholder cannot compensate his underinvestment incentive with leverage, but he can also
not compensate it with agency gains. As a consequence of that EVA in the region where the
convertible bond is in the area of equity in gure 1.8(d) is negative. This implies that in this
region, the equity cannot overcome the debt overhang problem and thus the equityholder is
better o not doing the acquisition. The conversion option may therefore prevent positive NPV
acquisitions with high bankruptcy costs.
The bondholder prots from that rather hypothetical situation. Debt agency loses its power,
so DAC in gure 1.8(e) are almost zero in the region where the convertible bond is in the area of
equity. The equityholder's (hypothetical) capital injection is mainly consumed by the incumbent
bondholders in the region where the convertible bond is in the area of equity as illustrated in
gure 1.8(b). Since there is not much room left for excess leverage to serve agency purposes, the
welfare loss in gure 1.8(g) is also almost zero in the region where the convertible bond is in the
area of equity.
1.3.2.5 A note on the size of the value shifts
Since the questions in the intro do not only aim to make an assessment in terms of the direction
of value added and value shifts but also in terms of the order of magnitude, some words about it
for the bankruptcy perspective. Except for the convertible bond, EVA for realistic bankruptcy
costs are between 2% and 5%. DVA is between  4% and 4%, depending if the overall value or
the equity value was the basis of the capital structure trade o. For the convertible bond, which
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includes an embedded option, this option increases the range of the upsides as well as the range
of the downside36 and the gures run up to  =+ 20%. Welfare loss is between 1% and 2%.
Looking at the numbers, the level bankruptcy costs has an impact on a relevant level on the
size of value shifts during acquisition. There is an impact of remarkable level across all contracts,
especially for assets with high bankruptcy costs. So in line with Yagil (1989) - where this was
conrmed empirically - bankruptcy costs are in important nancial parameter that should be
considered when assessing a potential acquisition.
1.3.3 The tax perspective
With the earlier denition of a perspective, the tax perspective is a mesh over a grid of the
master parameter average annual asset volatility (2) and the tax rates (). But it might be
more accurate to call it a leverage ratio perspective, since the corporate tax rate has a direct
eect on leverage.
1.3.3.1 Unsecured straight bond
The results for an unsecured straight bond are presented in gure 1.9. As mentioned at the
beginning, the tax rate has a direct impact on the company's ex ante leverage ratio. On the one
hand, the higher the tax rate is, the more room there is for a tax shield and thus the higher is
the leverage ratio. But on the other hand, the higher the leverage ratio, the less room there is to
play games as there remains little leverage capacity and thus little potential for excess leverage.
Under both, a value maximizing capital structure and an equity maximizing capital structure,
the bondholder favors a regime with a high tax rate for an acquisition - as presented in gures
1.9(a) and 1.9(b).
INSERT FIGURE 1.9 ABOUT HERE
For the equityholder, the preferred tax regime depends on the risk of the acquisition. If the
risk of the new assets is low, then for both, a value maximizing capital structure and an equity
maximizing capital structure, the equityholder prefers a regime with a low tax rate as presented
in gures 1.9(c) and 1.9(d). Otherwise too much of the leverage capacity has to be reserved
for the tax shield. There remains little exibility either to install a value maximizing capital
structure or for agency. Also with a high incumbent leverage ratio, a high tax rate and low risk,
the equityholder faces another debt overhang like problem. He has to contribute fairly much to
36Through the debt overhang problem.
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the acquisition in terms of capital, since a lot of the company's leverage capacity has already been
used and there remains little room for additional leverage. The bondholder may then once more
prot from that investment, since the collateral base is improved and mostly equity nanced.
This is observed in gure 1.9(h) which plots the dierence between the pre-acquisition and the
post acquisition leverage ratio for a value maximizing capital structure. When the acquisition is
one with low risk and the tax rate is high, then there is a lot more room to increase the leverage
ratio than there would be if the tax rate would be low. Since the equityholder cannot overcome
this debt overhang problem, his EVA - as presented in gure 1.9(c) - is negative in the eastern
corner and the acquisition is undesirable. The same problem holds true for an equity maximizing
capital structure - presented in gure 1.9(d) - when risk is low and the tax rate is high.
When the risk of the acquired assets are high, the trade o is dierent. The equityholder's
debt overhang problem becomes less important and asset substitution becomes more important.
If the incumbent leverage ratio is high as a result of the high tax rate, then the equityholder can
dilute the incumbent bondholder's claim by acquiring risky assets - classical asset substitution.
That is illustrated in gures 1.9(c) and 1.9(d) in the north corner. This is less ecient when the
tax rate is low. Then there is less leverage in place and thus less debt that can be diluted. And
potential newly issued debt - which is expensive when the risk is high - has to be issued at fair
value. Asset substitution - which is the agency issue here - is also what is driving the EAG in
gure 1.9(f) - the surface is leaning towards the north corner.
Under an equity maximizing capital structure, the DVA in gure 1.9(b), the DAC in 1.9(e),
the welfare loss in gure 1.9(g) as well as the dierence in ex ante and ex post leverage ratio
in gures 1.9(h) and 1.9(i) experience a reversion of the slope in the middle, similar to the one
observed in the bankruptcy cost perspective in gure 1.5. The equityholder is trading o two
eects here, namely benets from claim dilution against costs of excess debt. When walking
up that tax rate axis from zero, then the excess leverage increases - and with that the agency
costs and the welfare loss. But then further up the grid, this is reversed. Then excess leverage
becomes very costly and is reduced. This is why the peak of excess leverage and thus the bottom
of welfare loss is somewhere in the interior.
1.3.3.2 Senior bond, callable bond and CLO
For the senior bond, the DVA and the EVA surfaces are presented in gures 1.10(a) and 1.10(b).
This trade o is with respect to acquisitions as one would expect: The bondholder favors a
high tax rate, because then there is not much nancial exibility left and not a lot of room
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for agency. For the equityholder, the situation is exactly reversed. As it is presented in gure
1.10(b), for high tax rates the EVA is negative and thus the acquisition is not desirable for the
equityholder. This is because of the debt overhang problem that the seniority clause bears and
that is reinforced by a high tax rate.
INSERT FIGURE 1.10 ABOUT HERE
The EVA surface for a renance callable bond presented in gure 1.11(a) is increasing in the
tax rate. This might be surprising. The result is driven by the assumption that assets are traded
at their unlevered after tax value. Then the higher the interest rate, the larger is the tax shield
that the company can generate by leveraging the asset.
INSERT FIGURE 1.11 ABOUT HERE
The EVA of the CLO is presented in gure 1.11(b). With the CLO, the acquisition is leveraged
separately. Similar to the callable bond, the EVA is increasing in the tax rate, since the newly
acquired assets are traded at their unlevered after tax value.
1.3.3.3 Convertible bond
The situation with the convertible bond is more complicated, since two payo proles are mixed.
It was noted earlier, exercising the conversion option bears a loss in tax shield. In Stein (1992)
convertible bonds were termed backdoor equity nancing. The loss in tax shield is in some sense
a negative consequences of that. The level of the tax rate inuences the likeliness of conversion
and thus the region in which the conversion option dominates the convertible bond's value. The
loss in tax shield is increasing with the tax rate, conversion is therefore more likely when the tax
rate is low. This is why DVA for both approaches to maximize the capital structure in gures
1.12(a) and 1.12(b) is high at the lower end of the tax rate axis. The option part of the bond
dominates there.
INSERT FIGURE 1.12 ABOUT HERE
The equityholder is again stuck with the constant debt overhang problem that the conversion
option bears. The EVA surface in gure 1.12(c) and 1.12(d) is decreasing towards the lower end
of the tax rate axis - the region were conversion is likely - which reects the equityholders debt
overhang problem. It is also illustrated in the special gure 1.12(h) which presents the company's
ex post dierence in leverage ratio between a value maximizing and an equity maximizing capital
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structure. The excess leverage in gure 1.12(h) is increasing towards the lower end of the tax
rate axis, since the equityholder has an incentive to use debt instead of equity, because there is
substantial nancial exibility. This excess leverage is diluting to the incumbent bondholder's
claim, but it is not the bond part that is aected - it is not dominating - but the option part
of the convertible bond. This is because the excess leverage shrinks the value of the equity and
thus lowers the value of the incumbent bondholder's hypothetical equity stake. It is a form of
claim dilution. This is why - despite the high excess leverage - DAC in gure 1.12(e) are raising
steeply towards the lower end of the tax rate axis, but the welfare loss in gure 1.12(g) is only
moderately increasing. The agency gains of the equityholder in that situation on gure 1.12(f)
are only moderate, since the equityholder is not trying to generate agency gains but is rather
trying to avoid agency losses resulting from the debt overhang problem.
On the other end of the tax rate axis - the higher end - the situation is similar to the unsecured
straight bond. In that area the bond part of the convertible bond is dominating its ex ante value
- the convertible bond is busted. The equityholder is then again in the position to dilute the
incumbent bondholder's claim, by taking on excess leverage and acquiring risky assets. The
EVA in gures 1.12(c) and 1.12(d) as well as EAG in gure 1.12(f) are - as a result of asset
substitution - higher when the acquired asset's annual volatility is high.
At the high end of the tax rate axis, there is a lot of tax shield to gain for the equityholder,
since assets are assumed to be traded at their unlevered after tax value. But also at the high
end of the tax rate axis, a lot of the company's leverage capacity is already used to create a tax
shield. There is not much room for excess leverage to generate agency gains as illustrated in
gure 1.12(h). The agency gains from excess leverage in gure 1.12(f) and the excess leverage
itself in gure 1.12(h) are therefore not the highest at the high end of the tax rate axis, but
somewhere in the middle, where the convertible bond slides from the area of equity to the area
of debt. Or to put that in other words, the agency gains are the highest at the point where the
dominating part of the convertible bond is switched from the option part to the bond part.
What is now interesting to see is that - despite the fact that agency through excess leverage
is the most ecient in the middle of the grid - generating EVA by taking advantage of the tax
shield is creating more value under an equity maximizing capital structure than taking advantage
of agency. EVA in gure 1.12(d) is higher at the high end of the tax rate axis than in the middle,
where agency is the most ecient. So, if a convertible bond is the incumbent bond, a high tax
rate tends to bust the incumbent convertible bond in the event of an acquisition. But it also
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oers some protection to the incumbent bondholder against agency, since under a high tax rate
agency through excess leverage becomes unattractive.
1.3.3.4 A note on the size of the value shifts
The size of the inuence of a change in tax rate to the value shifts is in the range of 8% for bonds
without options and up to 30% for realistic gures for a convertible bond. The reason for that
dierence is the potential destructive eect of conversion options on the tax shield. This seems
high compared with Graham (2000), who estimated the tax benet of debt to be between 4%
and 10%. The model in this paper clearly overestimates the tax benets to debt. This is because
the model is a static model of capital structure which tend to overestimate leverage ratios and
thus tax benets of leverage. A dynamics model like Goldstein et al. (2001) would allow for
more decent leverage ratios, but would also tremendously increase the complexity of analyzing
structured debt contracts and acquisitions.
Are tax benets/losses of acquisitions therefore of negligible size? Academic and anecdotal
evidence suggests that the answer is no. Lewellen (1971) rst suggested tax benets as a reason
for an acquisition. Brealey et al. (1981) however, list tax benet from acquisitions under dubious
reasons for mergers. But it seems that their categorization in sensible and dubious reasons for
mergers would be largely equivalent to a categorization into economic and nancial reasons for
mergers. So Brealey et al. (1981) generally have doubts that there are nancial reasons for an
acquisition. The results in Leland (2007) as well as the results in this paper suggest that there
are nancial reasons for an acquisition.
Tax issues are an important part of every due diligence prior to an acquisitions. This is to
some extend because of scal positions that occur as a result of the implementation of the merger
e.g. legal restructuring or deferred taxes that must be realized.
1.4 What is a good contract...
This chapter aims at transferring the above analysis in recommendations for companies where
unexpected acquisitions are potentially an issue. It is therefore set to answer 6 that was posed
at the beginning.
42
1.4.1 ...when risk is the main concern?
A simple unsecured straight bond is not a good choice. It is vulnerable to agency - especially
when the risk is high. Although one would expect companies to avoid to generate agency gains
- they want to keep a clean credit history - it is in an actual case dicult to determined if the
gains that the shareholder make from the acquisition are a result of value added or of agency. If
both, the debt certicates and the shares are listed, the price movements and the movements in
volatility may give a hint of what happens, but it is still dicult to tell. But even in the absence
of agency, the equityholder favors risky acquisitions as a result of the convexity of his claim. The
straight bond however is a concave claim and favors save acquisitions.
It has been discussed in the last section, how the situation changes when one of the following
contractual features is added to the debt contract: A seniority clause, an early redemption clause,
bankruptcy remoteness and an embedded conversion option. Unless the acquisition is negative
i.e. it is a spin-o, a seniority clause oers almost perfect protection against debt dilution and
asset substitution. It creates however a new agency problem that is similar to debt overhang. It
is especially strong when the risk of the acquisition is somewhat similar to the assets in place.
Then most of the added value of the acquisition is absorbed by the bondholders and the acqui-
sition loses attractiveness for the equityholder.
An embedded call option oers a solution to this problem. It allows the equityholder to
redeem the incumbent bond and renance it with a bond issued at fair value. Within the scope
of this model, an early redemption clause solves the debt overhang problem associated with the
seniority clause. A similar argument is made in Childs et al. (2005), but with short term debt
rather than with callable debt. Callable bond often include a penalty fee, so this option to re-
structure is - as opposed to the model in this paper - costly. But as recognized in Hennessy and
Tserlukevich (2008), this penalty fee is tax deductible like interest, which lowers the cost of the
option to restructure.
Securitization is a dierent solution to the two agency problems mentioned above. Leland
(2007) argues that there are large benets from securitization when the company backs the CLO
with assets that are very save (2 = 0:04) or that are very risky (2 = 0:5). Figure 1.3(c) presents
the dierence in EVA between securitization and restructuring an incumbent callable bond. I
use numbers a bit dierent, but I conrm that securitization is valuable for high risk assets. On
the other end of the scale there is no advantage of securitizing a low risk acquisition but I do not
go as deep down the scale as in Leland (2007).37
37The median annual asset volatility of a AAA-rated company is estimated at 0:21 by Schaefer and Strebulaev
(2008). Although the value in Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) might be overestimated, it is to doubt if there
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A convertible bond is rather messy when it comes to an acquisition. It is vulnerable to
agency and the conversion option creates a debt overhang problem for risky acquisitions. Anec-
dotal evidence presented earlier shows, that convertible bonds are frequently renanced around
acquisitions, sometimes the bondholders even have some of the bargaining power. Taking evi-
dence from this model, it makes sense to issue convertible bonds callable to avoid the potential
problems around an acquisition. In Vanden (2009) an altered payo structure for a convert-
ible bond is proposed that - within his framework - solves the agency problems associated with
a convertible bond around an acquisition. However, I think there is a legal and an economic
problem associated with that payo structure: I doubt whether an instrument with the payo
structure in Vanden (2009) would be classied as debt by the tax authority or the bankruptcy
court, more likely it will be classied as hidden equity. Furthermore, the payo structure is such
that default occurs when asset values are high. This leads to high ex post bankruptcy costs and
thus increases the cost of debt.
The overall recommendation from the evidence of the model in this paper would be to issue
the incumbent debt callable and with a seniority clause. If the acquisition is very risky, then
securitizing the acquisition makes sense. A convertible bond ought to be issued callable, to avoid
potential problems around an acquisition.
1.4.2 ...when bankruptcy costs are the main concern?
The issues for an unsecured straight bond are similar to the risk perspective but dierent in order
of magnitude. Agency issues are the most pronounced somewhere in the middle of the grid at an
average level and they are low for very high and very low bankruptcy costs. A regime with low
bankruptcy costs is favorable for the equityholder. For this regime, there are almost no agency
costs for the incumbent bondholder. For high bankruptcy costs agency is reduced, but does not
entirely disappear.
A seniority clause reverses the equityholder's trade o: As a result of the debt overhang
problem associated with that clause, the equityholder favors now a regime with high bankruptcy
costs. This makes it problematic.
A call option preserves the shape of the EVA, the equityholder favors a regime with low
bankruptcy costs. For securitization - the call option's rival - Gorton and Souleles (2007) put
forward, that bankruptcy cost consideration are the most important motive for asset securiti-
zation and that companies with risky assets and high bankruptcy costs are likely to securitize
exist corporate assets that are as deep down the lower end of the volatility scale as in Leland (2007). In 2007,
residential mortgage were thought to be at that low level - today the assessment would probably be dierent.
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assets. Figure 1.7(c) presents the dierence in EVA between securitization and restructuring
an incumbent callable bond. As opposed to Gorton and Souleles (2007) and similar to Leland
(2007), this dierence is low over the entire grid. The dierence is the largest 1:5% when the
assets have low bankruptcy costs and high risk.
If a convertible bond is the incumbent bond, then the situation is - from an agency perspective
- ambivalent: On the one hand, the bankruptcy costs inuence the likelihood of actual conversion
of a convertible bond. Everything being equal, the higher the bankruptcy costs, the more is the
conversion option worth relative to the bond part of the convertible bond - the convertible bond
is in the area of equity. So, when bankruptcy costs are high, the equityholder's debt overhang
problem is more sever and he has no incentive to pursue acquisitions. On the other hand, when
bankruptcy costs are low, the bond part dominates the situation - the convertible bond is in the
area of debt. The convertible bond is junior to any new debt and thus very vulnerable to agency.
The bottom line for the convertible bond is, that it is vulnerable to agency around acquisitions
and the level of bankruptcy costs determine which stakeholder suers from the agency costs.
Again a convertible bond should be issued callable.
The overall recommendation for a regime with low bankruptcy costs is unsecured straight
debt or securitization. The rst recommendation is because claim dilution through acquisitions
is nearly impossible when bankruptcy costs are low. Also under unsecured straight debt, the
equityholder actually favors a regime with low bankruptcy costs. This holds across the entire
risk grid.
For assets with high risk, securitization is favorable. It makes the equityholder better o
than callable debt, there is no claim dilution and no debt overhang and the seniority clause is
potentially harmful for the bondholder. So it is certainly true for the specic case in Leland
(2007) that bankruptcy costs consideration are not relevant in size. A more extensive analysis
however, reveals that - in line with Gorton and Souleles (2007) - bankruptcy cost indeed drive
the application of securitization. In a way both papers are right, Leland (2007) for the specic
case analyzed in section IV.B while Gorton and Souleles (2007) is right in terms of quality and
for a broader consideration.
1.4.3 ...when taxes are the main concern?
Taxes help to protect the holder of an unsecured straight bond from agency. This is because
with high taxes, much of the leverage capacity of the company has to be used for a tax shield
and there remains little exibility for excess leverage for agency.
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For the same reason, high taxes worsen the debt overhang problem that the equityholder
faces with a seniority clause.
Both, callable debt and securitization favor a high tax rate, since it increases the tax shield
generate with the acquisition. In gure 1.7(c), the dierence between the EVA after an acquisi-
tion involving a redeemed callable bond and one involving securitization. The tradeo between
callable debt and securitization depends more on risk than it does in the tax rate. Generally, a
higher tax rate tends to favor callable debt.
The convertible bond is again vulnerable to agency through claim dilution and debt overhang.
It ought to be issued callable.
When the tax rate is low, unsecured debt is vulnerable to agency. The debt overhang associ-
ated to a seniority clause is low and thus a call clause is almost neutral. A callable senior bond
is therefore to favor when taxes are low.
When taxes are high, claim dilution is less of a problem but an unsecure straight bond is still
vulnerable to asset substitution. If the risk of the acquisition is not too high, unsecured straight
debt can be appropriate. If it is not, again callable senior debt is to favor.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature of capital structure by analyzing the impact of an unex-
pected corporate acquisition on a set of dierent incumbent structured debt contracts. Unsecured
debt, senior debt, callable debt, securitization and conversion options were analysed in this pa-
per.
Unsecured debt is vulnerable to claim dilution and asset substitution. By taking on excess
leverage the equityholder can transfer value from the unsecured straight bond to his own claim.
High risk favors agency costs, while high bankruptcy costs - through high costs of leverage - and
a high tax rate - through the fact that most of the company's debt capacity has to be allocated
to the tax shield - oer some protection from debt agency. But especially the second protection
immediately opens another agency problem, namely one that is similar to debt overhang. The
bondholder is potentially free riding on acquisitions that the equityholder is nancing.
A seniority clause protects the bondholder from debt agency. But it allows the bondholder
again to free ride on the acquisition. With an incumbent bond that has a seniority clause, the
equityholder leaves value added on the table that is absorbed by the bondholder. This problem
is especially pronounced when risk and bankruptcy costs are low.
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A new motive was proposed to issue callable bonds. An early redemption clause oers the
equityholder the option to restructure the incumbent debt. The equityholder can renance a
bond that would otherwise forces him to leave money on the table. A seniority clause combined
with a call option is often a good choice for a company where unexpected acquisition might be
an issue. The seniority clause protects the bondholders from agency and the call option makes
sure that there will be no money left on the table.
Securitization is a structuring tool that applies bankruptcy remoteness. This oers protec-
tion from agency as well against both, claim dilution and debt overhang. It also helps to reduce
the nancing costs of very high risk acquisition by separating the bankruptcy risk and taking
advantage of limited liability.
Incumbent convertible bonds are problematic with acquisitions. When the bond is in the
area of debt it is vulnerable to claim dilution, when it is in the area of equity, the equityholder
suers a constant debt overhang problem. It makes sense to issue convertible bonds callable and
anecdotal evidence suggest that convertible bonds are renanced around acquisitions.
In terms of order of magnitude, the value added and the value transfers between the claimhold-
ers are of perceivable size, but mostly within single digit percentages. Anecdotal as well as
academic evidences suggest that this is a level that is relevant to the investors implying that
careful structuring of debt contracts has not only implications in quality but also in quantity.
The welfare loss from agency is similar to Mauer and Sarkar (2005): not very pronounced and
seldom about 1%. It is associated with excess leverage to dilute debt claims.
Finally the question to answer was what a good contract is for companies with potential
acquisitions. A callable senior bond oers protection to both forms of the agency problem by
adding protection to the bondholder and exibility to the equityholder. For high risk acquisition
it can be worth while to explore the advantages of bankruptcy remoteness. If risk is low then
there is no need for structuring and simple unsecured straight debt is applicable. Convertible
bonds are problematic around acquisitions and should be redeemed.
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Appendix
I Standard parameter values
Fixed Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Expected present value of asset 1 X01 100
Expected present value of asset 2 X02 100
Annual volatility of asset 1 1 0.22
Conversion ratio of a convertible bond  0:25
Table 1.1: Values for parameters of the model in section 1.2 that are xed.
Fixed Parameters, unless they are part of the examples
Description Parameter Value
Correlation between asset 1 and asset 2 1;2 0:5
Bankruptcy costs  0:23
Corporate tax rate  0:2
Time to maturity T 5 years
Table 1.2: Values for parameters of the model in section 1.2 that are xed unless mentioned
otherwise.
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II Illustrations on the risk perspective
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(e) Debt agency costs
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(f) Equity agency gains
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(g) Welfare loss
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2
4
6
8
10
12
ρσ2
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 le
ve
ra
ge
 ra
tio
 (le
ve
rag
e r
ati
o i
n (
%)
)
(h) Excess leverage of an equity
maximizing capital structure
Figure 1.1: The value added/loss for the stakeholder, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss and
the excess leverage of an agency maximizing capital structure of an acquisition for an unsecured
straight bond over a 2=-plane.
53
ii Senior secured bond
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(a) Debt value added
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(b) Equity value added
Figure 1.2: The value added/loss for the stakeholder of an acquisition for a senior secured bond
over a 2=-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing capital coincide in this case.
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iii Callable bond and CLO
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(a) Equity value added, callable bond that has been
renanced
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(b) Equity value added, CLO
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(c) Dierence in Equity value added between a CLO
and a renanced callable bond
Figure 1.3: The equity value added/loss of an acquisition for a callable bond that has been
renanced and a CLO over a 2=-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing
capital coincide in this case.
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(f) Equity agency gains
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(h) Post acquisition leverage ratio,
value maximizing capital structure
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(i) Post acquisition leverage ratio,
equity maximizing capital struc-
ture
Figure 1.4: The value added/loss, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss and the post acquisi-
tion leverage ratios of an acquisition for a convertible bond over a 2=-plane.
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III Illustrations on the bankruptcy costs perspective
i Unsecured straight bond
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
α
σ2
D
eb
t V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
(a) Debt value added, value max-
imizing capital structure
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
α
σ2
D
eb
t V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
(b) Debt value added, equity max-
imizing capital structure
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
σ2α
Eq
ui
ty
 V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
(c) Equity value added, value
maximizing capital structure
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
σ2α
Eq
ui
ty
 V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
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(h) Excess leverage of an equity
maximizing capital structure
Figure 1.5: The value added/loss for the stakeholder, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss and
the excess leverage of an agency maximizing capital structure of an acquisition for an unsecured
straight bond over a =2-plane.
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(a) Debt value added
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(b) Equity value added
Figure 1.6: The value added/loss for the stakeholder of an acquisition for a senior secured bond
over a =2-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing capital coincide in this
case.
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iii Callable bond and CLO
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(b) Equity value added, CLO
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(c) Dierence in Equity value added between a CLO
and a renanced callable bond
Figure 1.7: The equity value added/loss of an acquisition for a callable bond that has been
renanced and a CLO over a =2-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing
capital coincide in this case.
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(f) Equity agency gains
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(g) Welfare loss
Figure 1.8: The value added/loss, the agency gains/losses and the welfare loss of an acquisition
for a convertible bond over a =2-plane.
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IV Illustrations on the tax Perspective
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(h) Dierence in leverage ratio
before and after the acquisition,
value maximizing capital structure
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Figure 1.9: The value added/loss for the stakeholder, the agency gains/losses, the welfare loss
and the dierence in leverage of an acquisition for an unsecured straight bond over a =2-plane.
61
ii Senior secured bond
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0
2
4
6
8
10
σ2τ
D
eb
t V
al
ue
 A
dd
ed
/L
os
t (%
)
(a) Debt value added
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(b) Equity value added
Figure 1.10: The value added/loss for the stakeholder of an acquisition for a senior secured bond
over a =2-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing capital coincide in this case.
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(a) Equity value added, callable bond that has been
re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(b) Equity value added, CLO
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(c) Dierence in Equity value added between a CLO
and a renanced callable bond
Figure 1.11: The equity value added/loss of an acquisition for a callable bond that has been
renanced and a CLO over a =2-plane. The value maximizing and the equity maximizing
capital coincide in this case.
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(h) Excess leverage of an equity
maximizing capital structure
Figure 1.12: The value added/loss for the stakeholder, the agency gains/losses, the welfare
loss and the excess leverage of an agency maximizing capital structure of an acquisition for an
convertible bond over a =2-plane.
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Chapter 2
Market segmentation and capital
structure
Gabriel H. Neukomm1
Abstract
Most contributions on capital structure assume a frictionless market, in which the optimal capital struc-
ture depends solely on a company's characteristics. Recent empirical evidence on market segmentation
in the corporate bond market has called this assumption into question. This paper analyzes the implica-
tions of segmentation in the corporate bond market on optimal capital structure. The paper provides a
number of insights, three of which are as follows: First, under market segmentation the capital structure
trade o exhibits discontinuities and the optimal solution is potentially a corner solution. Second, around
the segmentation bounds companies have a local incentive to constrain leverage in order to maintain their
position in the higher rated market segment. This leads to apparently underleveraged companies. Third,
the degree of arbitrage activity in a weakly segmented market inuences the optimal capital structure
and potentially mitigates some of the costs of market segmentation to companies, if the activity has
enough intensity.
JEL Classication Numbers: G24, G32
Keywords: Capital structure, market segmentation, corporate nance with frictions
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2.1 Introduction
After the publication of the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958), a large number of
subsequent publications have analyzed the eects of a comprehensive set of issues2 on a com-
pany's capital structure decision. Also a number of frameworks3 for the optimal capital structure
have been proposed.
Especially inuential were Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996), which
started a stream of literature that relies on contingent claim valuation. These papers however,
assume an entirely frictionless capital market with complete market access of all market par-
ticipants. In this type of framework, debt claims are redundant assets. This enables arbitrage
free valuation which is entirely independent of the market's characteristics and solely depends
on the company's characteristics. It becomes irrelevant to the capital structure decision in what
market segment a company operates i.e. what investors invest into a company's securities. This
assumption is inherent to a wide range of models and contributions to capital structure.
It is widely accepted that this assumption conicts with the extensive anecdotal and empiri-
cal evidence on frictions in the corporate bond market. Modigliani and Sutch (1966) as well as
Modigliani and Sutch (1967) rst documented a form of maturity-induced market segmentation
in the market for government bonds. Kisgen (2006), Kisgen and Strahan (2010), Chen et al.
(2010) and Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) among others documented, how the demand for
and the costs of corporate debt capital are inuenced by market segmentation.
This is reinforced by anecdotal evidence. The market access of an individual investor often
depends on his prole.4 There is a substantial hedge fund activity devoted to arbitrage market
segmentation5 and the survey conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001) on the practice of cor-
porate nance identied ratings as a very important decision variable. This implies that capital
structure is driven by factors that lie beyond a company's fundamentals.
This paper addresses the implications of market segmentation on capital structure. In a two
period model of capital structure that has its root in Leland (2007), combined with a mean-
variance market for corporate securities that is segmented, this paper aims to answer how com-
2These issues include taxes such as in Miller (1977), bankruptcy costs such as in Hirshleifer (1966) and various
forms of agency like claim dilution in Schwartz (1989), debt overhang in Myers (1977) and the free cash ow
problem in Jensen (1986).
3These include the trade-o theory rst formalized by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), the pecking order theory
proposed in Myers and Majluf (1984) and the market timing theory proposed in Baker and Wurgler (2002).
4This includes aspects such as private vs. institutional investor, various denitions of qualied and unqualied
investors and protection to investors in funds among others.
5This takes place under the label capital structure arbitrage. See Berndt and Veras de Melo (2003) for an
introduction to capital structure arbitrage and Choi et al. (2010) for the empirical importance of arbitrage capital
to the non-investment grade segment of the corporate bond market.
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panies are aected by and how their capital structure trade o is altered by strong and weak
market segmentation, as well as how companies incorporate the eects of market segmentation
into their choice of capital structure.
In the model, there is a company that has assets in place and implements its capital structure.
If the company dips into the bond market, it is exposed to market segmentation in the corporate
bond market. Market segmentation means, that not all investors have the same opportunity
set, the market is split into subsets. Under complete market segmentation, which is what is
assumed in section 2.3, all investors are subject to market segmentation and have access only
to one market segment. The subsets do not communicate with each other. In section 2.4, the
market is assumed to be weakly segmented, which means that some investors have access to all
market segments while other investors remain restricted to invest in one single market segment.
The friction of complete market segmentation that is assumed in section 2.3 activates the
relevancy of the supply characteristics in the corporate bond market to the valuation of a bond.
A company's objective function to optimal capital structure is a trade o in the spirit of Kraus
and Litzenberger (1973). The company receives the advantage of the tax shield but it carries the
burden of bankruptcy costs and - as a contribution of this paper - it carries the burden of market
segmentation associated with its securities. The burden of market segmentation associated with
a particular security, consists of the discount of the security's equilibrium price to that security's
value in a frictionless market. A security's value in a frictionless market in turn corresponds to
the arbitrage free value in the literature on capital structure in frictionless markets.
Under complete market segmentation, this discount depends on three elements: First it de-
pends on the question in what market segment the company is active. The assignation to a
market segment is drawn according to a company's risk level, which includes both, the risk as-
sociated with the company's assets as well as the risk associated with the company's leverage.
Second, the market segments dier in the supply of capital, which is in this model assumed to
be nite and declining with lower market segments. The discount thus depends on the aggregate
supply of capital of the mean-variance market of the segment the company is active in. Third,
the discount also directly depends on the company's risk level. So, what ultimately drives the
discount is the supply of capital in the market segment the company is active in and the risk level
associated with a corporate security. Under weak market segmentation in section 2.4, the dis-
count additionally depends on the degree of arbitrage activity. This extends the standard trade
o model to a generalized trade o model that accounts for the characteristics of a segmented
corporate bond market. This generalization has a direct eect on companies' capital structure
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and leads to rationales for some observations on corporate nancing behavior, that cannot be
explained under the standard trade o model.
The transition from one segment to another causes a discontinuous shock to the supply of
capital a company enjoys i.e. this risk-induced market segmentation leads to discontinuities in a
company's capital structure trade o. These discontinuities occur if a company operates at the
boundary of a market segment, and allow that for some companies - but not necessarily all - the
optimal capital structure is a corner solution.
This is a stylized fact that has been recently document in the empirical literature on capital
structure, such as in Kisgen (2006), Kisgen and Strahan (2010), Chen et al. (2010) and Cher-
nenko and Sunderam (2012). Kisgen (2006) as well as Kisgen and Strahan (2010) investigate the
inuence of discrete i.e. discontinuous costs associated with a change in credit rating on capital
structure. Chen et al. (2010) provide evidence for a discontinuous shock between the invest-
ment grade and the non-investment grade segment by comparing cumulative abnormal returns
subsequent to a mechanical change in credit ratings. Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) use a
regression discontinuity approach and nd a discontinuity between the investment grade and the
non-investment grade market segment. The generalized trade o model in this paper provides
a theoretical foundation and explanations that match these stylized facts based on risk-induced
market segmentation in the corporate bond market.
As a result of these discontinuities, some companies - but not all - have an incentive to main-
tain their assignment to a higher market segment. As the risk of a corporate bond - which is the
decisive parameter for the segment assignment - is inuenced by the choice of leverage, such a
company is able to implement its assignment to the higher segment by a reduction in leverage.
This creates a new rationale for the underleverage puzzle that was observed by Miller (1977) and
Graham (2000). Market segmentation creates a local incentive to constrain leverage in order
to remain in a higher market segment. This materializes itself in apparently underleveraged
companies and additionally explains the dispersion in the data on leverage ratios.
In an insightful contribution, Choi et al. (2010) have analyzed the role of arbitrage activity
to the supply of corporate bonds.6 They simultaneously investigated demand and supply of
corporate bonds and they found, that various measures for the ow of arbitrage capital have a
signicant inuence on the demand for corporate capital. This holds especially true for the 2008
short selling ban, that precluded some arbitrage strategies on corporate bonds.
Section 2.4 provides a theoretical foundation that matches this empirical fact. In the respec-
6Although there study focuses on convertible bonds, there is also a substantial degree of straight debt included
in their sample.
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tive section, the assumption of complete market segmentation is progressively weakened towards
a form of weak market segmentation. Under weak market segmentation there are certain investors
- termed arbitrage traders - that have full market access. To these investors the corporate bond is
approximately a redundant asset and as a consequence, their valuation of a bond corresponds to
the value in a frictionless capital market. This creates an arbitrage opportunity for these traders
between their own assessment of the bond's value and the equilibrium price of the bond, that
is induced by the mean-variance capital supply of the investors, that remain subject to market
segmentation. With growing arbitrage activity, the market converges to a frictionless market
and the segmentation induced friction declines. Consistent with economic intuition the costs
and inuence of market segmentation declines with the market's convergence to a frictionless
market. If the arbitrage activity is high enough, the costs of market segmentation eventually
decline enough, such that the company's local incentive to underleverage disappears. If the arbi-
trage traders account for the entire volume of the bond in question, the market is fully arbitraged
and the arbitrage traders' arbitrage free valuation prevails.
The paper nally discusses and recognizes the role of the initial and sustained ownership
structure of a company's corporate bonds with respect to an owner's market access. As the
degree of arbitrage activity inuences the supply and the valuation of corporate bonds, this has
consequences on a company's costs of debt and on a company's assignment to a market segment.
But the ow of arbitrage capital varies empirically over time. A shift in the volume of arbitrage
activity can therefore have consequences for a company's capital structure without an actual
change in the company's fundamentals.
There are a few older and some very recent contributions that address the consequences
of market segmentation and market characteristics to capital structure. Similar to this paper,
Rubinstein (1973b) and Glenn (1976) address the issue in a mean-variance framework. Rubinstein
(1973b) considers overlapping markets with dierent tastes i.e. levels of capital supply. He shows
how an interior solution to the optimal capital structure prevails, but the respective paper is
primarily interested in a social perspective and not in the perspective of an individual company's
optimal capital structure. Glenn (1976) considers the issue of optimal capital in a segmented
capital market. But the respective paper does not explicitly model how market segmentation
materializes and the conclusions remain very general.
The very recent contributions of Morellec (2010) and Hugonnier et al. (2011) take a dierent
approach. Their interest lies in the consequences of uncertainty on the actual ow of additional
capital in the future, rather than in market segmentation. Their modelling approach explains
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a substantial range of puzzling observations in the practice of corporate nance. It especially
creates an explanation for substantial corporate cash holdings. According to the view presented
here, the assumption of uncertain future capital supply in Morellec (2010) and Hugonnier et al.
(2011) and the assumption of market segmentation are complements rather than substitutes and
could eventually be combined.
The framework for capital structure in this paper is a rm based model. It is widely accepted7,
that this type of rm based model - static or dynamic - does not do very well in explaining ob-
served credit spreads. For that purpose various extensions have been proposed such as additional
risk factors as in Demchuk and Gibson (2006) or additional risk factors combined with endoge-
nous investments such as in Arnold et al. (2012). The present paper solely adds a friction to a
company's nancing problem and not an additional risk factor. It additionally assumes that a
private owner manager provides sucient equity capital to the company.8 As a consequence this
paper does not make a contribution to the literature on the credit spread puzzle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives a motivation based on
theoretical, anecdotal and empirical evidence on why market segmentation plays an important
role in corporate nance. Section 2.3 presents a generalized trade o model of optimal capital
structure that incorporates strong market segmentation. Section 2.4 generalizes this model futher
towards weak market segmentation and discusses the implications. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Why market segmentation matters: anecdotal and em-
pirical evidence
2.2.1 Traditional models on capital structure and market segmentation
A fruit of the assumption of a frictionless capital market is the irrelevance of the investor. What
is meant with that term is, that the demand for risky assets of the external investors is irrelevant
to the pricing of these securities - a fact that follows from the assumption of complete market
access of all market participants. The newly issued debt security is then a redundant asset,
which has in the absence of arbitrage one price that all investors - independent of their demand
for risky securities - agree upon. This price is the arbitrage free price and this methodology is
termed arbitrage free pricing. As such the demand for risky assets is irrelevant to the decision
about the optimal capital structure. This follows from the methodology for derivative pricing
7First analyzed by Jones et al. (1984).
8This is sometimes termed as the private owner manager has deep pockets.
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based on the constructive contributions of Black and Scholes (1973) as well as Merton (1973),
that was popularised for the pricing of corporate bonds by Merton (1974) and Leland (1994).
However, a bond is only redundant, if either the company's asset portfolio is a traded asset
itself or if the company has already issued another security. The former assumption is generally
not given.9 The latter assumption is often only apparently given. It is not enough to have
another security outstanding, all market participants must also have access to this incumbent
outstanding security.10 If this is the case for none of the investors of the new security, markets
are completely segmented. But even if some investors are not subject to market segmentation,
the volume of these investors must be large enough in order to drive the price to its arbitrage
free level. If this is not the case, markets are weakly segmented.
In segmented markets, arbitrage free pricing is limited or even void and the irrelevance of the
investor does not hold. Chen (1995) demonstrated how arbitrage free pricing and equilibrium
pricing do not necessarily coincide under market segmentation. This is naturally even true
for nancial innovations that are pure repacking between segments. This breaks arbitrage free
pricing and thus the irrelevance of the investor, and - contrary to most of the capital structure
literature - the characteristics of the supply side of the capital market inuences the valuation
of corporate bonds and thus optimal capital structure.
2.2.2 Anecdotal evidence
Market segmentation in the bond market was rst proclaimed by Modigliani and Sutch (1966)
as well as Modigliani and Sutch (1967). They observed, that returns earned on government
bonds vary signicantly across maturities. They put forward their behavioral explanation, that
investors dier by time preference. As a consequence their investment opportunity sets dier.
This leads to a maturity-induced market segmentation. This theory is labeled as the preferred
habitat theory.
In the corporate bond market, market segmentation is primarily driven by risk-induced reg-
ulations. Some restrictions step in on the buyer's side: A wide range of investors are restricted
in their investments, either by government regulations or in their by-laws. A prominent ex-
ample is, that most of these investors are restricted from adding non-investment grade bonds
9It is hardly possible to replicate a company's business model with traded securities and derivatives. It might
be approximately true for very specic companies e.g. companies that have a high exposure to commodities, but
even in such a case the replication is at best a crude approximation.
10The new security must also be written on the same asset portfolio as the incumbent security. If the incumbent
and the new security are written on dierent assets belonging to the same corporation but kept in bankruptcy
remote structures, redundancy is not given, even though the company has already a traded security.
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to their portfolios.11 Other restrictions step in on the seller's side: Some issuers are restricted
to sell their securities only to accredited investors, which usually are investors with a certain
size and/or nancial sophistication.12 These primarily risk-induced regulations split the corpo-
rate bond market into segments which are in turn risk-induced. It is then not surprising that
Miller (1986) argued that market segmentation and the bulk of nancial innovations is driven by
regulations.
2.2.3 Empirical evidence
The risk-induced market segmentation is supported by overwhelming empirical evidence. Chen
et al. (2010) conducted a natural experiment. They investigated mechanical changes in ratings
due to changes in the construction of a major bond index. They found a signicant discontinuity
in cumulative abnormal returns between bonds that were upgraded from the non-investment
grade segment to the investment grade segment and bonds that stayed in their previous market
segment. Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) observed the same discontinuity. By applying a
regression discontinuity approach they observed that at the cuto between the investment grade
and the non-investment grade segment, non-investment grade companies are exposed to more
variations in the supply and cost of capital than their peers in the investment grade segment. This
excess variation is not driven by fundamentals. Kisgen (2006) as well as Kisgen and Strahan
(2010) found a signicant inuence of discrete costs of a change in credit rating on capital
structure. Their results are the strongest at the cuto between investment grade and non-
investment grade companies. Also the survey conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001) on
what corporations actually consider when they determine their capital structure, lists our credit
rating as the second highest concern. All these empirical contributions imply that there exists
risk-induced market segmentation in the corporate bond market.
11For example the California public employees' retirement system statement of investment policy for global xed
income program, September 13, 2010 sets limits on investments in individual xed income segments. Another
example are savings association which according to 12 United States Code x1831e(d)(1) (2011) must not hold
non-investment grade bonds. See also Kisgen (2006), paragraph I.A, Kisgen and Strahan (2010), paragraph 1.1
for some more examples and Jiang (2010) for a general primer.
12Most developed jurisdictions have a denition for accredited investors. Denition in the United States: 15
United States Code x77b(a)(15) (2011). Denition in the European Union: Annex II of Directive 2004/39/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in nancial instruments amending
Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, Ocial Journal of the European Union, L 145, 30/04/2004
pages 0001 - 0044.
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2.2.4 Consequences for capital structure
This regulation, risk and ultimately rating induced segmentation has practical consequences for
corporations. Because of the exclusion of some investors from lower market segments - voluntary
or mandatory - the supply of capital declines in these lower market segments. The market is tight
relative to higher segments. This naturally leads to higher cost of debt for corporations operating
in the lower segments of the debt market and additionally to an incentive to corporations to stay
in higher market segments.
2.3 Generalized trade o model
This section constructs a generalized trade o model that accounts for market segmentation.
Subsection 2.3.1 sets up the environment, subsection 2.3.2 introduces the supply schedule of
corporate debt capital under complete market segmentation, subsection 2.3.3 introduces the
objective function for the optimal capital structure and subsection 2.3.4 provides applications of
the generalized trade o model.
2.3.1 General setup and corporate claims
2.3.1.1 Timing and legal environment
The model in this paper is a two period model with only one single company in the market. The
approach to capital structure i.e. the demand side of the market for capital, is related to Leland
(2007). There are two relevant points in time, namely t = 0 and t = T . Two legal characteristics
that are according to Armour et al. (2009) constructive for a developed economy are assumed to
hold within this paper: Companies are subject to limited liability and interest payments are tax
deductible. The corporate tax rate is denoted by  .
As a result of the static nature of the model and limited liability, a company is in default if its
liabilities exceed its assets. It is then liquidated following a Chapter 713 procedure.14 Bankruptcy
results in two forms of bankruptcy costs: I) the company loses some xed share  of its asset
value15 and II) the company loses its tax shield16.
1311 United States Code Chapter 7 (2011).
14There is no agency about the timing of the bankruptcy proceedings.
15This captures the resale discount and the procedural costs.
16As I have outlined in chapter 1, it is disputed whether this is true. Kim (1978) argues in a similar direction.
For an argument, why this is most probably the right assumption I refer the reader to Kim (1978) or to the
mentioned expose.
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2.3.1.2 Assets
Corporate assets in this model are denoted by Xt where t is the point in time. The assets are a
random cashow that a company generates at t = T from some business activity. This random
cashow is assumed to be XT  N (X ; X) with X 2 (0;1)17 and X 2 (0;1)18. The cashow
from operations are earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The EBIT minus the interest
payments are a company's taxable income.
There also exists a risk free rate from t = 0 to t = T denoted by rTf .
2.3.1.3 Bonds
A bond is a security that promises to pay a xed amount P at t = T . The bond's t = T payo
is denoted by B

XT ;P

and its t = 0 equilibrium price is denoted by q(P )19. The equilibrium
price depends on the market's supply of bonds that is introduced in section 2.3.2. The interest
payments are included in the nal xed payment P and there are no interim payments. Bonds
in this paper are therefore zero coupon bonds.
The payo of a bond depends on the promised payment P , on the tax shield and on default.
As the taxable income is the EBIT minus the interest payments, a company only pays taxes if
the EBIT lies above a zero tax bound XZT which is at
XT  XZT = P   q (2.1)
This just stipulates that a company only pays taxes if its earnings are above its interest
payments. As introduced in section 2.3.1.1, a company is in default, if its liabilities exceed its
assets that is if XT is such that
0  XT    max

XT  XZT ; 0

  P
The above condition implies that, if XT is less than the debt repayments plus the interest
and the tax payments, a company is in default. The default bound XD solves therefore
0 = XD    max (XD  XZT ; 0)  P
17The expected asset value can be decomposed into an annual net asset return rX by solving X = X0 (1 + rX)
T
where X0 is the size of the company.
18The asset volatility can be decomposed into an annual net asset return volatility &X by solving X = X0&X
p
T .
19From here on forward the argument P - the bonds principal - is suppressed.
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The zero tax bound has to be lower than the default bound, otherwise the interest payment
would exceed the nal xed payment which is a contradiction. As a result the default bound XD
is at
XD = P +

1   q
 (2.2)
Given this bound, the resulting bond payo has the following structure
B

XT

=
8>><>>:
P; if XD  XT
X (1     ) ; if 0  XT < XD
0; if XT < 0
9>>=>>; (2.3)
Equation 2.3 is the ex post payo. The ex ante valuation of the bond i.e. the t = 0 equilib-
rium price q depends on the supply schedule that will be introduced in section 2.3.2. For this
supply schedule and thus the valuation scheme, the expected discounted value and the expected
discounted variance of the bond will be necessary. Expressions for these moments are given by
equations 2.21 and 2.18 in Appendix I.i to this chapter. Note that the payo in equation 2.3
implicitly depends on q through XD and XZT . This lies in the cross dependency between the
tax shield and the payo of the bond. Because of this, there will be no explicit solution to q
and numerical methods have to be applied.
2.3.1.4 Equity
The equity claim in this model is the residual claim on the assets after the bond is served if the
company is solvent, and enjoys limited liability, if the company is in bankruptcy. This yields the
following payo for the residual equity claim
E

XT

=
8><>: X
T   P   

XT  XZT

; if XD  XT
0; if XT < XD
9>=>; (2.4)
where XZT and XD are dened as in equations 2.1 and 2.2. The expected discounted value
and the expected discounted variance of the equity claim are given in equations 2.22 and 2.25 in
Appendix I.ii to this chapter.
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2.3.2 Capital supply to the corporate bond market
2.3.2.1 Approximate linear mean-variance investors
As it was outlined in section 2.2.1, a consequence of segmented markets is the loss of complete
market access of all market participants. In this section it is assumed, that markets are completely
segmented i.e. every market participant has only access to one market segment. As a consequence
of this, a company, that implements its capital structure, is new to the segment, it is considering
to issue a security. By adding a new security to a market segment, the company provides a
nancial innovation to that particular market segment - even if it already has a security trading
in another market segment. A nancial innovation is not simply a redundant asset, but it
enlarges the span of the particular market segment. This fact disables arbitrage pricing and - as
a consequence - an assumption on how the market participants supply capital is necessary.
In this paper it is assumed that the market participants are expected utility maximizers that
have a constant demand for risky securities (CDRS).20 Under the above assumption and under
the assumption of approximative normality of corporate securities, expected utility maximization
is approximately equivalent to linear mean-variance optimization.21 The working assumption in
this paper is therefore, that the market participants that are subject to market segmentation are
approximate linear mean-variance optimizers.22
2.3.2.2 Equilibrium capital supply within a market segment
Agents that are approximate linear mean variance optimizers, value a corporate security based
on its mean S and its variance S . Throughout this paper, optimization problems - including
the capital market investor's portfolio selection problem - are expressed in discounted terms.
Then the T -period risk free rate's expected value equals to once the amount invested. The ith
investor's portfolio problem with respect to the corporate security S is
20This is equivalent of assuming constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
21See Collins and Gbur (1991) for the exact derivation and Tsiang (1972) as well as Hanson and Ladd (1991)
for numerical illustrations for the approximative result.
22The assumption of a mean-variance market for corporate capital appears frequently in the literature on
corporate nance with frictions. Rubinstein (1973a) assumes a mean-variance market model in his synthesis of
portfolio theory and corporate nance theory. It is also assumed by Rubinstein (1973b) and Glenn (1976) in their
contributions on segmented markets as well as in Kim (1978)'s analysis on the role of bankruptcy costs for the
optimal capital structure. The mean-variance market model also remains widely used in practice on both ends of
the market: It is frequently used for capital budgeting as well as for investment management. This is presented
in Graham and Harvey (2001) as well as in Fabozzi et al. (2002). It is part of every textbook about portfolio
management such as Ramaswamy (2003) for example, and - as presented in Lerner (2003) - its use extends beyond
listed securities such as to private equity. Even the laws on investment management are mostly written based on
the mean-variance market model, see Bines (1976).
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max
i0;1
i0 + 
i
1S   i2

i1S
2
(2.5)
s:t: i0 + 
i
1q = w
0
i (2.6)
where i0 denotes the number of risk free bonds, 
i
1 the number of risky securities S, q the
price of security S, i the i
th investor's demand for risky securities23 and w0i the i
th investor's
t = 0 wealth. The problem in equations 2.5 and 2.6 can be reduced to
max
i1
w0i   i1q + i1S   i2

i1S
2
(2.7)
The rst order condition of the reduced problem in equation 2.7 determines the ith investor's
optimal holding of the risky security S which is
i2 =
S   q
i2
(2.8)
The overall market demand for the security S is just the sum of the individual holdings. In
a capital market equilibrium markets have to clear i.e. supply has to match demand. Without
loss of generality, the overall quantity of the risky security S is normalized to one. Then its
equilibrium price q solves the equation
X
i
h
i1
i
 1) 1P
i [i]
S   q
2S
 1 (2.9)
Dene the aggregated market demand parameter for risky securities as   =
P
i [i], then the
equilibrium price for the security S in a CDRS/mean-variance market is
q = S   2S  (2.10)
2.3.2.3 Risk-induced market segmentation
As presented in section 2.2 there is overwhelming anecdotal and empirical evidence for risk-
induced market segmentation in the corporate bond market. This holds especially true for the
border between investment grade and non-investment grade bonds. In this paper it is assumed
that there exists risk-induced market segmentation in the corporate bond market. In this section
this market segmentation is complete, in section 2.4 it is weak.
23This is also termed the investor's coecient of absolute risk aversion or the investor's taste for risk.
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The corporate risk policy in a rm based model is inuenced by two elements: By the risk
of the operational cashows and by the risk of leverage. The risk of the operational cashows is
characterized by the distribution ofXT and as such by X . Leverage is characterized by the choice
of P i.e. the t = T amount promised to the bondholders. Both risk factors are jointly expressed by
a bond's volatility. Additionally, a volatility measurement that maps market segmentation ought
to allow to compare dierent bonds. Denoted B as the annualized and discounted volatility of
a bond's expected gross returns. B serves in this paper as the volatility measurement that maps
market segmentation, as it allows to compare dierent corporate bonds. Remembering that the
gross return RB can be expressed as RB =
B
q where B denotes the bond's t = T expected value
and q denotes the bond's t = 0 equilibrium price, B is expressed as
B =
s
2RB
T
=
1p
T
q
2Bq
(q)2
(2.11)
where 2RB denotes a bonds discounted variance of returns, B the bond's payo as in equation
2.3 and 2B is the bond's variance. 
2
B is given by equation 2.21 while the equilibrium price q
 is
determined by the supply schedule that is introduced in this section by equation 2.13.
The above parameter B includes both risk factors of a company, the one from leverage is
included by P and the one from the company's operations is included by X . The literature
24
generally agrees that the volatility of bonds increases, when walking down the rating scale. This
is primarily a consequence of the higher default rates that bonds with low ratings exhibit.25 It
is therefore consistent to model risk-induced market segmentation by means of B , as it maps a
company's fundamental risk implied in a corporate bond.
Market segmentation is in this section assumed to be strong or complete i.e. the individual
segments of the market do not communicate with each other. Since it is assumed that the
investors in this paper exhibit CDRS, the parameter that controls the aggregated capital supply
to risky securities is  . The market segmentation in this model is drawn by a segmentation
function  : B !  , that maps a particular risk level B on a supply level i.e. on a particular  .
The segmentation function is dened piecewise based on a collection of detachment points that
draw the market segments. These detachment points denote the maximum level of risk that may
be associated with a bond in order to allow the bond to stay in a particular segment. If a bond
24See Reilly and Wright (1997) or Reilly et al. (2009) page 68 for an illustrative and summarizing example and
Bao and Pan (2010) for a recent study.
25There is a simple economic explanation for this, which lies in the bonds capped and concave payo structure:
While a bond has a limited upside potential because it is capped from above, a bond's potential for variations in
expected return is limited. A bond however has a substantial downside potential and as such a large potential
for variation in volatility. Among other things, non-investment grade bonds exhaust the latter potential.
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surpasses that detachment point, it drops into the next lower segment.
It is assumed that the market is split into three segments, a high grade (HG), a medium
grade (MG) and a non-investment grade (NIG) segment. As market segmentation is assumed to
materialize along the lines of B , there are two detachment points that mark the risk-induced
boundaries of the market segments. They are denoted by j , where index j = HG=MG denotes
the detachment point between the high and the medium grade segment and the index j =
MG=NIG the detachment point between the medium and non-investment grade segment. The
associated supply levels within the market segments are denoted by  j ; j 2 fHG;MG;NIGg. The
segmentation function is written as
 (B ;; ) =
8>><>>:
 HG; if B < HG=MG
 MG; if HG=MG < B < MG=NIG
 NIG; if MG=NIG < B
9>>=>>; (2.12)
with B as in equation 2.11,  =

HG=MG;MG=NIG

and   = ( HG; MG; NIG). In section
2.2.4 it was argued that the main consequence from market segmentation is, that the supply of
capital narrows while walking down the rating scale. In order to map the empirical evidence
mentioned in section 2.2.4,  j has to increase when walking down the rating scale i.e.  HG <
 MG <  NIG.
The above approach to model market segmentation is illustrated in gure 2.1. The abscissa
depicts the risk level of a bond B while the y-axis depicts the supply level that is assigned
to a risk level. The white, the gray and the dark gray areas depict the HG, the MG and
the NIG segment respectively. The segments are detached by the detachment points HG=MG
and MG=NIG. The dashdotted line illustrates the way a bond takes through the segmentation
function: As long as the bond's risk level is below HG=MG, the bond is in the HG segment and
the supply level  HG is assigned to the bond. If the bond's risk level is larger than HG=MG but
lower than MG=NIG, the bond is in the MG segment and the bond's supply level jumps to  MG.
If the bond's risk level is large than MG=NIG, the supply level jumps to  NIG.
INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE
The approach is in some sense similar to Rubinstein (1973b)'s assumption of markets with
dierent tastes. However, in Rubinstein (1973b) the question is addressed on how the overlap
drives a capital structure trade o i.e. on how the   that results from the overlaps drives a capital
structure trade o. In this paper the overlap is already concentrated in   and the segmentation
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induced discontinuities are the object of interest. In Glenn (1976) it is not explicitly modelled
how market segmentation materializes.
2.3.2.4 Equilibrium capital supply with risk-induced market segmentation
The equilibrium capital supply and as such the equilibrium price q for a corporate bond in
a market which combines the assumption of CDRS agents as in equation 2.10 with market
segmentation drawn by a segmentation function  (B) as in equation 2.12, is derived as follows:
Since market segmentation is modelled by  (B) that draws the   that is associated with a
particular corporate bond, and since the supply within a particular market segment is given by
equation 2.10, the bonds equilibrium price under complete market segmentation is given by
q = B   2B (B ;; ) (2.13)
Expressions for B and B are given in Appendix I.i to this chapter. As opposed to equa-
tion 2.10, the supply schedule in equation 2.13 is now the supply schedule of the entire market,
that takes into account the market segmentation. The structure of equation 2.13 is basically
the bond's expected value B - which corresponds to the arbitrage free value in the literature
on capital structure without frictions - minus some discount. This discount reects the supply
restrictions of a particular bond and as such it reects the burden of market segmentation a bond
is exposed to. The discount depends on the market's aggregated demand for risky securities  
which is assigned through the segmentation function  (B ;; ), and on the bond's variance
B . So the discount depends on the supply characteristics of the corporate bond market which
are mapped by   and implicitly - through the segmentation function - as well as explicitly on the
bond's variance B . If  j = 0, capital supply is innitely elastic
26 and the friction disappears.
The value of the bond is then equal to its expected value which retrieves the standard trade
o model. The pricing scheme in equation 2.13 exhibits the following comparative statics: The
lower   is, the more elastic is the supply of capital and thus the lower is the discount for a bond
with xed principal P .
The supply schedule in equation 2.13 is dened in terms of B , B and  (B ;; ). These g-
ures implicitly depend on q through the tax shield and market segmentation. This creates cross
dependencies that were already noted in section 2.3.1.3. Because of that there is no analytical
solution to q and the model has to be evaluated numerically.
26This is equivalent of saying the market has risk neutral utility.
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2.3.3 Capital structure decision
It is assumed that at t = 0 a company's assets are already in place but no decision has been taken
yet on the capital structure. It is further assumed that the company's equity is held by an owner
manager that has risk neutral utility.27 If a bond with principal P is issued, the bond's payo is
given by equation 2.3, the market's aggregated demand for the bond is given by equation 2.13,
the payo of the owner manager's residual equity claim is given by equation 2.4 and the owner
manager's valuation of the residual equity claim is given by equation 2.22. The total value V(P )
of a company with a bond outstanding of principal P , is the sum of the value of its claims i.e.
V(P ) = q + E
where E denotes the expected value of the equity claim that is given by equation 2.22.
28
The owner manager maximizes the company's value and thus determines the optimal capital
structure by choosing the principal such that29
P  = argmax
P
fV(P )g = argmax
P

q + E
	
(2.14)
In the maximization problem in equation 2.14 the owner manager trades o the advantage of
the tax shield created by issuing a bond against the costs of bankruptcy and the costs resulting
from the market's limited demand for the risky bond and market segmentation. The approach
presented in this paper is therefore a generalized trade o that accounts not only for the tax
shield and bankruptcy costs, but additionally for the costs resulting from risk-induced market
segmentation. The capital structure trade o does no longer solely depend on the company's
characteristics but additionally on the market's characteristics which are mapped by  ( : ).
Note that the owner manager - despite his risk neutral utility - values the bond the same way
the market does. This is because the owner manager measures the bond's value in terms of the
proceeds the company receives when issuing a bond. This last quantity in turn is the market's
willingness to pay q.
27This implies that equation 2.18 in Appendix I to this chapter represent the owner manager's valuation of
his residual equity claim. Note that the owner manager is assumed to be constrained to hold solely the residual
equity claim in order to avoid the existence of arbitrage opportunities. According to the view presented here,
capital and borrowing constrains to an owner manager are a reasonable assumption and do not have a driving
eect on the model.
28Remember that the owner manager has risk neutral utility.
29There is ex ante no room for agency. An equity maximizing strategy is equivalent to a value maximizing
strategy.
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2.3.4 Application
2.3.4.1 Parameters
In this part, the model and market structure laid out is applied. Table 2.1 reports values for a
rst series of parameters that are xed throughout this paper: The bankruptcy costs  are such,
that they match historical recovery rates in two period models, time to maturity T is the median
debt maturity of corporate bonds, the tax rate  is a literature average, the risk free rate per
annum rf is the medium term median of the treasury constant maturity rate that corresponds
to T and the size of the company X0 is set to X0 = 100.
INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE
Table 2.2 reports values for a second series of base case parameters that are xed throughout
this paper unless mentioned otherwise. In their empirical study on capital structure, Schaefer
and Strebulaev (2008) gave estimates for the asset return volatilities of companies from dierent
rating classes. The values for the asset return volatilities in table 2.2 follow their estimates with
some minor adjustments.30 I consider a AAA and a AA rated company as a company of the HG
segment, a BBB rated company as a company of the MG segment and a B rated company as a
company of the NIG segment.31
INSERT TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE
Because of the comprehensive application of bond pricing models in empirical studies, that
include the assumption of the irrelevance of the investor, the expected values corresponding to
the asset return volatilities above are typically not observed. Potential proxies for asset returns
are returns on commodity or real estate indices. The FTSE NAREIT real estate indices family
exhibits pretty stable long term annual returns of 10% on all levels except for mortgages.32 Greer
(2000) presents an empirical study on long term returns on commodity indices and nds roughly
the same numbers. Variations in asset quality are in this model primarily implemented through
variations in asset volatility.
Market segmentation in this model is induced by the risk associated with a corporate bond,
which is implemented by  (B ;; ). Although the literature
33 agrees on the trend of bond
volatility, when walking down the rating scale, there is less agreement on the size of bond volatility
30The estimates of Bao and Pan (2010) for the asset return volatility lie in a similar order of magnitude, but
they are not pinpointed down to ratings as detailed as in Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008).
31This is how the market is generally understood, see e.g. Fabozzi et al. (1997) page 226.
32Source: http://returns.reit.com/returns/DomesticReturns.pdf, Accessed July 08, 2011.
33See footnote 24.
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and as such on the detachment points between the market segments. Of course this is partly
in the nature of things as the volatility is not directly observable. Another part of the problem
is - as outlined carefully by Bao and Pan (2010) - that there is considerable excess volatility
in corporate bond returns, that persists over the dierent rating classes and decreases with the
sampling frequency. This excess volatility is a surplus in the sense, that it is not explained by
pure default risk. This is however the only source of risk of a corporate bond in a rm based
model. Reilly and Wright (1997) observed a volatility of about 3:5% for HG securities such as
mortgages, 4% for MG securities and 5% for upper level NIG securities34. These gures lie in
the same order of magnitude as the estimates of Bao and Pan (2010), which are corrected for
the excess volatility. The observations of Reilly and Wright (1997) are most probably based
on low frequency data. Since the detachment points ought to lie on the border between the
segments and based on the work of Reilly and Wright (1997) as well as Bao and Pan (2010), the
detachment point HG=MG between the HG and the MG segment ought to be at about 3:75%
and the detachment point MG=NIG between the MG and the NIG segment ought to be at about
4:5%
Finally, the aggregated market demand parameter for the MG market segment  MG, is set
such that it matches the average observed leverage of a BBB company as indicated in Schaefer
and Strebulaev (2008). In the HG segment,  HG is low - only half its MG value - in order to
model the high supply elasticity in this market segment and in order to be close to the standard
trade o model. In the NIG segment,  NIG is double the MG value in order to model the
regulatory and risk-induced capital constraints in the NIG segment.
Compared with estimates from the asset allocation and the insurance literature, the values
above are rather low: Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) have stable estimates around 0:18. An
exception is Paun et al. (2007) that have estimates for the Romanian stock market that match
the assumptions on the  's in this paper. The reason for these resulting low values of   that
matches observed leverage ratios lies in the nature of the rm based model: It is frequently
observed, that these type of models underestimate spreads of corporate bonds while maintaining
adequate leverage ratios.35 This - together with the assumption that the equity holder meets a
potential nancing gap - requires a high aggregated market demand for risky securities and thus
a low   in order to match observed leverage ratios.
Babcock et al. (1993) provide an overview over the estimates for   that have been proposed
34Upper level NIG securities are bonds that have ratings of BB or B. Ratings of CCC and below are low level
NIG bonds.
35See Jones et al. (1984) for the rst analysis and Leland (2009) for an illustrative summary. Even in the
extended model of Demchuk and Gibson (2006) the market price of risk remains rather small.
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in the literature on production theory. These estimates are rather disperse ranging from values
in the neighborhood of the estimates of the asset allocation literature to values well below to
what is assumed in this paper. The average estimate in the literature on production theory is
therefore closer to what is assumed in this paper than the average estimate form the literature
on asset allocation. A sensitivity analysis with respect to   is provided in section 2.3.4.4.2.
2.3.4.2 Capital structure within a market segment
As an introduction, gure 2.2 illustrates the generalized trade o model within a market segment,
i.e. with only one value for  . Figure 2.2(a) presents the capital structure trade o i.e. the total
company value V as a function of leverage, for a set of aggregated market demand parameters  
for a company with the asset volatility of a AA rated company. If   equals zero, the standard
trade o model is retrieved. This is the solid black line in gure 2.2(a). The dashed, dotted
and dashdotted lines in black and grey are the capital structure trade o for the set of  's as
indicated in the legend to gure 2.2(a). Figure 2.2(a) illustrates how the capital structure trade
o is altered in a model with imperfect capital supply. The higher   is, the more is the supply
of capital constrained and as such the more expensive is debt nancing for a company. This
materializes itself in lower total company value for a given leverage ratio.
INSERT FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE
As it is visible in gure 2.2(a), this leads to distinct optimal solutions. This is presented
in gure 2.2(b), the optimal leverage ratio as a function of  . This graph is the envelope of
optimal leverage ratios of the trade o graphs in gure 2.2(a). Figure 2.2(b) is consistent with
the economic intuition, that companies choose lower leverage, if the demand for their bonds is
constrained.
2.3.4.3 The generalized trade o model
2.3.4.3.1 How companies form their capital structure
In gures 2.3 - 2.5 the supply of bonds is constrained and segmented using the structure of
equation 2.13 and the parameters in tables 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.3 presents the capital structure
trade o for companies with the asset volatilities of HG companies in a segmented bond market.
In this paragraph, companies are dierentiated by their asset volatility as indicated in table 2.2.
Figure 2.3(a) involves a AAA rated company. The rst panel in gure 2.3(a) presents the
capital structure trade o in a frictionless market, this is the grey dashed graph, and for a
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segmented market, this is the black solid graph. The solid black line in the second panel in gure
2.3(a) indicates in what market segment the respective bond falls i.e. what   is assigned by the
segmentation function to a AAA rated company given the respective leverage ratio. The panels
go together, they share the scale on the x-axis. The layout as described above is the same for
gures 2.3 - 2.5. As indicated in the rst panel of gure 2.3(a), a company with the asset volatility
of a AAA rated company can take full advantage of its debt capacity and is not constrained by
the segmentation bounds. Only if the company takes on suboptimal excess leverage it would
drop to the MG segment as indicated in the second panel in gure 2.3(a). This corresponds to
the intuition, that a very high rated company with high quality assets is almost not impacted
by market segmentation as it operates in the prime segment.
INSERT FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2.3(b) presents the capital structure trade o for a company with the asset volatility
of a AA rated company. The kinks in the graph in the rst panel of gure 2.3(b) indicate the
impact of market segmentation on this company. If the leverage ratio of the company surpasses
a kink then the company drops in a lower market segment. The rst kink in gure 2.3(b), is at
the point where the company drops from the HG to the MG segment at about a leverage ratio of
0:44. The second kink is at the point where the company drops form the MG to the NIG segment
at about a leverage ratio of 0:48. As a result of the discontinuity in the capital structure trade
o induced by market segmentation, it is possible that for some companies, optimal leverage is a
corner solution rather than an interior solution. This is exactly what happens to a AA rated HG
company as it is close to the bound to the MG segment: Optimal leverage is a corner solution
at the rst kink between the HG and MG and not an interior solution. The company takes into
account the market segmentation and restricts its leverage in order to be able to operate in the
HG market segment.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Kisgen (2006), which conrms the intuitive
idea, that rating induced market segmentation is a highly signicant decision variable for capital
structure, and that the optimal capital structure is for some companies a corner solution rather
than an interior solution. It is also consistent and a potential explanation for the nding of the
Graham and Harvey (2001) survey with respect to ratings.
Quantitatively the generalized trade o model implies a lower leverage ratio than the standard
model: The company with the AA asset volatility is restricted to the corner solution and reduces
leverage to roughly 0:44 in order to stay in the HG segment. With the same capital supply,
but without the kink to the MG segment, the optimal leverage would be at roughly 0:48 which
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constitutes a reduction in leverage of 8:33%.
Figure 2.4(a) presents the capital structure trade o for a company with the asset volatility
of a BBB rated company. The situation is similar to the AA rated company in gure 2.3(b):
There are two kinks in the capital structure trade o, only that in this case, the kink between
the HG and the MG segment has an almost invisible impact and does not have the power to
constraint the company's nancing activities. Despite the higher nancing costs, it is valuable to
the company to surpass the kink between the HG and the MG segment. If the company would
stop at the kink it would not generate enough tax shield i.e. the benets of additional tax shield
generated by higher leverage is higher than the additional costs of market segmentation that
result from the drop into the MG segment. However, the company's optimal capital structure is
again a corner solution, in this case at the kink between the MG and the NIG segment.
That the border between the MG and the NIG segment has a strong segmentation eect has
been conrmed by numerous empirical evidence like Chen et al. (2010) and Kisgen (2006). The
model in this paper provides an approach to capture this observation.
INSERT FIGURE 2.4 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2.4(b) presents the capital structure trade o for a company with the asset volatility
of a B rated company. The asset quality of this company is so bad that market segmentation
has almost no eect on its nancing activities. The company would have to restrict its leverage
too much in order to take advantage of better segments of the bond market. It is more valuable
for this company to issue its debt in the NIG segment of the market and take full advantage of
the tax shield. Consequently the optimal capital structure has an interior solution.
2.3.4.3.2 Optimal leverage versus asset volatility
Figure 2.5 summarizes gures 2.3 and 2.4 from an optimal leverage perspective. The solid black
graph in the rst panel in gure 2.5 is the optimal leverage ratio as a function of a company's
asset volatility under complete market segmentation. It is the envelope of the capital structure
trade o graphs depicted in gures 2.3 and 2.4. The dashed grey graph is the envelope of the
standard trade o model.
INSERT FIGURE 2.5 ABOUT HERE
The generalized trade o model implies decreasing leverage with increasing asset volatility
similar to the standard model. But in the generalized model the optimal leverage decreases more
steeply and has a number of kinks and turning points. This is a result of the constrain in the
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supply of capital and market segmentation. Market segmentation provides an incentive to some
companies to limit their leverage in order to sustain their ratings and thus their access to the
better market segment. After a smooth decrease, the envelope graph exhibits a sudden fall at an
asset volatility of about 0:18 until the switch in market segment at 0:21 from the HG to the MG
segment. In this region between an asset volatility of 0:18 and 0:21, the incentive to companies
to constrain their leverage in order to retain their bonds in the HG segment, is active.
At an asset volatility of about 0:21, the costs of constrained leverage and the associated high
rating become too high and the segment is switched. After the switch in market segment there
is a sudden rise in leverage followed by a smooth decrease until an asset volatility of about 0:23.
The sudden rise in leverage is explained by the loss of the incentive to constrain leverage after
the switch in market segment.
After an asset volatility of about 0:23, it becomes again valuable to constrain leverage in order
to be able to operate in the MG segment. This incentive is valid until an asset volatility of about
0:255 where the costs of constrained leverage are too high and the segment is switched.
This issue is emphasized through gure 2.6. The black solid line in the rst and second panel,
in gure 2.6 is the annual bond volatility of the optimal bond36. In the second panel the grey
dashdotted line is the detachment point between the HG and the MG market segment while
the grey dashed line is the detachment point between the MG and the NIG segment. The solid
black line in the third panel of gure 2.6 indicates to what market segment the particular bond
is assigned i.e. what   is assigned by the segmentation function to a particular optimal bond.
The scales on the x-axis of the three panels match.
INSERT FIGURE 2.6 ABOUT HERE
Similar to the graph of the optimal leverage ratio in gure 2.5, the graph of the volatility
of the optimal bond has turning points and kinks near the detachment points. The graph of
the annual bond volatility of the optimal bond visualize the result of the leverage reduction,
that companies close to the detachment points implement. As illustrated in the second panel of
gure 2.6, the leverage reduction prior to the detachment points allows a company to keep the
volatility of the optimal bond below the detachment points indicated by the dashed and dotted
lines. When the costs of the leverage reduction becomes too high, the segment is switched, the
optimal leverage ratio jumps, which causes the jump in the volatility of the optimal bond.
The general trend of gure 2.5 towards lower leverage than the standard model implies, is
consistent with the under leverage puzzle investigated by Miller (1977) and Graham (2000) and
36The bond that implements the leverage ratio capital structure.
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is partly driven by imperfect demand for risky assets. But additionally, for certain companies
- but not all - optimal leverage falls even steeper. However, as opposed to the idea of credit
rationing such as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it is not the market that is redlining companies on
capital, but companies themselves constrain their leverage as a result of their incentive to stay
in a higher market segment. This results in apparently underleveraged companies as a natural
feedback eect of the segmented structure of the corporate bond market.
Kisgen (2006) presents dierentiated evidence: He found strong evidence of an incentive to
constrain leverage, when companies are close to a switch in market segments. This is exactly
the behavior that the model in this paper rationalizes, by recognizing a market induced feedback
eect on corporate leverage policies. The model is also consistent with the survey of Graham
and Harvey (2001) which found, that ratings have a sustainable inuence on corporate leverage
policies.
2.3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
2.3.4.4.1 Sensitivity to the asset rate of return
This section analyzes the model's sensitivity to two parameters that were kept xed in section
2.3.4.3, namely the annual asset return and the market's aggregated demand for risky securities.
Figure 2.7(a) presents the sensitivity analysis with respect to the annual asset return. The
surface of gure 2.7(a) is the company's optimal leverage ratio as a function of the annual asset
return on the x-axis and the annual asset volatility on the y-axis. The surface exhibits two
trenches, at the region where the surface changes from dark blue to cyan and at the region where
the surface is light green. These leverage trenches are the three dimensional representation of
the pattern that was observed in section 2.3.4.3.2, that a company constrains its leverage if it is
close to a segmentation bound.
INSERT FIGURE 2.7 ABOUT HERE
This is emphasized in gure 2.7(b), which presents the surface of the annual volatility of
the optimal bond as a function of the annual asset return and the annual asset volatility. The
steps in the surface i.e. the regions of the surface where the surface remains at, indicate the
regions, where the company's incentive to constrain leverage in order to keep its optimal bond
in the superior market segment is active. The pattern, that companies have an incentive to
constrain their leverage, if they are close to the segmentation bounds, is therefore preserved
under variations of the annual asset return.
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2.3.4.4.2 Sensitivity to the market's aggregated demand for risky securities
For the sensitivity with respect to the market's aggregated demand for risky securities, a similar
situation presents itself. Both, the optimal leverage surface in gure 2.7(c) as well as the annual
bond volatility surface 2.7(d), exhibit leverage trenches similar to gures 2.7(a) and 2.7(b). The
incentive of companies to constrain leverage close to the segmentation bounds is therefore also
preserved under gentle variations of the market's aggregated demand for risky securities.
2.4 Weak market segmentation
In this section it is assumed that markets are weakly segmented i.e. that some market participants
have full market access while other market participants remain subject to market segmentation.
These arbitrage traders that have full market access, are able to trade the residual equity claim
and exploit this fact strategically. As the arbitrage traders are not subject to the market friction,
to them the bond is approximately a redundant asset37. Thus their valuation of the bond
corresponds to the arbitrage free valuation in a frictionless market. This creates an arbitrage
opportunity for them between the equilibrium valuation of the market participants that remain
subject to market segmentation and their own assessment of the bond's value.
2.4.1 Empirical evidence
If a form of weak market segmentation ought to exist, then a considerable arbitrage activity
ought to be observed. This is indeed the case: It is known under the term capital structure
arbitrage38 and it is a relative value arbitrage strategy conducted primarily by hedge funds i.e.
participants with a good market access. It is the goal of this arbitrage strategy to explore
arbitrage opportunities between dierent corporate claims of the same company.
As capital structure arbitrage is a hedge fund strategy, its volume is not easy to be quantied
directly. However, anecdotal evidence in Berndt and Veras de Melo (2003) indicates, that the
activities are substantial.39
To my knowledge, the only empirical analysis that analyses the importance of arbitrage
capital to the corporate bond market is Choi et al. (2010). Although their focus lies primarily on
convertible bonds, there is also some straight debt included in their data. They simultaneously
37Redundancy is not exact as in bankruptcy, the bondholder is protected against XT  0 through limited
liabilities. It is assumed that the probability of XT  0 is small enough in order to provide a reasonable
replication.
38Berndt and Veras de Melo (2003) as well as Yu (2006) give a good overview on the essence of this strategy.
39Note that this evidence of course dates back until before the late 2000s nancial crisis.
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investigate demand and supply of corporate bonds over somewhat more than ten years, which
includes at least three market downturns40. They found that the measures for the ow of
arbitrage capital, that they construct, have a signicant inuence on the supply of corporate
bonds. Moreover, during the 2008 short selling ban which essentially precluded some directions
of capital structure arbitrage, they measure an immediate and signicant downward jump in
the proceeds from straight as well as from convertible bond issuance. The ow of arbitrage
capital is a signicant control to a company's demand for capital and issuance activity. This
documents that a weak form of market segmentation exists in the corporate bond market: In a
frictionless market the irrelevance of the investor implies a shift in the volume, that a particular
class of investors generate, should not inuence the quality of the corporate bond market. This
is impressively rejected by the empirical evidence in Choi et al. (2010).
Bajlumy and Larsenz (2007) report that i) the gains from capital structure arbitrage are
the largest in the NIG segment and ii) that the arbitrage gains cannot be explained by market
factors. The former point is consistent with what is postulated in this paper, namely that the
costs of market segmentation - and thus the potential arbitrage gains - are the higher the lower
the market segment. The latter point reinforces the existence of arbitrage activity, as arbitrage
gains are logically not related to market performance factors.
2.4.2 The arbitrage trader's activities
In this section it is explored, how the generalized trade o is altered if some - but not all - market
participants are able to trade the residual equity claim and exploit this fact strategically. As it
was outlined earlier, the arbitrage trader's41 ability to trade the residual equity claim allows him
to replicate the bond. This ability in turn cancels the friction of market segmentation for the
arbitrage trader and enables him to apply arbitrage free valuation. He therefore values the bond
at the value it has in a frictionless market, which corresponds to E of equation 2.22.
It is assumed that for all j market segments that  j > 0, i.e. the remaining market participants
are subject to market segmentation.42 It is further assumed that the arbitrage trader is capital
constrained i.e. he may at maximum hold a fraction 0  AB  1 of the company's bonds. Finally,
it is assumed that the arbitrage trader acts strategically insofar as he arbitrages as much as
possible i.e. he always uses his full arbitrage capacity AB in order to generate as much arbitrage
40The LTCM-crisis in 1998, the burst of the tech-bubble in 2001 as well as the late 2000s nancial crisis.
41It is assumed from here on forward that there is one representative arbitrage trader for a continuum of
arbitrage traders.
42For  j = 0 for all j market segments, the ex ante value of the bond would already be at the arbitrage free
value as   = 0 corresponds to a frictionless market.
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gains as possible.
If the arbitrage trader remains passive, the bonds equilibrium price is drawn by equation 2.13
and - as a result of  j > 0 for all j - the equilibrium price satises q
 < B . This constitutes an
arbitrage opportunity for the arbitrage trader. From his perspective the bond is undervalued.
But the arbitrage trader's activities inuence the other market participant's valuation. Although
the arbitrage trader also pays the equilibrium price for his share of the bond, the arbitrage trader's
holdings reduce the volume the restricted market participants have to absorb by AB . This in
turn alters the market clearing condition in equation 2.9. The market clearing condition in the
presence of arbitrage activity is
1
 j
S   q
2S
= 1  AB
Considering the equation for the equilibrium price in a segmented bond market of equation
2.13, the equilibrium price of a bond in a weakly segmented market with an arbitrage activity
in excess of AB reads
q = B   2B (B ;; )

1  AB

(2.15)
For the case AB = 1 the arbitrage trader buys up the entire market and neutralized the
friction. For AB 2 (0; 1) market segmentation still drives the equilibrium bond price, but it is
weakened by the power of the arbitrage trader. For AB = 0 equation 2.13 is retrieved.
2.4.3 Optimal capital structure in a weakly segmented market
The capital structure is in this section still determined according to equation 2.14, only that it is
now equation 2.15 and not longer equation 2.13 that derives the equilibrium prices of the bond.
First note that q increases as AB increases. This is consistent with the economic intuition, that
the costs of market segmentation are the lower the less markets are segmented. This is equivalent
to saying that the costs are the higher, the less pronounced the arbitrage trader's activities are,
which is a natural consequence of the absence of the irrelevance of the investor.
This has direct consequences to a company and its capital structure trade o. As q increases
with AB , a company would have an incentive to attract arbitrage activity. However, for the
purpose of this subsection, it is assumed that AB is exogenous.
Figure 2.8(a) illustrates the generalized trade o for a company with the asset volatility of
a BBB rated company for dierent levels of arbitrage activity. The grey dashed line indicates
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the standard trade o. The solid black line indicates the generalized trade o in a completely
segmented market as in section 2.3. The black solid line and the grey dashed line correspond
together to the rst panel in gure 2.4(a). Similar to gure 2.4(a), the second panel in gure
2.8(a) and 2.8(b) indicate the market segment i.e. the   that is assigned to a particular bond.
The black dashed, dotted and dashdotted graphs indicate the company's generalized trade o
for dierent levels of arbitrage activity.
INSERT FIGURE 2.8 ABOUT HERE
As it is made visible in gure 2.8(a) with an increasing level of AB , the eects i.e. the costs of
market segmentation are weakened. This is consistent with the economic intuition, that arbitrage
activities help to improve the quality of the markets by weakening the obstacles such as market
segmentation. If the arbitrage trader acquires 75% of the bond - this is the black dashdotted line
- the costs of market segmentation becomes almost irrelevant.
This point is further illustrated in gure 2.8(b). The grey dashed line in the rst panel of
gure 2.8(b) indicates the optimal leverage ratio of a company with the asset volatility of a BBB
rated company in a frictionless market, while the grey dashdotted line indicates the optimal
leverage ratio of the same company in a completely segmented market. The solid black line
indicates the optimal leverage ratio in a weakly segmented market, depending on the level of
arbitrage activity AB . From left to right in gure 2.8(b), the market converges from a completely
segmented market to a frictionless market. As indicated by the black solid graph, the costs of
market segmentation rst decline on a very low scale in gure 2.8(b) until about an activity level
of AB = 0:755. At this point the costs of market segmentation are low enough such, that the
company's incentive to constrain leverage in order to stay in the MG market segment vanishes.
The value of additional tax shield generated by a higher leverage ratio, surpasses the additional
costs of market segmentation at AB = 0:77. Consistent with economic intuition, the importance
of and the costs from market segmentation decline with the market's convergence to a frictionless
market.
2.4.4 The RELEVANCE of the investor
The question arises, whether there is evidence, that companies take the arbitrage activity into
account as it is postulated in section 2.4.3. In the absence of the irrelevance of the investor the
degree of arbitrage activity drives the degree of market segmentation and thus the net proceeds
a company achieves, when issuing a bond. Consequently, under the model as it is written down
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in the last subsection, a company has an interest to have AB as high as possible - the nature of
the investors matters.
Whether companies actively pursue this, is dicult to observe in practice. Companies that
want to issue additional securities, frequently go on what is termed a roadshow. A roadshow
is basically a series of investors' presentations with corresponding face to face meetings. It is
disputed in the literature, what the purposes of these roadshows are. While Cai et al. (2007) see
it as a tool to reduce information asymmetries with respect to the issuing company, Fridson and
Garman (1998) see it as a general method to actively attract investors. Fridson and Garman
(1998) do not give a specic rationale on why this would be necessary. But it is insofar consistent
with the model in this paper, as attracting arbitrage activity could be a potential explanation
for these promotion activities.43
In the model as written down in this part, companies have an interest to have their capi-
tal structure as much arbitraged as possible. As the study of Choi et al. (2010) presents, an
arbitrageur's ability to lever his positions is - among other variables - an explaining variable
for the supply of arbitrage capital. This of course exposes the arbitrageur to the risk of his
own bankruptcy and thus the arbitrageur's continued ownership of the bond is potentially inter-
rupted. An arbitrageur that leaves the market implies a lower AB .
This is what is analysed and modelled in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), the risk that
an arbitrageur has to leave the market. They take an overall market perspective and not the
perspective of an individual company, and they assume exogenous securities. But in fact Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2005)'s schedule for the equilibrium price of an asset in their equation 6 is
equivalent to the equilibrium price in equation 2.15 in this paper, if one sets  = 2B (B ;; ),
S = 1 and X(t) = AB in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005). Insofar the model in this section
could be considered as an extension of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) with endogenized se-
curities that includes the perspective of an individual company's capital structure.
However, since the model in this paper is only a two period model of capital structure, a
company is not aected by a subsequent lower AB . But one could imagine - and it is in eect
indicated by the empirical evidence provided by Choi et al. (2010) - that a company, that ought
to renance a bond, faces higher nancing costs, if the arbitrage activity declines and markets
become more segmented.
Recalling that the equilibrium price in equation 2.15 depends positively on the arbitrage ac-
43As a matter of fact Fridson and Garman (1998)'s newspaper quote in their footnote 10 which reads "Bonds
are sold; they are not bought [...]" could be interpreted to the eect that companies ought to attract the right
type of buyer.
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tivity AB, and further recalling, that by equation 2.11 the market segment assignation depends
negatively on the equilibrium price, it is even possible that a bond changes the segment, if the
arbitrage activity declines steeply enough. So it is possible that a fallen angel occurs, not be-
cause the company's business activities go badly but only because arbitrage activity declines.
Now again for a company this would only have a meaning, if it ought to renance the bond later,
which is not part of the model in this paper. But it has consequences for the investors, that
are subject to market segmentation. Their own valuation depends positively on the arbitrage
activity. This again emphasizes, that the nature of the investor that holds a bond is irrelevant
neither to a company nor to an individual investor under a weak as well as under a strong form
of market segmentation.
2.5 Conclusion
The importance of rating induced market segmentation in the corporate bond market is estab-
lished by substantial anecdotal and empirical evidence. This paper contributes to the literature
on capital structure by generalizing the trade o model to incorporate market frictions induced
by a segmented bond market. In a segmented bond market, the market access of certain - but
not necessarily all - investors is restricted and the supply characteristics of the market become
relevant for the optimal capital structure. Market segmentation in this paper is two-fold: The
segmentation is induced by the risk associated with a corporate bond, and the supply of capital
declines with lower market segments.
This type of risk-induced market segmentation leads to discontinuities in the capital structure
trade o. Under these discontinuities, for some - but not all - companies the optimal capital
structure is a corner solution rather than an interior solution.
Companies that are close to a segmentation bound have an incentive to constrain their lever-
age in order to remain in the higher market segment. This leads to apparently underleveraged
companies and provides a new rationale to the underleverage puzzle.
Under weak market segmentation, the degree of arbitrage activity is an additional parameter,
that inuences the capital structure of an individual company. This empirically signicant ar-
bitrage activity mitigates parts of the costs of market segmentation to companies as the market
converges from a completely segmented to a frictionless market. If arbitrage activity is strong
enough, the incentive to underleverage eventually disappears.
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Appendix
I Moments for corporate securities
Let X  N (X ; X). Denote the associated density function by  (x;X ; X) and the associated
cumulative distribution function by (x;X ; X). The standard normal density function and
distribution function are denoted by  (x) and (x). The following denitions follow fromWinkler
et al. (1972) equation 2:6 and the subsequent lines on page 292:
G (a; b; X ; X) 
Z b
a
x (x;; ) dx = X



b  X
X

  

a  X
X

 
X



b  X
X

  

a  X
X

(2.16)
V (a; b; X ; X) 
Z b
a
x2 (x;; ) dx =

2X + 
2
X



b  X
X

  

a  X
X

+
X (X + a)

a  X
X

  X (X + b)

b  X
X

(2.17)
i Bond
The payo of a T -period discount bond is given by equation 2.3. If X is the company's only
asset, the expected discounted value of a bond with principal P is
B =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
E [B(X)] =
 
1
1 + rTf
! 
(1     )
Z XD
0
x (x;X ; X) dx+
Z 1
XD
P (x;X ; X) dx
!
Applying equation 2.16 yields
B =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
((1     )G (0;XD; X ; X) + P (1  (XD;X ; X))) (2.18)
where XD is dened in equation 2.2.
The same bond's discounted variance is given by
2B =
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
E
h
(B(X))
2
i
  (E [B(X)])2

=
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
E
h
(B(X))
2
i
  2B

(2.19)
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All terms of the above equation except for the rst part of the dierence are known. Applying
the denition of the expected value operator
E
h
(B(X))
2
i
= (1    )2
Z XD
0
x2 (x;X ; X) dx+ P
2
Z 1
XD
 (x;X ; X) dx (2.20)
Combining equations 2.19 and 2.20 and applying equations 2.16 and 2.17 yields
2B =
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
(1     )2V (0;XD; X ; X) + P 2 (1  (XD;X ; X))  2B

(2.21)
ii Equity
The payo of the residual equity claim of a company with a bond outstanding with principal P
is given by equation 2.4. If X is the company's only asset, the expected discounted value of the
residual equity claim is
E =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
E [E(X)] =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
(1  )
Z 1
XD
x (x;X ; X) dx+
Z 1
XD
(XZT   P ) (x;X ; X) dx

Applying equation 2.16 yields
E =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
((1  )G (XD;1; X ; X) + (XZT   P ) (1  (XD;X ; X))) (2.22)
The same equity claim's expected discounted variance is given by
2E =
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
E
h
(E(X))
2
i
  (E [E(X)])2

=
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
E
h
(E(X))
2
i
  2E

(2.23)
All terms of the above equation except for the rst part of the dierence are known. Using
the binomial theorem yields for this term
E
h
(E(X))
2
i
=
 
(1  )2
(1 + rTf )
2
!Z 1
XD
x2 (x; X ; X) dx+2
 
(1  )
(1 + rTf )
2
!Z 1
XD
(XZT   P )x (x; X ; X) dx+
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1
(1 + rTf )
2
!Z 1
XD

P 2   2PXZT  +X2ZT 2

 (x; X ; X) dx (2.24)
Combining equations 2.23 and 2.24 and applying equations 2.16 and 2.17 yields
2E =
 
1  
1 + rTf
!2
V (XD;1; X ; X) +
0B@ 2(1  )
1 + rTf
2
1CA (XZT   P )G (XD;1; X ; X)+
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
P 2   2PXZT 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2

(1  (XD;X ; X)) (2.25)
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III Illustrations for section 2.3
Figure 2.1: Illustration of this paper's approach to model risk induced market segmentation in
the corporate bond market. The abscissa depicts the annualized and discounted volatility of a
bond's expected gross returns while the ordinate depicts the supply level associated with the
respective level of volatility.
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(a) The capital structure trade o in the generalized trade o model for dierent values of aggregated
market demand for risky securities  .
(b) The optimal leverage ratio in the generalized trade o model for dierent values of aggregated
market demand for risky securities  . This graph is the envelope of optimal leverage ratios of the
trade o graphs in gure 2.2(a).
Figure 2.2: The capital structure trade o and the optimal leverage ratio in the generalized trade
o model for dierent values of aggregated market demand for risky securities  .
107
(a) Capital structure trade o and the impact of market segmentation for a company with the
asset volatility of a AAA rated company. The rst panel depicts the capital structure trade
o while the second panel depicts the aggregated market demand for risky securities assigned
to the respective bond.
(b) Capital structure trade o and the impact of market segmentation for a company with the
asset volatility of a AA rated company. The rst panel depicts the capital structure trade o
while the second panel depicts the aggregated market demand for risky securities assigned to
the respective bond.
Figure 2.3: The impact of market segmentation for HG companies.
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(a) Capital structure trade o and the impact of market segmentation for a company with the
asset volatility of a BBB rated company. The rst panel depicts the capital structure trade
o while the second panel depicts the aggregated market demand for risky securities assigned
to the respective bond.
(b) Capital structure trade o and the impact of market segmentation for a company with the
asset volatility of a B rated company. The rst panel depicts the capital structure trade o
while the second panel depicts the aggregated market demand for risky securities assigned to
the respective bond.
Figure 2.4: The impact of market segmentation for MG and NIG companies.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal leverage ratios given a company's annual asset volatility in a segmented
bond market. The rst panel depicts the optimal leverage ratio while the second panel depicts
the aggregated market demand for risky securities assigned to the optimal bond. The graph in
the rst panel is the envelope of optimal leverage ratios of the graphs in gures 2.3 and 2.4.
Figure 2.6: Annual volatility of the optimal bonds given a company's annual asset volatility in
a segmented bond market. The rst and the second panel depict the annual volatility of the
optimal bonds while the third panel depicts the aggregated market demand for risky securities
assigned to the optimal bond.
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(a) Sensitivity of the optimal leverage ratio to the asset
rate of return.
(b) Sensitivity of the annual volatility of the optimal
bond to the asset rate of return.
(c) Sensitivity of the optimal leverage ratio to the mar-
ket's aggregated demand for risky securities.
(d) Sensitivity of the annual volatility of the optimal
bond to the market's aggregated demand for risky se-
curities.
Figure 2.7: Sensitivity analysis.
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IV Illustrations for section 2.4
(a) Capital structure trade o and the impact of market segmentation for a company with the
asset volatility of a BBB rated company and dierent levels of arbitrage activity. The rst
panel depicts the capital structure trade o for dierent levels of arbitrage activity while the
second panel depicts the aggregated market demand for risky securities assigned to the respective
bonds.
(b) The optimal leverage ratio of a company with the asset volatility of a BBB rated
company given the degree of arbitrage activity. The rst panel depicts the optimal
leverage ratio while the second panel depicts the aggregated market demand for risky
securities assigned to the optimal bonds.
Figure 2.8: The impact of dierent levels of arbitrage activity in a segmented bond market on the
capital structure trade o and the optimal leverage ratio of a company with the asset volatility
of a BBB rated company.
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Chapter 3
Capital structure and structured
nance in a segmented corporate
bond market
Gabriel H. Neukomm1
Abstract
Structured nance and securitization have been a large part of the US nancial market prior to the late-
2000s nancial crisis and remain a substantial part until today. Despite this importance the techniques
of structured nance, namely tranching and bankruptcy remoteness are not understood very well as they
are neutral to a corporate capital structure in a frictionless market. Some contributions on structured
nance have pointed out the importance of segmentation in the funding market. This paper analyzes
how the techniques of structured nance improve a company's capital structure in a model of capital
structure with a segmented corporate bond market. This provides a number of insights on structured
nance and securitization, three of which are as follows: First, both tranching and bankruptcy remoteness
are techniques that allow a company to access multiple segments of the funding market and thus adjust
its capital structure to market segmentation. Second, tranching unlocks additional value and increases
optimal leverage for all companies. Consistent with empirical evidence this is particularly powerful for
companies with high asset volatility. Third and also consistent with empirical evidence, bankruptcy
1I thank Jean-Charles Rochet, Anna-Magdalena Waecken, the participants of the Brown Bag lunch seminar
at the University of Zurich and particularly Alexander F. Wagner for their helpful comments and guidance.
Financial support from the Swiss Finance Institute and from the Swiss National Science Foundation is also
gratefully acknowledged.
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remoteness unlocks additional value and allows for higher optimal leverage exclusively for companies
with high asset volatility.
JEL Classication Numbers: G01, G24, G32
Keywords: Capital structure, structured nance, market segmentation
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3.1 Introduction
The notion of structured nance and securitization generally refer to techniques for the issuance
of securities that are either backed by assets concentrated in a bankruptcy remote special purpose
vehicle (SPV) or that have multiple layers or even both. The primary techniques of structured
nance are therefore tranching and bankruptcy remoteness. Tranching refers to the technique,
where a security is split into a cascade of layers that are serviced sequentially. The rst tranche
- often called the senior tranche - is served rst. If the senior tranche is fully served, the next
tranche is served etc. In a tranched structure, potential losses are therefore absorbed in the other
direction starting with the lowest tranche2. The lower tranches serve as a cover for the more
senior tranches. Bankruptcy remoteness refers to the technique, where a company disunites itself
and isolates certain assets from the rest of the company into an SPV. The SPV then issues secu-
rities that are exclusively secured with these isolated assets. This creates a structure such, that
the SPV's securities are only subject to the bankruptcy risk associated with the SPV's assets
and not subject to the residual company's bankruptcy risk. The SPV's securities are bankruptcy
remote from the residual company.
The securities issued through the application of these techniques have been a large part of the
United States' corporate capital market prior to the late-2000s nancial crisis and they remain
a substantial part of this market until now.3 But despite the above empirical facts the ratio-
nales for and the techniques of structured nance have not been understood very well and many
questions remain open.4 Among other reasons, this is because in a frictionless and arbitrage free
capital market - which is usually assumed in frameworks for capital structure and valuation -
the principle of exposure conservation applies. Exposure conservation implies that securitization
is a zero-sum game: In a frictionless capital market any increase in value of a specic layer
of securities or in the securities of an SPV are oset by an equivalent decrease in value of the
securities of another layer or of the residual company. Any other outcome would be an arbitrage
opportunity.
This paper provides a rationale for the application of structured nance based on the argu-
ment, that the corporate bond market is segmented. Based on a simple two period model for
capital structure rst developed in chapter 2 which incorporates a segmented funding market
2The lower tranches are termed junior, mezzanine and equity tranches, depending on the number of layers.
3See for example gure 2 in Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), gure 3 in Shivdasani and Wang (2011) as well
as gures 1 in Benmelech et al. (2012) for some data on the issuance volumes of corporate collateralized loan
obligations.
4The literature survey on securitization conducted by Gorton and Metrick (2012) provides a list of open
question.
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for corporate bonds, this paper shows that the techniques of structured nance may improve
a company's capital structure under market segmentation. It thus adds to the understanding
of the open questions on structured nance that have been highlighted by Gorton and Metrick
(2012).
There are already a few contributions that analyze the benets of structured nance. Schwarcz
(1994) claimed that "...securitization is an alchemy that really works."5 without providing an eco-
nomic foundation. DeMarzo (2005) promotes asymmetric information as a rationale for tranch-
ing. In the respective paper it is argued, that with the ability to concentrate the default risk in a
specic tranche, the intermediary is enabled to create a senior tranche with substantially reduced
sensitivity to asymmetric information. Gorton and Souleles (2007) argue that bankruptcy re-
moteness is a way to avoid bankruptcy costs. In Oldeld (2000), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009)
as well as in the discussion of Gorton and Souleles (2007)6 market segmentation in the funding
market is put forward as a rationale for structured nance but without providing an economic
foundation for this claim.
There is indeed empirical evidence in support of Schwarcz (1994)'s claim: In their compre-
hensive analysis on CLOs, Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) document that the application of the
techniques of structured nance results in lower cost of capital. Maskara (2010) conrms that
specically for tranching, while Ayotte and Gaon (2010) conrm that for bankruptcy remote-
ness. Maskara (2010) additionally documents, that the benets of tranching accrue primarily
to borrowers with low credit quality. This is conrmed by Rauh and Su (2010)'s analysis on
the structure of corporate debt, that establishes, that companies with low credit quality are
more likely to have multiple debt layers. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) analyze the underly-
ing collaterals of CLOs issued prior to the late-2000s nancial crisis. They document that the
respective collaterals are concentrated around the boundary between the investment grade and
the non-investment grade market segment. This paper aims to provide an economic foundation
for these stylized facts, especially on how structured nance unlocks additional value and why
this seems to be particularly powerful for low credit quality companies.
In the generalized trade o model for capital structure developed in chapter 2 and applied in
this paper to structured nance, the funding market for corporate bonds is split into segments.
The individual segments of the funding market do not communicate with each other i.e. there
is complete market segmentation.7 Market segmentation is risk-induced in this model i.e. the
5See Schwarcz (1994), page 134. The footnote 2 in Schwarcz (1994) is omitted here.
6See the discussion summary in Gorton and Souleles (2007) on page 602.
7In chapter 2 it is shown that this strong assumption can be generalized towards weak market segmentation
with some degree of arbitrage activity.
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market segments are drawn along the lines of the risk level associated with a corporate bond.
More specically, the market segments are dened through a series of cuto values of bond
volatility that draw the bounds of the market segments: If a bond's volatility is higher than a
given cuto value, the bond is assigned to the next lower market segment. The market segments
dier in terms of aggregated supply of capital. The supply of capital is assumed to be limited and
declining with lower market segments i.e. the lower the market segments, the more costly it is
to raise capital.8 Within this funding market with frictions, the company trades o the benets
of the tax shield versus the bankruptcy costs and additionally accounts for limited aggregated
supply of capital. A company's objective function to determine its optimal capital structure
is therefore a trade o in the sense of Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), which is generalized for
segmentation in the funding market.
In this paper the primary techniques of structured nance, namely tranching and bankruptcy
remoteness, are applied within the above model for capital structure under risk-induced market
segmentation. A tranched bond is in this paper a corporate bond that is split into layers - a senior
tranche and a junior tranche - where the senior tranche has priority over the junior tranche. To
issue bankruptcy remote bonds, a company disunites itself. For that purpose it is assumed that
a company has two kinds of assets in its asset portfolio that dier in asset volatility, namely low
risk assets with low annual asset volatility and high risk assets with high annual asset volatility.
If a company issues bankruptcy remote bonds it isolates these two kinds of assets and leverages
them separately. This results in two bankruptcy remote bonds, one secured exclusively with low
risk assets and one secured exclusively with high risk assets.
In chapter 2 it was shown that if risk-induced market segmentation prevails on the funding
market for corporate bonds, this materializes itself in three eects on corporate capital structure:
First, as a result of the limited supply of capital in the funding market, leverage is obviously
lower under market segmentation. Second, since the market segments are drawn by means of
a collection of volatility cutos, a company's capital structure trade o exhibits discontinuities.
Third, if a company operates close to a bound of the segments in the funding market, a company
has an incentive to constrain its leverage in order to preserve its level of capital supply.
The present paper shows how the techniques of structured nance improve a company's capital
structure under risk-induced segmentation in the funding market and thus creates a rationale
for the application of tranching and bankruptcy remoteness. Key to this insight is, that under
8There is comprehensive empirical evidence for this assumption: Kisgen (2006), Kisgen and Strahan (2010)
as well as Chen et al. (2010) conrmed the inuence of rating changes on corporate capital structures, while
Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) conrmed a rating-induced discontinuity in cost of capital at the boundary
between the investment grade and the non-investment grade market segment.
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risk-induced market segmentation, arbitrage is limited by construction and thus the principle of
exposure conservation is potentially violated. Exposure conservation is violated, if the company
applies the above mentioned techniques such, that it can access multiple market segments. For
tranching that implies that the senior tranche ought to trade in a higher segment than the junior
tranche, while it implies for bankruptcy remoteness, that the bond secured with low risk assets
ought to trade in a higher segment than the bond secured with high risk assets. It is assumed
in this paper that a company only applies these techniques, if they have the potential to cause
a violation of exposure conservation.
If a company applies tranching, the value unlocked through the violation of exposure conser-
vation is always positive, as the two layers of its bond allow the company to adjust its leverage
more accurately to the segmented funding market. However, tranching remains an imperfect
mechanism to mitigate market segmentation, as the individual tranches remain subject to mar-
ket segmentation. There are thus still discontinuities in a company's capital structure trade o,
but tranching reduces their severity. This is similar to what is argued in Oldeld (2000), namely
that tranching constitutes an imperfect mechanism to mitigate segmentation in the funding mar-
ket.
Since capital supply is by construction more constrained in lower market segments, tranching
unlocks more value for companies that would otherwise only have access to low market segments.
This result is consistent with the empirical evidence in Maskara (2010). It is further consistent
with the stylized facts on corporate capital structures analyzed in Rauh and Su (2010) and
provides an economic foundation for these observations. Tranching also allows a company to
maintain a higher optimal leverage. This eect is particularly strong for companies with lower
credit quality. This is consistent with the stylized facts in Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) and
provides an economic foundation for this concentration of collaterals. Higher optimal leverage
through tranching implies lower cost of capital, which is in turn consistent with the evidence in
Nadauld and Weisbach (2012).
If a company applies bankruptcy remoteness, the value unlocked is only positive for companies
with low credit quality. Companies with high credit quality decrease their value if they apply
bankruptcy remoteness. This has a simple explanation: For companies with low overall credit
quality it is valuable to concentrate its low risk assets in order use it as a collateral to access
higher market segments. Companies that have a good overall credit quality and already have
access to high market segments do not improve their position, if they concentrate their low risk
assets. Bankruptcy remoteness is therefore a technique primarily suited for low credit quality
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companies.
By the same logic that applies to value unlocked, bankruptcy remoteness allows companies
with low credit quality to maintain a higher optimal leverage. This eect is particularly strong in
the area where a company - without bankruptcy remoteness - would have an incentive to constrain
its leverage in order to preserve its level of capital supply. This is because a company that
applies bankruptcy remoteness mitigates the above incentive since it concentrates its collaterals
according to quality and thus adjusts its capital structure to market segmentation. Higher
optimal leverage implies lower cost of capital. The argument here is thus consistent with the
empirical evidence in Ayotte and Gaon (2010), where it is found that bankruptcy remoteness is
an explaining factor for the funding rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the reader to
the techniques of and rationales for structured nance as well as market segmentation. Section
3.3 reviews a generalized trade o model of optimal capital structure that incorporates market
segmentation and combines it with the techniques of structured nance. Section 3.4 provides
results on the application of structured nance within the model of section 3.3. Section 3.5
relates the results to the late-2000s nancial crisis. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Structured nance: Techniques and rationales
3.2.1 Structured nance: Techniques
What is structured nance? In Jobst (2007)'s Primer on Structured Finance it is described in the
following way: Structured nance encompasses all advanced private and public nancial arrange-
ments that serve to eciently renance and hedge any protable economic activity beyond the
scope of conventional forms of on-balance sheet securities (debt, bonds, equity) at lower capital
cost and agency costs from market impediments on liquidity. A more narrow denition is found
in Leland (2007): \Structured nance" typically refers to the transfer of [...] a company's assets
(an \activity") into a bankruptcy-remote corporation or other special purpose vehicle or entity
(SPV/SPE). These entities then oer [...] multiple classes of securities [...].9
The securities issued through the aforementioned entities are called collateralized debt obli-
gations (CDO). Depending on the collaterals, CDO's are classied into subgroups such as resi-
dential real estate or commercial real estate CDOs (RRE/CRE CDOs) which are collateralized
9Similar denitions are found in Coval et al. (2009) or Schwarcz (1994). This narrow denition of structured
nance is also termed securitization.
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with residential and commercial mortgages, collateralized bond obligations or collateralized loan
obligation (CBO/CLO) which are collateralized with corporate loans or corporate bonds and
CDO-squared (CDO2) which are collateralized with other CDOs. The focus of this paper lies on
structured corporate loans or corporate bonds i.e. the focus of this paper lies on CBOs or CLOs.
Structured nance and securitization rely on two primary techniques, namely tranching and
bankruptcy remoteness. These techniques are introduced in the following.
3.2.1.1 Tranching
Tranching is the primary form of credit enhancement10. This technique imposes a cascade of
layers or tranches with declining priority on the security i.e. the cashows generate by the assets
that back the security are allocated with declining priority to the tranches. The tranche with
the highest priority is called the senior tranche and has rst rights on cashows until it is fully
funded. When the senior tranche is fully funded, the remaining cashows fund the next tranche
which is called the junior or mezzanine tranche. Any remaining cashows after the senior and the
junior tranche is funded, fund the last tranche which is called the equity tranche. This structure
of layers with declining priority is metaphorically termed the waterfall structure.
While priority on cashows is top-down, losses are absorbed bottom up i.e. the equity tranche
is the rst to absorb losses until it is wiped out. After that, the losses are absorbed by the junior
tranche and so forth, and only if all lower tranches are wiped out, then the senior tranche is
aected by losses. In eect the lower tranches serve as a cover for the senior tranche.
3.2.1.2 Bankruptcy remoteness
Bankruptcy remoteness is a technique to isolate some of a company's assets from the bankruptcy
risk of the residual company and to raise funds based on these individual assets rather than based
on the combined company. For that purpose a company disunites itself and spins some of its
assets o into an SPV. In order to achieve bankruptcy remoteness of the SPV, the transaction to
the SPV has to qualify as a true sale under the bankruptcy law11. That removes the assets from
the residual company's potential bankruptcy estate. Furthermore the SPV's business activities
10There are additional techniques of credit enhancement such as overcollateralization, spread accounts or third
party guarantees. Overcollateralization is very similar to tranching while the remaining techniques are not con-
sidered here.
11This rst and foremost means that the transaction has to be on arm length basis. See for instance Klee and
Butler (2002).
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are limited to nancing activities.12 The bankruptcy remote SPV is then enabled to use its assets
to raise funds by itself and separately from the residual company, while the residual company
maintains operational control over the assets of the SPV.13 The result of the application of this
technique is thus, that operational and nancial control over assets is separated and the company
nances itself piecewise.14
3.2.2 Structured nance: Rationale
3.2.2.1 Starting point: Traditional models of capital structure
Most contributions and valuation frameworks for capital structure assume that the market for
corporate bonds is frictionless. On a frictionless market, the value of a corporate security is only
driven by company specic characteristics. Under this frictionless approach, tranching is a value
neutral technique: The value gain on the senior tranche is oset by a value decline on the junior
tranche. For bankruptcy remoteness it is not entirely clear if it is neutral in a frictionless market.
On the one hand, Schwarcz (1994) argues that in the absence of market frictions, the principle of
exposure conservation applies and bankruptcy remoteness is neutral. Leland (2007) on the other
hand argues, that bankruptcy remoteness may create some value even in a frictionless market,
namely if a company's asset portfolio is strongly under diversied.
The conclusion that structured nance is neutral, however conicts with the substantial
primary market volume of CLOs during the last ten years.15 It furthermore conicts with the
anecdotal and empirical evidence on structured nance and market frictions.
12This is to protect the SPV from the combined company's creditors. Note that the simplest way to achieve
that would be to have the SPV waive its right to le voluntarily for bankruptcy. However Klee and Butler (2002)
as well as other legal scholars argue that this would not be enforceable.
13This isolation of nancial control rights is also termed as ringfencing.
14It is important to see the dierence between secured debt and bankruptcy remoteness. At rst it seems similar
as in both cases the collateral secures a specic creditor's claim. However, there is an important dierence: A
secured creditor's collateral - despite being specically attached to his claim - is still part of the combined
company's bankruptcy estate and thus included into the bankruptcy procedure. So even if the secured creditor's
collateral is of high quality, it is still possible that an activity of bad quality causes the company to default and
the high quality collateral is included into the bankruptcy procedure. This exposes the creditor to bankruptcy
costs even if his collateral was not triggering the default.
Unlike the secured creditor, a creditor to a bankruptcy remote SPV is only part of a bankruptcy procedure if
the SPV defaults i.e. if the assets that specically secure his claim cause a default. If the remaining asset of the
residual company cause a default of the residual company, the assets held by the SPV are not part of the residual
company's bankruptcy estate and thus the assets are not included into the bankruptcy procedure. The result is
that the creditor of the SPV is in the above case not exposed to bankruptcy costs. An extended discussion of
the dierence between secured creditors and creditor to a bankruptcy remote SPV is found in Ayotte and Gaon
(2010).
15The numbers in Shivdasani and Wang (2011) indicate that the issuance volume of CDO's is back to the level
of 2004/05 which marked the onset of the boom of securitization. This is still only a third of the average volume
during the 2005 - 2007 boom of structured nance.
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3.2.2.2 Limited arbitrage and risk-induced market segmentation
A number of contributions such as Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), Oldeld (2000) and the dis-
cussion of Gorton and Souleles (2007) attribute the evolution of structured nance to the failure
of arbitrage and thus to market segmentation on the corporate bond market.16 Modigliani and
Sutch (1966) as well as Modigliani and Sutch (1967) were the rst to establishment market
segmentation on the sovereign bond market. They documented maturity-induced market seg-
mentation on the sovereign bond market. On the corporate bond market, segmentation is driven
by risk-induced regulation. Access to certain products of the corporate bond market often de-
pends on an investor's prole.17
Risk-induced market segmentation on the corporate bond market is reenforced by comprehen-
sive empirical evidence: Kisgen (2006) as well as Kisgen and Strahan (2010) nd, that discrete
costs of changes in credit ratings have a signicant inuence on capital structure decisions. This
holds especially true at the cuto between the investment grade and the non-investment grade
market segment. Chen et al. (2010) analyse cumulative abnormal returns subsequent to a me-
chanical shift in bond ratings and they found a signicant discontinuity at the aforementioned
cuto. Using a regression discontinuity approach, Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) nd a dis-
continuity in availability and cost of capital at the boundary between the investment grade and
the non-investment grade market segment. They nd it impossible to attribute this additional
friction to the non-investment grade companies' fundamentals and thus concluded that they are
driven by market segmentation.
3.2.2.3 Consequences for companies
One way for a company to break exposure conservation and to mitigate market segmentation
would be to access multiple market segments. This holds especially true for companies with low
credit quality. Since they operate in low market segments and are thus exposed to a low level
of capital supply, they have an incentive to apply techniques that allow them to access higher
market segments. This is where structured nance steps in: Both techniques oer the possibility
to access multiple market segments. Tranching allows a company to create a senior tranche that
is issued in a high market segment, while bankruptcy remoteness allows a company to create a
bond secured with low risk assets that is issued in a high market segment. This is exactly what
16Chen (1995) provides a nice example how market segmentation breaks arbitrage free pricing.
17Restrictions on market access are sometimes on the buyer's side e.g. some institutional investors are restricted
or not allowed to hold non-investment grade bonds and sometimes on the seller's side e.g. certain products have
selling restrictions. Miller (1986) argues that exactly these kind of access restrictions drive most of the nancial
innovations. See also the discussion in Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009).
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is reected in the cross section of corporate capital structures: As analyzed by Rauh and Su
(2010), there is a substantial heterogeneity in the cross section of priority structures, with the
trend that companies with low credit quality are more likely to have a tranched capital structure.
3.3 A two period model for capital structure and struc-
tured nance under market segmentation
In a related expose18 I proposed a two period model to capture the inuence of risk-induced
market segmentation on capital structure. The respective model has its basis in Leland (2007)
and combines the standard capital structure trade o with a segmented market for corporate
bonds in order to include the eects of market segmentation into the standard capital structure
trade o. This section introduces the generalized trade o model developed in chapter 2 and
introduces the corporate claims that are created by means of the techniques of structured nance
to this model.
3.3.1 Fundamentals
3.3.1.1 Timing, environment and assets
Time in this paper is denoted by t. The model is a two period model of capital structure i.e.
there are two points in time, t = 0 and t = T .
Similar to most developed corporate jurisdictions19, companies enjoy limited liability and
interest paid on corporate debt is tax deductible. The corporate tax rate is denoted by  .
A company is in default at t = T if it's liabilities exceed it's assets. Default is followed by a
bankruptcy procedure that liquidates the company's assets.20 Bankruptcy costs occur through
two channels, namely the company loses a xed amount  of its asset value and the company
loses its tax shield.
Corporate assets are denoted by Xti where t denotes the point in time and i denotes the
asset's index. Corporate assets are random cashows that occur from business activities and they
materialize at t = T . These random cashows from business activities correspond to earnings
before interest and taxes (EBIT) and are assumed to be XTi  N (Xi ; Xi) with Xi 2 (0;1)21
18See chapter 2.
19See Armour et al. (2009).
20This corresponds to a liquidation procedure in the spirit of Title 11 United States Codes Chapter 7 (2011).
21The expected asset value can be decomposed into an annual net asset return rXi by solving Xi =
X0
 
1 + rXi
T
where X0 is the size of the company.
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and Xi 2 (0;1)22. If there is more than one asset, the assets are assumed to be correlated
with correlation coecient i;j 2 [ 1; 1]. A company's taxable income are the EBIT minus a
company's interest expenses.
There also exists a T -period risk-free interest rate denote by rTf .
3.3.1.2 Standard corporate claims and their payos
A corporate security's t = T payo is denoted by k

XT

while the t = 0 equilibrium price
is denoted by qk, where k denotes the index of the security. Standard corporate claims are a
straight bond which is denoted by the index k = B, and the associated residual equity claim
which is denoted by the index k = EB . A straight bond is a security that promises a xed
amount P at t = T if the company is solvent and receives everything left over, if the company
is in default. The residual equity claim receives at t = T the cashows after the bond is served,
if the company is solvent and is protected by limited liability, if the company is in default.
The above design of the standard corporate claims combined with the environment described in
section 3.3.1.1 leads to the following payo for the straight bond
B

XT

=
8>><>>:
P; if XDB  XT
(1     )XT ; if 0  XT < XDB
0; if XT < 0
9>>=>>; (3.1)
and the following payo for the associated residual equity claim
EB

XT

=
8><>: X
T   P   

XT   (P   qB)

; if XDB  XT
0; if XT < XDB
9>=>; (3.2)
where XDB denotes the default bound for the straight bond which is dened as
23
XDB = P +

1   q

B (3.3)
22The asset volatility can be decomposed into an annual net asset return volatility &Xi by solving Xi =
X0&Xi
p
T .
23It was assumed earlier, that a company is in default if its assets exceed its liabilities. It was further assumed
that a company only pays taxes if it earns more than its interest expenses. That is to say that the default
bound XBD solves 0 = X
T    max  XT    P   qB ; 0   P with XT = XDB . In the prior equation, the rst
term represents a company's asset value, the second term the tax expenditures and the last term the amount
the company has to return to the bondholders. Note that the tax expenditures are always positive in default,
otherwise the interest expenditures would exceed the bond's nal xed payment. This results in the default bound
in equation 3.3.
124
3.3.1.3 Structured corporate claims and their payos
3.3.1.3.1 Tranched bond
Since there is symmetric information about asset quality, there is no role for an intermediary
and it is thus assumed, that a company issues structured corporate claims by itself. A tranched
bond is a security similar to a straight bond, only that it splits the t = T promised amount into
two tranches, a senior tranche denoted by the index k = ST with promised t = T amount PST
and a junior tranche denoted by the index k = JT with promised t = T amount PJT .
24 The total
principal outstanding is then simply PST + PJT . The equilibrium prices are denoted by q

ST and
qJT respectively. The associated residual equity claim is denoted by the index k = ET .
As described earlier, the essence of tranching is, that the junior tranche is only served as long
as the senior tranche is fully served. If the company is solvent at t = T , then the senior and the
junior tranche both receive their promised payments while the residual equity claim receives the
cashows after the tranches are served. If the company is in default the residual equity claim
is protected by limited liability, but there are two regimes to distinguish for the distribution of
the liquidation proceeds to the tranches: If there are enough liquidation proceeds to serve the
senior tranche, the senior tranche receives its promised payment while the junior tranche receives
what is left over. If there are not enough liquidation proceeds to serve the senior tranche, the
senior tranche receives everything that is left over and the junior tranche is protected by limited
liability.25 The design of the tranched bond described above leads to the following payo for the
senior tranche
ST

XT

=
8>><>>:
PST ; if XSS  XT
(1     )XT ; if 0  XT < XSS
0; if XT < 0
9>>=>>; (3.4)
while the junior tranche's payo reads
JT

XT

=
8>><>>:
PJT ; if XDT  XT
(1     )XT   PST ; if XSS  XT < XDT
0; if XT < XSS
9>>=>>; (3.5)
and the payo of the associated residual equity claim reads
24ST stands for senior tranche, while JT stands for junior tranche.
25For 0 < XT , both bonds are protected by limited liability.
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ET

XT

=
8><>: X
T   PST   PJT   

XT   (PST + PJT   (qST + qJT ))

; if XDT  XT
0; if XT < XDT
9>=>; (3.6)
where XDT denotes the default bound of the tranched bond which is dened as
26
XDT = PST + PJT +

1  
 
qST + q

JT

(3.7)
and XSS denotes the bound where the regime of the distribution of liquidation proceeds
switches.27 This bound is dened as28
XSS =
PST
(1     ) (3.8)
3.3.1.3.2 Bankruptcy remote bonds
Sofar the asset portfolio of a company was expressed by one single random variable XT . The
essence of bankruptcy remoteness is however piecewise nancing i.e. that a company disunites
itself and nances its assets separately. It is therefore necessary to impose an assumption on
the elements of a company's asset portfolio: It is assumed in this paper, that a company's
asset portfolio comprises two assets, low risk assets (LRA) and high risk assets (HRA), with
individual asset volatilities HRA and LRA as well as correlation HRA=LRA. The proportions
of the individual assets are set such that the company's aggregated asset volatility matches some
target asset volatility.29 If the company issues bankruptcy remote bonds, it leverages these two
assets in two separate entities. These entities then issue each a straight bond denoted by the
indices k = LRB and k = HRB with principals PLRB and PHRB .
30 The combined residual equity
claim of these two entities is denoted by the index k = ER. Since both of the separate entities
26The default bound XDT for a tranched bond is derived in a similar fashion as the default bound in equation
3.3: XDT solves 0 = XDT    max
 
XDT  
 
PST   qST + PJT   qJT

; 0
  PST   PJT for XT = XDT , which
results in the default bound in equation 3.7.
27This is to say that XSS is the lowest level of asset value where there are enough liquidation proceeds in
default to fully serve the senior tranche. SS stands for senior served.
28Since XSS is minimal asset value at which the senior tranche is fully served, XSS solves 0 = (1    )XT  
PST for X
T = XSS . This results in the bound in equation 3.8.
29To make this point clearer: Assume that LRA is the proportion of low risk assets in the company's asset
portfolio and that the company has an aggregated target asset volatility of . (Note that since there are only
two assets, the proportion of high risk assets is HRA = 1   LRA.) Then LRA is set such that the following
relationship holds:  =
q
2LRA
2
LRA + (1  LRA)22HRA + 2LRA(1  LRA)LRAHRALRA=HRA.
30LRB stands for low risk bond while HRB stands for high risk bond.
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are assumed to issue straight bonds, equation 3.1 for the bonds' payo and equation 3.2 for the
payo of the residual equity claim as well as the default bound of equation 3.3 still apply.
3.3.2 Equilibrium capital supply for corporate claims under risk-induced
market segmentation
3.3.2.1 Modelling the risk associated with a corporate bond
It is assumed in this paper that there is a form of risk-induced market segmentation observed
on the corporate bond market, that creates an ordering of corporate bonds according to their
risk. The model of capital structure in this paper is rm based i.e. the corporate risk policy
has two elements, namely the nancial risk which results from a company's leverage and the
risk associated with the operational cashows. The former element is implemented through a
company's choice of total bond principal outstanding while the latter element is modelled by the
distribution of XTi and thus primarily by Xi . A risk measure that jointly maps both elements of
the corporate risk policy implied in a corporate bond is the annualized and discounted volatility
of a bond's expected return, which is denoted by k
31where k denotes the index of the bond. The
literature32 generally agrees that the lower a bond's rating, the higher a bond's volatility. It is
therefore consistent to model a risk ordering by means of k.
3.3.2.2 Capital supply within a market segment
The corporate bond market is assumed to be completely segmented i.e. the individual market
segments do not communicate with each other. A company that implements its capital structure
is now potentially new to the market segment it considers to issue a bond in. This essentially
implies, that the company provides a nancial innovation to the particular market segment, even
though it also issues another security in a further market segment or it already has a security
trading in another market segment. Financial innovations enlarge the span of the respective
market segment and are not simply redundant assets. Arbitrage pricing is then disabled and an
assumption on how the market supplies capital is necessary.
It is assumed that the market participants are expected utility maximizers that have a con-
stant demand for risky securities (CDRS)33, which is - together with the assumption of ap-
proximative normality of corporate claims - approximately equivalent to linear mean-variance
31A derivation of k based on a bond's volatility is given in appendix I.iii to this paper.
32Reilly and Wright (1997) or Reilly et al. (2009) provide illustrative and summarizing examples while Bao and
Pan (2010) present a recent study.
33This is equivalent of assuming constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
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optimization.34 The working assumption in this paper is therefore, that the market participants
are approximate linear mean-variance optimizers.35 Given the above assumption of linear mean-
variance optimizers, the equilibrium capital supply schedule within a segment of the corporate
bond market assuming that the market clears is given by
qk = k   2k  (3.9)
where k is a bond's discounted expected value, k the discounted volatility, q

k the bond's
equilibrium price and   the market segment's aggregated demand for risky securities.36
3.3.2.3 Equilibrium capital supply under risk-induced market segmentation
The segmentation structure of the market is drawn based on a collection of detachment points.
These detachment points indicate the maximum level of k that a bond may exhibit in order
to stay in a particular segment. If a bond's k surpasses a detachment point, it drops into the
next lower market segment. It is assumed that the market splits in three segments, a high grade
segment (HG), a mid grade segment (MG) and a non-investment grade segment (NIG). There
exist thus two detachment points that indicate the boundaries between the market segments,
one between the HG and the MG segment denoted by HG=MG and one between the MG and
the NIG segment denoted by MG=NIG.
The parameter   in equation 3.9 is the parameter, that controls the level of capital supply
within a market segment. The higher  , the more constrained is the supply of capital and thus
the more costly is capital. It is assumed that the market segments dier in terms of their levels
of capital supply and i.e. that they dier in  . The market is assumed to split into three
segments, thus there are three levels of capital supply, namely  HG in the HG segment,  MG
in the MG segment and  NIG in the NIG segment. In order to map the empirical evidence on
market segmentation, it is assumed that we have  HG <  MG <  NIG i.e. capital supply is more
constrained in lower market segments.
These two elements of market segmentation, namely the levels of capital supply within market
34This is analytically derived in Collins and Gbur (1991). Tsiang (1972) as well as Hanson and Ladd (1991)
illustrate this numerically.
35The assumption of a mean-variance market for corporate capital appears frequently in the literature on
corporate nance with frictions such as in Rubinstein (1973a), Rubinstein (1973b), Glenn (1976) or Kim (1978).
The mean-variance model also remains a widely used market model in practice on both ends of the market as
investigated by Graham and Harvey (2001) as well as Fabozzi et al. (2002).
36This equation corresponds to equation 2.10 in chapter 2. Equations for k and k for the dierent corporate
claims in this paper are given in appendix I. For a derivation of this equation using the market clearing argument
I refer the reader to the aforementioned expose.
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segments and the detachment points, construct the risk-induced market segmentation on the
corporate bond market. It is implemented through a segmentation function  : B !   that
maps the risk level k of a given bond on its respective level of capital supply  . The function
is dened piecewise and reads
 (k;; ) =
8>><>>:
 HG; if k < HG=MG
 MG; if HG=MG < k < MG=NIG
 NIG; if MG=NIG < k
9>>=>>; (3.10)
with  =

HG=MG;MG=NIG

and   = ( HG; MG; NIG).
37
The segmentation function of equation 3.10 determines to what segment and thus to what level
of capital supply a bond is assigned. Given the mechanism that determines the level of capital
supply a bond is exposed to, a bond's equilibrium price under complete market segmentation
reads
q = k   2k (k;; ) (3.11)
Equations for k and k for the dierent corporate claims are given in appendix I to this
paper.
Note that tranching and bankruptcy remoteness are only eective if they allow a company to
operate in multiple market segments. This is what breaks exposure conservation. The tranched
bond introduced in section 3.3.1.3.1 only breaks exposure conservation, if the senior tranche
is issued in another market segment than the junior tranche. The bankruptcy remote bonds
introduced in section 3.3.1.3.2 only break exposure conservation, if the bond secured with low
risk assets is issued in another market segment than the bond secured with high risk assets. If
this is not the case, then structured nance is neutral as in a frictionless market. This is because
the level of capital supply diers between market segments while within a market segment all
securities are exposed to the same friction. If the company cannot spread it's bonds across the
market segments then tranching and bankruptcy remoteness have no eect and the company is
then not better o as the company would be, if it is using a straight bond. Because of this it
is assumed, that companies only apply structured nance, if the techniques have the power to
break exposure conservation.
37The above equation corresponds to equation 2.12 in chapter 2.
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3.3.3 Optimal capital structure
Companies in this paper are operated by an owner manager that has risk neutral utility and
holds the residual equity claim.38 At t = 0 a company has its assets in place, but the owner
manager has not taken a decision on the company's capital structure. If bonds are issued, the
market value of the bonds is determined by equation 3.1139. The owner manager chooses the
capital structure such that it maximizes the company's value. If he issues a straight bond, then
the bond's optimal principal P  is such that
P  = argmax
P

qB + EB
	
(3.12)
If the company issues a tranched bond then the optimal principals of the tranches of the
tranched bond P ST and P

JT are such that

P ST ; P

JT
	
= arg max
PST ;PJT

qST + q

JT + ET
	
(3.13)
If the company issues bankruptcy remote bonds then the optimal principals of the bond
secured with low risk assets and the bond secured with high risk assets P LRB and P

HRB are such
that 
P LRB ; P

HRB
	
= arg max
PLRB ;PHRB

qLRB + q

HRB + ER
	
(3.14)
Equation 3.12 is the generalized trade o model that is derived in chapter 2. This approach
to optimal capital structure accounts for the tax shield and bankruptcy costs, but additionally
for limited capital supply caused by risk-induced market segmentation. Equations 3.13 and 3.14
present an augmentation to the generalized trade o model, that allows to apply and analyze
the eects of the techniques of structured nance under risk-induced market segmentation. The
applications are presented in the following section.
38This implies that the owner manager values the equity stake at its expected value i.e. by means of equation
3.19 or 3.24 in appendix I to this paper. The owner manager is constrained to hold solely the residual equity
claim in order to avoid arbitrage opportunities. Note that capital and borrowing constrains to an owner manager
are common and thus a reasonable assumption.
39The owner manager measures a bond's value in terms of the proceeds the company receives, when it issues a
bond. This implies that the owner manager prices a bond at the market's willingness to pay, which is equivalent
to a bond's equilibrium price qk.
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3.4 Structured nance under market segmentation: Ap-
plications
3.4.1 Parameters
In this part, the model to analyze structured nance under market segmentation laid out in
section 3.3, is applied. Note that the tax shield creates a cross dependency between the payo
and the market value of a bond i.e. k implicitly depends on qk. Because of this there is no
explicit solution to the model and it is instead relied on numerical techniques.
Table 3.1 reports the choice of parameters that are xed throughout the paper unless men-
tioned otherwise. The parameters are equivalent to the choice in chapter 2: The bankruptcy
costs  are such that they match observed recovery rates in two period models, the tax rate  is
a literature average for the eective tax rate, time to maturity T is the median debt maturity of
corporate bonds, the risk-free rate per annum rf is the ten year median of the constant maturity
treasury rate corresponding to T and the size of the company is set to X0 = 100.
INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE
Since most of the bond valuation models applied in empirical studies assume a frictionless
market and use risk-neutral pricing, the expected returns of corporate assets are generally not
observed. Returns on commodities or returns on real estate are potential proxies and exhibit
steady long term returns of about 10%.40 The expected return on corporate assets is assumed
to be equivalent over all market segments and variations in asset quality are modelled through
variations in asset volatility.
Annual asset volatilities are chosen according to Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008). I consider a
AAA rated company as a representative company of the HG segment, a BBB rated company as a
representative company of the MG segment and a B rated company as a representative company
of the NIG segment. The detachment points are chosen according to the empirical study on the
bond market conducted by Reilly and Wright (1997). Their estimates lie in the same order of
magnitude as Bao and Pan (2010).41
The parameters for the aggregated supply of capital to the MG segment  MG, is set such,
that the optimal bond matches the average observed leverage ratio of a BBB rated company as
40The FTSE NAREIT real estate indices exhibit steady long term annual returns of 10% (Source:
http://returns.reit.com/returns/DomesticReturns.pdf, Accessed July 08, 2011.). The numbers in Greer (2000) on
long term returns on commodity indices are in the same order of magnitude.
41For a detailed discussion on the choice of the asset volatilities and the detachment points I refer the reader
to the discussion in chapter 2 in section 2.3.4.1.
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indicated by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008). In the HG segment, the capital supply parameter
 HG is low - only half its MG value - in order to model the high supply to this market segment
and in order to be close to the standard trade o model. In the NIG segment, the capital supply
parameter  NIG has double its MG value in order to model the regulatory and risk-induced
capital constraints in the NIG segment.42
As it was noted earlier, for companies that use bankruptcy remote bonds an additional as-
sumption is necessary, namely regarding their asset portfolio. It is assumed that there exists
two kinds of assets, low risk assets and high risk assets with either a low or a high asset volatil-
ity. Table 3.2 reports the asset volatilities for the individual assets and their correlation. The
asset volatilities correspond to the asset volatilities of a representative HG and NIG company
respectively. Correlation is set to an average value in order to avoid underdiversication.
INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE
3.4.2 How a company forms its capital structure
3.4.2.1 Tranched bond
Figures 3.1 to 3.8 provide numerical applications of the model laid out in section 3.3. Figures 3.1
and 3.2 illustrate the capital structure trade o of a company with a tranched bond and equity
in a segmented corporate bond market using equation 3.13 and the parameters of table 3.1.
Figure 3.1 presents the capital structure trade o of a company with the asset volatility of a
BBB rated company i.e. a company of the MG segment. The rst panel of gure 3.1 presents
the total company value as a function of the leverage ratio for a company with a tranched bond
- this is the solid black line - versus a lower and an upper benchmark. The upper benchmark is
the total company value of a company with the same assets in a frictionless market - this is the
grey dashed line - while the lower benchmark is the total company value of the same company
in a segmented corporate bond market - this is the dashed black line - both with a standard
straight bond outstanding . The second panel of gure 3.1 illustrate the levels of capital supply43
that are assigned to the bonds in a segmented corporate bond market, where the solid black line
is the level of capital supply assigned to the senior tranche, the dashed black line the level of
capital supply assigned to the junior tranche and the gray dashed line is the level of capital
supply assigned to the bond of a company using a straight bond. The third panel of gure 3.1
42In chapter 2 a detailed discussion on the choice for the parameters of aggregated capital supply is provided
with reference to the literature on asset pricing, insurance and production theory.
43The level of capital supply of a bond corresponds to the   that is assigned to a particular bond through  ( : ).
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illustrates the share of total principal outstanding that is promised to the senior tranche. The
fourth panel of gure 3.1 illustrates the value added unlocked through tranching as a percentage
of total company value. The scales on the x-axis of the individual panels of gure 3.1 match each
other. This applies to all illustrations in appendix III to this paper.
INSERT FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE
Without tranching, a company with the asset volatility of a BBB rated company exhibits a
sharp kink in company value visible in the rst panel of gure 3.1. The kink occurs at the point
where the company's bond drops from the MG to the NIG segment at about a leverage ratio of
0:335. As a result of this kink, the company's optimal capital structure is a corner solution.
As it is evident from the rst and fourth panel of gure 3.1, tranching helps to mitigate this
eect of market segmentation: With a tranched bond the company issues the senior tranche
in either the HG or the MG market segment while the junior tranche is issued in the NIG
segment. The kink in company value goes then almost unnoticed and is moved up to a leverage
ratio of approximately 0:3475, which is where the senior tranche drops from the HG to the MG
segment. The additional value unlocked through tranching illustrated in the fourth panel is
strictly positive.
But despite the application of tranching, there remain some eects from market segmentation:
As it becomes evident from the third panel of gure 3.1, if the senior tranche is close to the bound
between the segments, the company reduces the principal of the senior tranche relative to the
junior tranche in order to preserve the level of capital supply of the senior tranche. This implies
that despite tranching, some eects of market segmentation remain. This is consistent with
what is argued in Oldeld (2000), namely that tranching constitutes an imperfect mechanism to
mitigate market segmentation.
Figure 3.2 presents illustrations equivalent in structure to gure 3.1 for a company with the
asset volatility of a B rated company i.e. a company of the NIG segment. Without tranching,
the company is not subject to a kink, as the company's asset quality is low and the company
would have to restrict is leverage too much in order to stay in higher market segments.
INSERT FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE
With tranching however, the company may still mitigate part of the eects of market seg-
mentation by issuing the senior tranche in the MG segment and only the junior tranche in the
NIG segment. This allows the company to unlock additional value and to increase its optimal
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leverage from around 0:23 to 0:27. At this point the magic ends: It is no longer possible for the
company to issue the senior tranche in the MG segment and thus tranching becomes obsolete.
3.4.2.2 Bankruptcy remote bond
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the capital structure trade o of a company that applies bankruptcy
remoteness in a segmented corporate bond market using equation 3.14 and the parameters of
tables 3.1 and 3.2, in a similar fashion as gures 3.1 and 3.2.
As mentioned earlier, with bankruptcy remoteness the company disunites itself. The com-
pany's overall asset volatility in gure 3.3 is the asset volatility of a BBB rated company i.e. a
company of the MG segment similar to gure 3.1. The company has low risk assets and high risk
assets in its asset portfolio with volatilities and correlation as reported in table 3.2. Applying
the equation of footnote 29, this results in a proportion of low risk assets of approximately 19%.
With bankruptcy remoteness the company uses these two asset classes separately to issue two
bankruptcy remote bonds.
INSERT FIGURE 3.3 ABOUT HERE
The second panel of gure 3.3 illustrate the levels of capital supply assigned to the bonds:
The black solid line depicts the level of capital supply assigned to the bond secured with low
risk assets, the black dashed line depicts the level of capital supply assigned to the bond secured
with high risk assets, while the grey dashed line depicts the level of capital supply assigned to
the bond of a company that does not apply bankruptcy remoteness.
The bond secured with low risk assets is always assigned to the HG segment while the bond
secured with high risk assets is always assigned to the NIG segment. As illustrated by the third
panel, the company is actively maintaining this structure as it slowly decreases the share of total
principal outstanding promised to the bond secured with low risk assets as the share of low risk
assets decreases.
The rst and the fourth panel of gure 3.3 illustrate the eect on total company value. As it
is illustrated in the rst panel, the optimal leverage is actually lower with bankruptcy remoteness
than without this technique. Moreover, the value added is not strictly positive under bankruptcy
remoteness and it is especially negative at the point of optimal leverage without bankruptcy
remoteness. Bankruptcy remoteness is therefore a technique not suited for companies of the MG
segment as an MG company does not need to establish access to investment grade funding.
Figure 3.4 presents illustrations equivalent to gure 3.3 for a company with the overall asset
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volatility of a B rated company. Given the parameters in table 3.2, this results in a proportion
of low risk assets of approximately 4%. Similar to gure 3.3, the company uses the low risk
assets to create a bond that is issued in the HG segment, while the remaining debt is secured
with high risk assets and is issued in the NIG segment. This is illustrated in the second panel.
As depicted in the fourth panel, the additional value unlocked is strictly positive over the entire
grid and increases with increasing leverage for a company with the overall asset volatility of a B
rated company.
INSERT FIGURE 3.4 ABOUT HERE
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate that bankruptcy remoteness may be a tool to mitigate the eects
of market segmentation, but not for all companies but only for companies with a high overall
asset volatility. This is because for companies of the HG and MG segment that already have
access to high market segments, the decrease in value through the bond that is secured purely
with high risk assets is not oset by the increase in value through the bond that is secured purely
with low risk assets.
For a company of the NIG segment that would issued a bond in the NIG segment with-
out bankruptcy remoteness, the increase in value osets the decrease. This is consistent with
Schwarcz (1994) where it is argued that bankruptcy remoteness is a tool to access higher market
segment.
3.4.3 Optimal capital structure
3.4.3.1 Tranched bond
Figure 3.5 presents the path of total company value with optimal leverage of a company that
applies tranching. The rst panel of gure 3.5 presents the actual path, where the solid black
line is the path of total company value for a company in a segmented bond market, that applies
tranching, the dashed black line is the path of total company value for a company in a segmented
bond market, that does not apply tranching and the path of total company value for a company
in a frictionless market is depicted by the grey dashed line. The second panel depicts the levels
of capital supply, where the solid black line depicts the level of capital supply assigned to the
optimal senior tranche, the dashed black line the level of capital supply assigned to the optimal
junior tranche and the dashed gray line the level of capital supply assigned to the optimal bond
of a company, that does not apply tranching. The third panel illustrates the fraction of total
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principal outstanding, that the company that applies tranching optimally promises to the senior
tranche, while the fourth panel illustrates the additional value unlocked through tranching.
INSERT FIGURE 3.5 ABOUT HERE
As depicted in the rst panel for gure 3.5, the total company value is strictly higher, if a
company applies tranching. The path of the company that applies tranching has a kink at the
point, where the senior tranche changes from the HG to the MG segment. As depicted in the
third panel, a company that has an asset volatility close to the kink has an incentive to locally
constrain the fraction of relative principal outstanding assigned to the senior tranche in order
to keep the senior tranche in the HG segment. A similar incentive is active, if the company has
a very high asset volatility, in this case the company reduces the relative fraction of the senior
tranche in order to keep the senior tranche in the MG segment.
The graph of value unlocked through tranching in the fourth panel has a few interesting
kinks and turning points: The rst kink occurs, where the optimal bond of a company without
tranching changes from the HG to the NIG segment. Prior to this kink there is a short range of
steep increase. This is because prior to the segmentation bound, the company without tranching
has an incentive to constrain its leverage in order to keep its straight bond in the HG segment.
There is a downward kink at about an asset volatility of 0:235, which occurs at the point, where
the senior tranche changes the segment. After that there is another range of steep increase in
value unlocked, which occurs, because the company that does not apply tranching constrains its
leverage in order to keep its straight bond in the MG segment. The turning point occurs at the
point, where the company that does not apply tranching changes to the NIG segment. At the
end the value unlocked by tranching remains positive, but decreases with asset volatility.
The general trend of the graph in the fourth panel of gure 3.5, that the value unlocked
through tranching is higher for companies with high annual asset volatility, is consistent with
the empirical evidence in both Maskara (2010) and Rauh and Su (2010). The evidence in
Maskara (2010) suggests, that borrowers with low credit quality are more likely to issue tranched
bonds and that the benets of tranching accrue primarily to borrowers with low credit quality.
Also the stylized facts in Rauh and Su (2010) suggests, that borrowers with low credit quality
are more likely to have a capital structure with multiple debt layers. The results in the fourth
panel of gure 3.5 provide an economic rationale for these empirical ndings.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the equilibrium paths of optimal leverage. The rst panel of gure 3.6
depicts the paths of optimal leverage given the level of annual asset volatility. The solid black
line illustrates the optimal leverage path of a company that applies tranching, the dashed black
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line the path of a company, that does not apply tranching and the dashed grey line the path of
a company in a frictionless market. The second panel of gure 3.6 depicts the levels of capital
supply equivalent to the second panel of gure 3.5. The third panel depicts the dierence in
optimal leverage between a company that applies tranching and a company that does not apply
tranching. The fourth panel of gure 3.6 depicts the annual volatilities of the optimal tranches of
a tranched bond and the annual volatility of the optimal bond of a company, that does not apply
tranching. The dashed black line depicts the annual volatility of the optimal senior tranche,
the solid black line depicts the annual volatility of the optimal junior tranche and the dashed
gray line depicts the annual volatility of the optimal bond of a company that does not apply
tranching.
INSERT FIGURE 3.6 ABOUT HERE
As depicted in the rst and the third panel of gure 3.6, a company that applies tranching has
higher optimal leverage than a company that does not apply tranching. Tranching is therefore
a technique to mitigate market segmentation.
But as already recognized in section 3.4.2.1, it is not a perfect technique. A company that
applies tranching is still subject to some eects of market segmentation: Prior to the level of asset
volatility where the senior tranche drops to the MG segment, there is an area where leverage
decreases steeply because the company rations its overall leverage in order to preserve the level
of capital supply of the senior tranche. After the senior tranche has dropped to the MG segment,
overall leverage recovers somewhat, but again falls steeply at a leverage ratio of approximately
0:25 in order to preserve the level of capital supply of the senior tranche. The drop of the junior
tranche from the MG to the NIG segment however, goes almost unnoticed.
This discussion is emphasized by the fourth panel of gure 3.6. Remember that market
segmentation is risk-induced, based on a collection of volatility detachment points. When the
volatility of an optimal tranche or optimal bond is close to a detachment point, a company has
- with and without tranching - an incentive to reduce the principal of the respective tranche or
bond in order to preserve the level of capital supply of the respective tranche or bond.
This is exactly what happens in the rst and fourth panel of gure 3.6: The annual volatility
of the senior tranche is rising with the asset volatility. However, a company close to the segmen-
tation bound reduces the principal of the senior tranche in order to keep the senior tranche's
annual volatility below the HG=MG detachment point. This perserves the segment assignement
of the senior tranche to the HG segment and it is what creates the rst at part of the respective
graph. Towards the higher end of the asset volatility scale this eect is repeated: A company
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is again reducing the principal of the senior tranche in order to preserve the senior tranche's
assignement - this time to the MG segment.
The graph of the annual volatility of the junior tranche is at at the beginning in order to
keep the senior and the junior tranche in separate segments. After this at part the annual
volatility of the junior tranche is gradually increased until the area, where companies have an
incentive to preserve the annual volatility of the senior tranche. In this area the volatility of
the junior tranche is steeply increased until the senior tranche drops to the MG segment. After
the senior tranche has changed the segment, the volatility of the junior tranche again gradually
increases followed by a subsequent decline. The decline is the result of a gradual decrease in
overall leverage.
The incentive to constrain leverage in order to preserve the level of capital supply of a tranche
or bond holds for companies with and without tranching if they are close to the segmentation
bounds. This was already discussed in chapter 2 and leads to apparently underleverage compa-
nies.
But as depicted in the third panel of gure 3.6, these incentives to constrain leverage induced
by market segmentation are weakened through tranching. Tranching mitigates these leverage
constrains especially well for a company that is around the bound to the NIG segment. This is
consistent with the empirical evidence in Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) - especially gure 5 of
the respective paper - which shows that the collaterals in CLOs issued in the period 2000  2007
are similarly concentrated around the boundary between the MG and the NIG segment.
The observation of higher optimal leverage for companies that apply tranching implies, that
these companies enjoy lower costs of funding. This is exactly what is implied by the empirical
evidence in Nadauld and Weisbach (2012), namely that structured nance implies lower rates
of funding for the applying companies. The respective paper leaves the question open what the
sources of these observations were and whether it is rational. The model in this paper rationalizes
this nding, arguing that structured nance partly mitigates risk-induced market segmentation.
3.4.3.2 Bankruptcy remote bonds
Figure 3.7 presents the equilibrium path of total company value with optimal leverage of a
company that applies bankruptcy remoteness. The rst panel of gure 3.7 presents the actual
path, where the solid black line is the path of total company value for a company in a segmented
bond market that applies bankruptcy remoteness, the black dashed line is the path of total
company value for a company in a segmented bond market that does not apply bankruptcy
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remoteness, while the path of total company value for a company in a frictionless market is
depicted by the grey dashed line. The second panel depicts the levels of capital supply, where
the solid black line depicts the level of capital supply of the bond secured with low risk assets,
the dashed black line the level of capital supply of the bond secured with high risk assets and
the dashed gray line the level of capital supply of the optimal bond of a company that does not
apply bankruptcy remoteness. The third panel depicts the relative fraction of low risk assets
in the company's asset portfolio given the annual overall target asset volatility on the x-axis
and the gures from table 3.2. The fourth panel depicts the relative fraction of overall principal
outstanding that is promised to the bond secured with low risk assets. The dashed black line in
the fth panel depicts the value added unlocked through bankruptcy remoteness, while the gray
dashed line in the same panel indicates zero.
INSERT FIGURE 3.7 ABOUT HERE
What stands out at rst is that the separation of assets through bankruptcy remoteness cleans
up the discontinuities in the equilibrium path of total company value. This is because over the
grid of annual overall asset volatility, it is the proportion of low risk assets in the company's
asset portfolio that varies, but not the risk of the components of that portfolio i.e. of the low
risk and high risk assets. This implies that the mitigation of the discontinuities is conditional
on the assumption, that companies have heterogenous asset portfolios. If this is not the case
i.e. if a company with a high overall annual asset volatility has a homogenous asset portfolio,
bankruptcy remoteness would obviously be a neutral technique.
The rst and the fth panel of gure 3.7 reveal, that bankruptcy remoteness does not unlock
positive value added for all companies, but only for companies with high asset volatility. Only
in the area, where the annual overall asset volatility is high enough such that a company that
does not apply bankruptcy remoteness either rations its leverage in order to preserve its optimal
bond's level of capital supply or is already issuing its bond in the NIG segment, only there has
bankruptcy remoteness the power to unlock additional value.
This is consistent with what is suggested by Schwarcz (1994), namely that for a company with
a heterogenous asset portfolio, bankruptcy remoteness is a technique to access higher market
segments by exploiting their high quality assets. It is further consistent with the empirical
evidence in Ayotte and Gaon (2010). In that paper the authors show that bankruptcy remoteness
is an explanatory factor for funding rates.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the equilibrium path of optimal leverage for a company that applies
bankruptcy remoteness. The rst panel depicts the equilibrium paths, where the solid black line
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is the equilibrium path of a company that applies bankruptcy remoteness, the dashed black line
the equilibrium path of a company that does not apply bankruptcy remoteness and the dashed
grey line is the equilibrium path of a company in a frictionless market. The second, the third
and the fourth panel in gure 3.8 are equivalent to the second, the third and the fourth panel in
gure 3.7 and depict the levels of capital supply of the bonds, the proportion of low risk assets
in the company's asset portfolio and the relative fraction of overall principal outstanding, that
is promised to the bond secured with low risk assets. The fth panel depicts the additional
leverage unlocked through to the application of bankruptcy remoteness. The dashed black graph
illustrates the actual dierence, while the solid black spike indicates the zero.
INSERT FIGURE 3.8 ABOUT HERE
The situation with respect to optimal leverage is similar to gure 3.7: Leveraging the assets
separately allows a company with a heterogenous asset portfolio to mitigate potential kinks in
the equilibrium path of optimal leverage. This implies that it mitigates market segmentation
as well as the potential incentive to constrain leverage in order to preserve the level of capital
supply.
The application of bankruptcy remoteness unlocks additional leverage capacity for a company
that would otherwise constrain its leverage in order to preserve its level of capital supply or
for companies that would otherwise have to issue their optimal bond in the NIG segment.
This again emphasizes what is argued in Schwarcz (1994) and Ayotte and Gaon (2010), that
bankruptcy remoteness is an explanatory factor for the funding rates of companies that engage
in securitization.
3.5 Structured nance and the late-2000s nancial crisis:
A case for CLOs
In the above section it was shown that if a form of risk-induced market segmentation prevails on
the corporate bond market, then the primary techniques of structured nance, namely tranching
and bankruptcy remoteness, allow a company to improve its capital structure and adjust it more
accurately to the segmented bond market. It was further shown that this improvement implies,
that a company may increase its value, but also decreases its cost of capital and thus increases
its optimal leverage.
This is anecdotally consistent with what is argued in Shivdasani and Wang (2011) as well as
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in Nadauld and Weisbach (2012). They argue that the boom of structured nance prior to the
late-2000s nancial crisis fueled a wave of corporate lending through CLOs. However, structured
nance was often mentioned as a trigger for the late-2000s nancial crisis. Because of this it
shall be surveyed in the following, whether structured lending and especially corporate lending
through CLOs had a causal eect on the crisis and how the CLOs performed subsequently.
The literature generally agrees, that during the years prior to the crisis there was a decline
in credit quality and thus an overinvestment into the subprime segment of RRE CDOs.44 This
evolution was revealed through the construction of the ABX.HE index, an index for subprime
RRE CDOs.45
However, there is less agreement on whether there was a similar overinvestment into other
segments of the market for structured securities. The evidence in the CDX46 market is mixed:
Coval et al. (2009) suggested that the senior CDX tranches were misspriced prior to the crisis,
while Collin-Dufresne et al. (2010) takes the opposite position. Nadauld and Weisbach (2012)
conclude that the application of structured nance implied lower rates of funding but leave the
question open whether this was rational or not. The empirical evidence in Shivdasani and Wang
(2011) as well as in Benmelech et al. (2012) nds no evidence for the argument that CLO lending
led to a decline in credit quality similar as in subprime RRE CDO lending. This is reenforced
by the evidence in Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), which presents that, although there were
downgrades of mezzanine tranches of CLOs, they were far less severe than the downgrades on
mortgage related CDOs and that there were hardly downgrades of senior CLO tranches.
The above empirical evidence suggests that CLO lending was - as opposed to subprime RRE
CDO lending - not a channel of overlending and thus overinvestment. However, the rationale of
this high CLO lending prior to the crisis is still disputed. The rationale that this paper provides
is, that structured nance allows companies to adjust their capital structure more accurately to
the segmented bond market. This leads to additional lending with corresponding value creation.
This stands in contrast to subprime lending, which was to some part clearly an overinvestment.
Thus structured nance for corporation should - despite the nancial crisis - be seen as an
important tool to adjust corporate capital structures to segmented markets rather than the
trigger of the nancial crisis.
44See for example Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) for an empirical study.
45See Gorton (2009) for a comprehensive analysis of this story.
46CDX is a family of indices of corporate credit default swaps oered by Markit.
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3.6 Conclusion
Despite the substantial volume of corporate capital market instruments involving the techniques
of structured nance, the techniques of structured nance have not been understood well. With-
out proposing an economic foundation, some contributions have put forward segmentation in
funding market as a rationale for structured nance.
This paper contributes to the literature on capital structure and structured nance by pro-
viding an economic foundation for the argument, that segmentation in the corporate funding
market is the driver for the application of the techniques of structured nance. In a generalized
trade o model for capital structure that incorporates a segmented corporate bond market, it is
shown how the application of tranching and bankruptcy remoteness improve a corporate capital
structure.
Specically, tranching allows a company to adjust its capital structure more accurately to
the segmented funding market as it allows the company to access multiple market segments.
Although tranching reduces the impact of market segmentation, tranching is only an imperfect
mechanism to mitigate market segmentation, as the tranches remain subject to market segmen-
tation. If a tranche of a tranched bond is close to a segmentation bound, the company is still
exposed to potential discontinuities in the capital structure trade o. Through the improvement
of the capital structure, tranching allows companies to unlock additional value and reduce its
cost of capital. This in turn allows for higher optimal leverage. Tranching improves the capital
structure for all corporate risk levels, but consistent with empirical evidence, it is particularly
powerful for low credit quality companies.
Bankruptcy remoteness also allows a company to adjust its capital structure more accurately
to the segmented funding market as it allows the company to concentrate its collaterals according
to quality. This is consistent with empirical evidence that documents, that bankruptcy remote-
ness is an explanatory factor for cost of capital. However, bankruptcy remoteness only unlocks
additional value for companies with low credit quality, that would not have access to higher
market segments, if they simply rely on a straight bond. For companies that already have access
to high market segments, bankruptcy remoteness is not value creating within the context of a
segmented funding market. In the area where bankruptcy remoteness is value creating, it also
reduces the companies cost of capital and thus implies higher optimal leverage. It is particu-
larly powerful at the boundary between investment grade and non-investment grade funding i.e.
between the MG and the NIG segment. This is the area, where a company would - without
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bankruptcy remoteness - have an incentive to constrain its leverage in order to maintain its level
of capital supply.
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Appendix
I Moments for corporate securities
Let X  N (X ; X). Denote the associated density function by  (x;X ; X) and the associated
cumulative distribution function by (x;X ; X). The standard normal density function and
distribution function are denoted by  (x) and (x). The following denitions follow fromWinkler
et al. (1972) equation 2:6 and the subsequent lines on page 292:
G (a; b; X ; X) 
Z b
a
x (x;; ) dx = X



b  X
X

  

a  X
X

 
X



b  X
X

  

a  X
X

(3.15)
V (a; b; X ; X) 
Z b
a
x2 (x;; ) dx =

2X + 
2
X



b  X
X

  

a  X
X

+
X (X + a)

a  X
X

  X (X + b)

b  X
X

(3.16)
i Straight bond and equity
The moments for a T -period straight bond and the associated residual equity claim with payos
as in equations 3.1 and 3.2, are derived in chapter 2, equations 2.18, 2.21 and 2.22. The expected
value of the straight bond reads
B =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
((1     )G (0; XDB ; X ; X) + P (1  (XDB ;X ; X))) (3.17)
the volatility of the straight bond reads
2B =
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
(1     )2V (0; XDB ; X ; X) + P 2 (1  (XDB ;X ; X))  2B

(3.18)
and the expected value of the residual equity claim reads
EB =
 
1
1 + rTf
! 
(1  )G (XDB ;1; X ; X) +
 
(   1)P   qB

(1  (XDB ;X ; X))

(3.19)
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where G( : ) is dened as in equation 3.15, V ( : ) as in equation 3.16 and XDB as in equation
3.3.
ii Tranched bond and equity
a Senior tranche
The payo of a T -period senior tranche is given by equation 3.4. This payo is equivalent to the
payo of a straight bond only that XDB is exchanged for the bound, where the senior tranche is
served XSS . By relying on equations 3.17 and 3.18 the expected discounted value of the senior
tranche reads
ST =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
((1     )G (0;XSS ; X ; X) + PST (1  (XSS ;X ; X))) (3.20)
while the expected discounted variance reads
2ST =
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
(1     )2V (0; XSS ; X ; X) + P 2ST (1  (XSS ;X ; X))  2ST

(3.21)
where XSS is dened as in equation 3.8.
b Junior tranche
The payo of a T -period junior tranche is given by equation 3.5. The expected discounted value
of the junior tranche is then given by
JT =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
E [JT (X)] =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
(1     )
Z XDT
XSS
x (x;X ; X) dx
 
1
1 + rTf
! 
 
Z XDT
XSS
PST (x;X ; X) dx+
Z 1
XDT
PJT (x;X ; X) dx
!
Applying equation 3.15 yields
JT =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
((1     )G (XSS ; XDT ; X ; X))
 PST ( (XDT ; X ; X)  (XSS ; X ; X)) +
 
1
1 + rTf
!
(1  (XDT ; X ; X)) (3.22)
The junior tranche's discounted variance is given by
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JT =
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
E
h
(JT (X))
2
i
  (E [JT (X)])2

=
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
E
h
(JT (X))
2
i
  2JT

All terms of the above dierence are known except for the rst one. Applying the denition
of the expected value operator yields
E
h
(JT (X))
2
i
=
Z XDT
XSS

(1     )2x2   2(1     )xPST + P 2ST

 (x;X ; X) dx
+P 2JT
Z 1
XDT
 (x;X ; X) dx
Using equations 3.15 as well as 3.16 and relying on the above auxiliary equation yields
JT =
 
1
1 + rTf
!2
((1    )V (XSS ;XDT ; X ; X)  2(1    )PSTG(XSS ; XDT ; X ; X))
+
 
1
1 + rTf
!2 
P 2JT ( (XDT ; X ; X)  (XSS ; X ; X)) + PJT (1  (XDT ; X ; X))

(3.23)
c Equity
The payo of the residual equity claim of a company with a tranched bond outstanding is given
by equation 3.6. The expected discounted value of this claim is given by
ET =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
E [ET (X)] =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
(1  )
Z 1
XDT
x (x;X ; X) dx
+
 
1
1 + rTf
!
((   1)(PST + PJT )   (qST + qJT ))
Z 1
XDT
 (x;X ; X) dx
Using equation 3.15, ET is expressed as
ET =
 
1
1 + rTf
!
(1  )G(XDT ;1; X ; X)
+
 
1
1 + rTf
!
((   1)(PST + PJT )   (qST + qJT )) (1  (XDT ;1; X ; X)) (3.24)
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iii Annualized and discounted volatility of a bond's expected returns
The gross return of the corporate bond B, RB , can be expressed as RB =
B
qB
, where B denotes
the security's t = T expected value and qB denotes the security's t = 0 equilibrium price. The
annualized and discounted volatility of a bond's expected return, B , is then expressed as
B =
s
2RB
T
=
1p
T
q
2Bq 
qB
2 = 1pT
r
E
h 
B
 
XT
2i   E B  XT 2
qB
(3.25)
where 2RB denotes the discounted variance of a bond's expected return, B the bond's payo
47
and 2B is the bond's variance.
47This could be either equation 3.1, 3.4 or 3.5.
152
II
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
p
a
ra
m
e
te
rs
fo
r
th
e
m
o
d
e
l
in
se
ct
io
n
3
.3
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
p
a
ra
m
et
er
s
fo
r
th
e
m
o
d
el
in
se
ct
io
n
3
.3
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
P
a
ra
m
et
er
V
a
lu
e
S
o
u
rc
e
R
ea
so
n
B
a
n
k
ru
p
tc
y
co
st
s

0
:2
3
R
ei
ll
y
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
9
)/
L
e-
la
n
d
(2
0
0
7
)
M
a
tc
h
es
h
is
to
ri
ca
l
re
co
v
er
y
ra
te
s
in
tw
o
p
er
io
d
m
o
d
el
s.
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
ta
x
ra
te

0
:2
L
el
a
n
d
(2
0
0
7
)
L
it
er
a
tu
re
av
er
a
g
ea
.
R
is
k
fr
ee
ra
te
p
er
y
ea
r
r f
0
:0
3
F
ed
er
a
l
R
es
er
v
e
B
a
n
k
S
t.
L
o
u
is
b
1
0
y
ea
r
m
ed
ia
n
5
-y
ea
r
tr
ea
su
ry
co
n
st
a
n
t
m
a
-
tu
ri
ty
ra
te
.
T
im
e
to
m
a
tu
ri
ty
T
5
y
ea
rs
B
a
o
a
n
d
P
a
n
(2
0
1
0
)
M
ed
.
co
rp
o
ra
te
d
eb
t
m
a
tu
ri
ty
.
S
iz
e
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
a
n
y
X
0
1
0
0
S
iz
e
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
a
n
y
T
h
e
m
o
d
el
sc
a
le
s
li
n
ea
rl
y.
A
n
.
a
ss
et
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
a
ll
ra
ti
n
g
cl
a
ss
es
r X
0
:1
2
G
re
er
(2
0
0
0
)
L
o
n
g
te
rm
ex
p
ec
te
d
re
tu
rn
o
n
re
a
l
a
ss
et
s
p
ro
x
-
ie
d
b
y
co
m
m
o
d
it
ie
s.
A
n
n
u
a
l
a
ss
et
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
o
f
a
A
A
A
co
m
p
a
n
y
& A
A
A
0
:1
5
C
h
a
p
te
r
2
.
A
n
n
u
a
l
a
ss
et
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
o
f
a
B
B
B
ra
te
d
co
m
p
a
n
y
& B
B
B
0
:2
3
1 2
S
ch
a
ef
er
a
n
d
S
tr
eb
u
la
ev
(2
0
0
8
)
E
st
im
a
te
fo
r
a
A
co
m
p
a
n
y
+

A
n
n
u
a
l
a
ss
et
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
o
f
a
B
ra
te
d
co
m
p
a
n
y
& B
0
:2
7
S
ch
a
ef
er
a
n
d
S
tr
eb
u
la
ev
(2
0
0
8
)
In
fe
rr
ed
fo
rm
ta
b
le
7
.
D
et
a
ch
m
en
t
p
o
in
t
H
G
/
M
G

H
G
=
M
G
0
:0
3
3 8
R
ei
ll
y
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t
(1
9
9
7
)
&
B
a
o
a
n
d
P
a
n
(2
0
1
0
)
B
o
n
d
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
a
n
d
ex
ce
ss
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
D
et
a
ch
m
en
t
p
o
in
t
M
G
/
N
IG

M
G
=
N
I
G
0
:0
4
5
R
ei
ll
y
a
n
d
W
ri
g
h
t
(1
9
9
7
)
&
B
a
o
a
n
d
P
a
n
(2
0
1
0
)
B
o
n
d
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
a
n
d
ex
ce
ss
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
A
g
g
re
g
a
te
d
d
em
a
n
d
fo
r
H
G
ri
sk
y
b
o
n
d
s
 
H
G
1 2
1
0
 
3
C
lo
se
to
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
tr
a
d
e
o

m
o
d
el
.
A
g
g
re
g
a
te
d
d
em
a
n
d
fo
r
M
G
ri
sk
y
b
o
n
d
s
 
H
G
10
 
3
S
ch
a
ef
er
a
n
d
S
tr
eb
u
la
ev
(2
0
0
8
)
M
a
tc
h
es
th
e
le
v
er
a
g
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
a
B
B
B
ra
te
d
co
m
p
a
n
y.
A
g
g
re
g
a
te
d
d
em
a
n
d
fo
r
N
IG
ri
sk
y
b
o
n
d
s
 
H
G
2
1
0
 
3
H
ig
h
in
o
rd
er
to
m
o
d
el
ca
p
it
a
l
co
n
st
ra
in
s.
a
T
h
er
e
is
n
o
t
m
u
ch
a
g
re
em
en
t
o
n
w
h
a
t
th
e
e
ec
ti
v
e
ta
x
ra
te
a
ct
u
a
ll
y
is
.
S
o
m
e
cl
a
ss
ic
a
l
p
a
p
er
s
su
ch
a
s
L
el
a
n
d
(1
9
9
4
)
u
se
th
e
st
a
tu
to
ry
ra
te
w
h
ic
h
is
0
:3
5
(S
ee
2
6
U
n
it
ed
S
ta
te
s
C
o
d
e
x1
1
(b
)(
1
)
(2
0
1
1
))
.
M
o
re
re
ce
n
t
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
o
n
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l
m
o
d
el
s
su
ch
a
s
A
rn
o
ld
et
a
l.
(2
0
1
2
)
tr
ea
t
0
:1
5
a
s
a
st
a
n
d
a
rd
.
N
ic
o
d
a
m
e
(2
0
0
1
)
es
ti
m
a
te
d
th
e
e
ec
ti
v
e
co
rp
o
ra
te
ta
x
ra
te
a
t
a
b
o
u
t
0
:2
fo
r
th
e
U
n
it
ed
S
ta
te
s.
T
h
e
es
ti
m
a
te
o
f
M
a
rk
le
a
n
d
S
h
a
ck
el
fo
rd
(2
0
1
2
)
li
es
in
th
e
sa
m
e
o
rd
er
o
f
m
a
g
n
it
u
d
e.
T
h
is
p
a
p
er
s
fo
ll
o
w
s
th
is
es
ti
m
a
te
.
T
h
is
is
in
li
n
e
w
it
h
L
el
a
n
d
(1
9
9
8
)
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
L
el
a
n
d
(2
0
0
7
).
b
h
tt
p
:/
/
re
se
a
rc
h
.s
tl
o
u
is
fe
d
.o
rg
/
fr
ed
2
/
se
ri
es
/
W
G
S
5
Y
R
?
ci
d
=
1
1
5
,
A
cc
es
se
d
J
u
ly
0
8
,
2
0
1
1
.
T
ab
le
3.
1:
V
al
u
es
fo
r
p
ar
am
et
er
s
of
th
e
m
o
d
el
in
se
ct
io
n
3.
3.
153
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
o
n
co
rp
o
ra
te
a
ss
et
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
s
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
P
a
ra
m
et
er
V
a
lu
e
S
o
u
rc
e
R
ea
so
n
A
n
n
u
a
l
a
ss
et
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
o
f
lo
w
ri
sk
a
ss
et
s
& L
R
A
0
:1
5
C
h
a
p
te
r
2
L
ow
in
o
rd
er
to
m
o
d
el
h
ig
h
q
u
a
li
ty
a
ss
et
s
A
n
n
u
a
l
a
ss
et
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
o
f
h
ig
h
ri
sk
a
ss
et
s
& H
R
A
0
:2
8
S
ch
a
ef
er
a
n
d
S
tr
eb
u
la
ev
(2
0
0
8
)
A
ss
et
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
o
f
N
IG
co
m
p
a
n
ie
s
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
b
et
w
ee
n
lo
w
a
n
d
h
ig
h
ri
sk
a
ss
et
s

L
R
A
=
H
R
A
0
:2
5
L
el
a
n
d
(2
0
0
7
)
e
co
n
-
tr
a
ri
o
A
v
er
a
g
e
va
lu
e
T
ab
le
3
.2
:
A
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
on
s
on
th
e
as
se
t
p
or
tf
ol
io
of
a
co
m
p
an
y
th
a
t
is
su
es
b
an
k
ru
p
tc
y
re
m
o
te
b
on
d
s.
154
III Illustrations
i Illustrations on capital structure trade os
a Tranched bond
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Figure 3.1: The capital structure trade o of a company with the asset volatility of a BBB rated
company that applies tranching. The rst panel depicts the capital structure trade o versus
two benchmarks, the second panel depicts the associated supply levels, the third panel depicts
the fraction of total principal outstanding that the company that applies tranching promises to
the senior tranche and the fourth panel depicts the value unlocked through the application of
tranching.
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Figure 3.2: The capital structure trade o of a company with the asset volatility of a B rated
company that applies tranching. The rst panel depicts the capital structure trade o versus
two benchmarks, the second panel depicts the associated supply levels, the third panel depicts
the fraction of total principal outstanding that the company that applies tranching promises to
the senior tranche and the fourth panel depicts the value unlocked through the application of
tranching.
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b Bankruptcy remote bond
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Figure 3.3: The capital structure trade o of a company with the asset volatility of a BBB rated
company that applies bankruptcy remoteness. The rst panel depicts the capital structure trade
o versus two benchmarks, the second panel depicts the associated supply levels, the third panel
depicts the fraction of total principal outstanding that the company that applies bankruptcy
remoteness promises to the bond secured with low risk assets and the fourth panel depicts the
value unlocked through the application of bankruptcy remoteness.
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Figure 3.4: The capital structure trade o of a company with the asset volatility of a B rated
company that applies bankruptcy remoteness. The rst panel depicts the capital structure trade
o versus two benchmarks, the second panel depicts the associated supply levels, the third panel
depicts the fraction of total principal outstanding that the company that applies bankruptcy
remoteness promises to the bond secured with low risk assets and the fourth panel depicts the
value unlocked through the application of bankruptcy remoteness.
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ii Illustrations on optimal capital structure
a Tranched bond
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Figure 3.5: Optimal capital structure with a tranched bond. The rst panel depicts the path of
total company value with optimal tranching versus two benchmarks, the second panel depicts
the associated supply levels, the third panel depicts the fraction of total principal outstanding
that the company that applies tranching promises to the senior tranche and the fourth panel
depicts the value unlocked through the application of optimal tranching.
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Figure 3.6: Optimal leverage with a tranched bond. The rst panel depicts the equilibrium
path of optimal leverage with tranching versus two benchmarks, the second panel depicts the
associated supply levels, the third panel depicts the dierence in optimal leverage between a
company that applies tranching and a company that does not apply tranching, while the fourth
panel depicts the annual volatilities of the optimal senior tranche, the optimal junior tranche
and the optimal bond of a company that does not apply tranching.
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Figure 3.7: Optimal capital structure with bankruptcy remote bonds. The rst panel depicts
the path of total company value with bankruptcy remoteness versus two benchmarks, the second
panel depicts the associated supply levels, the third panel depicts the fraction of low risk assets in
the company's asset portfolio, the fourth panel depicts the fraction of total principal outstanding
that the company that applies bankruptcy remoteness promises to the bond secured with low
risk assets and the fth panel depicts the value unlocked through the application of bankruptcy
remoteness.
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Figure 3.8: Optimal leverage with bankruptcy remote bonds. The rst panel depicts the equilib-
rium path of optimal leverage with bankruptcy remoteness versus two benchmarks, the second
panel depicts the associated supply levels, the third panel depicts the fraction of low risk assets in
the company's asset portfolio, the fourth panel depicts the fraction of total principal outstanding
that the company that applies bankruptcy remoteness promises to the bond secured with low
risk assets, while the fth panel depicts the dierence in optimal leverage between a company
that applies bankruptcy remoteness and a company that does not apply bankruptcy remoteness.
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